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THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
HYDE PARK CITY 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs 
JERALD RIO DAVIS 
Defendant /Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Priority No. 2 
Case No.20080055-CA 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
1. Defendant/Appellant was charged in the Justice Court for Hyde Park City 
before a Justice court judge sitting in that court with some legal training but which 
justice was neither a law school graduate nor a member of any state or federal bar. The 
Defendant/Appellant, prior to trial in the Justice Court, filed Motions to Dismiss (See 
Appendix A) thereby challenging the constitutionality and sufficiency of the city 
ordinances under which Defendant/Appellant was charged and sentenced as well as the 
legislative enactments enabling the creation and operation of the Justice court system. 
2. The Defendant/Appellant suffered an adverse ruling by the sitting Justice 
and was thereafter tried, convicted and sentenced by said Justice Court Judge (See 
Appendix B). Defendant/Appellant appealed the conviction and Sentence to the First 
District court for Cache County (See Appendix C) and particularly specifying therein that 
1 
an illegal sentence had been imposed in light of Utah Law in addition to the other matters 
addressed in the Motions presented at the Justice Court level. 
3. The case was heard denovo in the District Court for Cache County and 
Defendant/Appellant suffered adverse rulings on all motions to dismiss filed therewith 
(See Appendix D), each filed anew in connection with the denovo proceeding 
(practically identical to those filed in the Justice Court). Each Motion addressed 
Constitutional issues and in fact challenged the constitutionality of one or more statutes 
or ordinances. 
4. Defendant/Appellant was convicted by the District Court after a Bench 
Trial on the 19th day of September, 2007 and at that time Judgment and Sentence were 
orally imposed by the Trial Court. (See Transcript as Appendix E). The Minutes, 
Sentence, Judgment, Commitment and Notice was signed and filed by the Court on the 
28th day of September, 2007 (See Appendix F). A Notice of Appeal was filed by the 
Defendant/Appellant on the 15 th day of October, 2007 (See Appendix G). This Appeal is 
taken from a criminal judgment pursuant to the provisions of Rule 26 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l, (1953 as Amended). 
Jurisdiction of this Court is established pursuant to provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(e), (1953 as Amended). 
5. The clerk of the Trial Court refrained from transmitting the file to the Court 
of Appeals, which Appeal Defendant had filed on 15 October 2007, even after the 
2 
Designation of Record was filed on November 30, 2007 (See Appendix H). On the 16 th 
day of January, 2008 the file was belatedly transmitted to the Utah Court of Appeals after 
two evidentiary hearings addressing a disputed contempt citation had transpired. The 
Trial Court, at each hearing, had granted Defendant/Appellant additional time to 
complete an ordered cleanup; the last review on the ordered clean up was scheduled for 
the 1st day of July, 2008 and was heard on that date, no further hearings are now 
scheduled. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
6. The Standard of Review on Appeal concerning the challenge to the Trial 
Court's interpretation as to the constitutionality of the questioned ordinance, the legality 
of the sentence, and the constitutionality of the Statutes creating Justice courts is as to the 
correctness of the trial courts ruling without deference to the trial Judges findings. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Are the Plaintiff/Appellee City's nuisance ordinances repugnant to 
and in conflict with the laws of the State of Utah and not in accord 
with the doctrine announced in ALLGOOD v. LARSON (Supra). 
II Are the nuisance Ordinances of Plaintiff/ Appellee and the various 
Statutes of the State of Utah addressing nuisance constitutional or 
should said statutes be declared void-for-vagueness because the 
statutes do not adequately define what is a nuisance nor do they 
provide adequate guidelines for the enforcement of said statutes. 
III. Is the penalty ordinance No. 10-359 of the Plaintiff/ Appellee 
enforceable on its face as imposed upon Defendant/ Appellant? 
IV. The Statutory scheme for Justice Courts interferes with Judicial 
3 
independence by providing monetary incentives to convict criminal 
defendants and by authorizing the administrative arm of municipal 
government to hire and fire judges and to control court operations. 
V. Did the Trial Court both at the Justice Court level and at the District 
level abuse their respective discretions and exceed the Maximum 
sentence as allowed by State Law thereby denying Due Process as 
guaranteed by the Utah Constitution and by the United States 
Constitution. 
VI. Did the District Court rule by its ruling appropriately dispose of the 
issues as to constitutionality of a statute or ordinance when it denied 
the Defendant/Appellant's motion to dismiss and the motion to quash 
the justice court conviction. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES FOR APPEAL 
7. The issues presented in the de novo prosecution were adequately preserved 
at the Justice Court level and subsequently in the District Court by Motion to Dismiss 
supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities dated 12th April, 2007 filed 
addressing the violation of the Defendant's right to due process of law, equal protection 
under the laws and right to uniform operation of the law, in that the Statute UCA 10-8-60 
defining what constitutes a Nuisance is relegated to each city and town and violates the 
Doctrine of Separation of powers as mandated by Article VIII Section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution and other constitutional provisions and that the very existence of the Justice 
Court constitutes a violation of Article VIII Section 4 of the Utah Constitution and 
thereby may not presume jurisdiction to decide criminal cases or controversies and by 
Objection to the Order entered on Motion to Dismiss And To Quash Conviction as filed 
on the 21st August, 2007 (See Appendix J) and on the Objection to Oral Verdict, 
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Judgement and Sentence filed on the 9 October, 2007 (See Appendix K). 
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
8. This action was originally filed in the Justice Court of Hyde Park City and 
was, after proceedings in that court, appealed to the District Court for Cache County. 
This Appeal is taken from a final Judgment and Sentence entered in the First District 
Court for Cache County, State of Utah on the 19 day of September, 2007 and signed by 
the District Judge on the 28 day of September, 2007 convicting Defendant of a purported 
violation of Hyde Park City Ordinance 10-332 thereby adjudging Defendant guilty of 1 
Count of Maintaining a Nuisance, an infraction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
9. Ira B. (Friday) Davis, the father of Defendant Jerald Rio Davis was a long 
time resident of Hyde Park City, owning lands located at 187 East 200 North in that 
city consisting of 1.07 acres upon which stood a home and shop which housed the 
business which was licensed pursuant to the laws of said municipality and operated as Ira 
B. Davis Body and Fender, apparently a de facto Proprietorship. 
9 
10. During the lifetime of Ira B. Davis, the minutes of the Hyde Park City 
Council (examined from 1970 to present), no discussion concerning said lands is noted 
other than one instance regarding placement of a "Trailer House" which had been moved 
onto the property, there was a brief discussion but no formal action was taken at that time 
and no further discussion regarding this topic or of any other issue was addressed until 
the end of 1979. (A mobile home is still situated on the property and is rented to tenants 
which tenants change from time to time.) 
11. Hyde Park City purported to enact Chapter 10-300 through 10-343 which 
agglomeration of ordinances is hereinafter referred to as the "nuisance ordinance." This 
ordinance appears to have been enacted on the 10 th day of January, 1979 and is said to 
have been revised or amended on the 1st day of February, 1979. 
12. The "nuisance ordinance", as adopted by the Plaintiff City, differs 
significantly from the nuisance statutes which have been and are presently enacted by the 
Utah Legislature during all relevant times including the time coextensive with this 
litigation and at the time of the alleged violation. 
13. On August 11, 1998 a letter from Mayor Mark E. Daines to Ira Davis 
advised that the City had received complaints about the "appearance of your property" 
(See Appendix L). 
14. In a letter dated November 9, 1998 from Mayor Mark E. Daines, it is 
observed that, 
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"...We have noticed the removal of some vehicles and very much appreciate 
your willingness to comply with the ordinance and at the same time not 
jeopardize your repair business/' 
15. Ira Davis died on May 18, 2001 and his estate ultimately passed to his son, 
Rio Davis, the Defendant/Appellant who, having previously been employed in the 
business by his father, continued to operate the business under license issued upon 
application of Rio Davis (See Appendix M). No significant alterations to the general 
condition of the subject lands have been made since the demise of Ira Davis except as 
noted hereinbelow. 
16. After taking possession of the property at 187 East 200 North, Hyde Park, 
Utah, Defendant/Appellant commenced a clean up, discarding and/or destroying items 
considered not to be relevant to the continued operation of the business, and has indeed 
removed a considerable amount of personal property from the East side of the tract, 
which portion was then fenced and now serves as an enclosure for horses, apparently a 
permitted use under applicable zoning ordinances. Personal property remains stored in 
the open area behind the shop which houses the Davis repair business as it is now 
operated. Likewise, a barn on the premises is employed as housing for animals as well as 
for storage of machinery and auto parts. 
17. On March 21, 2003 Defendant/Appellant received a letter from Reed A. 
Elder, purporting to represent Hyde Park City (See Appendix N). The letter discusses a 
visit and alluded to goals which were to be accomplished by Defendant/Appellant in 
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order to bring the property into compliance with the existing City ordinances as follows: 
111. Removal of or storage in an onsite garage, ...all non-licensed vehicles and 
boats. 
2. All miscellaneous materials that you [emphasis mine] have no useful purpose 
for and all debris must be removed from the property. This includes, but is not limited to 
automotive motor parts, brick and masonry materials, lumber or other wood items, metal 
barrels and all other items of furniture, machinery and building materials. 
3. All material and machinery which you [emphasis mine] want to keep and store 
on the property must be stored inside a closed structure or within an additional fenced 
area inside the property which creates a visual barrier to the other properties surrounding 
your property. The materials to be used and the location of placement of such a fence 
would need to be approved by the City. 
4. The property on which there is presently a trailer home located (northeast 
corner) must be separated from the balance of your property to establish its own lot and 
utilities. This will need to follow existing ordinances which the City will help you with. 
5. This all must be accomplished within 120 days of this letter or the City may 
have to take actions to have the work done, which will result in a charge to you for the 
cost." 
The letter goes on to request a signature from Defendant/Appellant which signature was 
never provided. 
18. On or about the 3 rd day of November, 2005 Defendant/Appellant was 
charged with the crime of "Maintaining a Nuisance" in violation of Hyde Park Revised 
Ordinance No. 10-332 with regard to the tract located at 187 East 200 North, Hyde Park, 
Utah and litigation ensued. (See Appendix P). 
19. After denial of written Motions challenging the constitutionality of the 
court and of the ordinance a trial was had on the 28th day of June, 2006 in the Hyde Park 
City Court, whereupon the Defendant was found Guilty and was Sentenced on the 1 st day 
of November, 2006 as follows: "Defendant is fined $50.00 (fifty dollars) each day after 
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11/30/06 not in compliance with ordinance." (See paragraph 2 above.) 
20. The Judgment of Conviction and sentence entered by the Justice court was 
Appealed to the First District Court in Cache County. After renewed Motions asserting 
constitutional grounds were filed and denied by the District court a trial was had on the 
19th day of September, 2007 whereupon the Defendant was adjudged Guilty of an 
infraction and was Sentenced on the 28th day of September, 2007 as specified 
hereinabove. The sentence required that Defendant pay a $50.00 fine and clean up the 
property to the satisfaction of city officials under pain of contempt. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
21. The Defendant/ Appellant is charged with violation of Hyde Park City 
Revised Ordinance 10-332 "Maintaining a Nuisance". The statute, as written, is 
repugnant to and in conflict with the laws of the State of Utah and not in accord with the 
doctrine announced in Allgood v. Larson 545 P.2d 530, 531 (Utah 1976)( See Appendix 
Q) and as such the nuisance statutes of both Hyde Park City/Appellee and the State of 
Utah are unconstitutional and should be declared void-for-vagueness because they do not 
adequately define what is a nuisance nor do they provide adequate guidelines for 
enforcement and each Ordinance should be struck down as unenforceable on its face and 
as it has been applied to this particular Defendant. 
22. The Defendant/ Appellant contends that Part 10-331 of the Plaintiff/ 
Appellant's nuisance ordinance and U.C.A. § 76-10-801(1) defining nuisance and 
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U.C.A. § 76-10-803 defining a public nuisance are unconstitutionally vague in violation 
of Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
23. Ordinances, such as the Plaintiff/Appellee has adopted here, are 
regulated by the State laws and by the courts, the city cannot impose a greater sentence 
than that provided by state law. See Allgood v. Larson (supra). It is to be noted that 10-
8-84, by its express terms, limits the grant of power to municipalities to pass ordinances, 
to those "not repugnant to law." It should be further noted that the penalty provisions in 
the city ordinance exceeds the mandates of 10-8-60 by pre-classifying the offense as a 
Class C Misdemeanor which defeats the "fine only" grant under the limitation on the 
grant of power regarding nuisance charges bestowed on the city by that statute. 
24. The Utah legislature's scheme for establishing and operating justice courts 
violates the separation of powers doctrine's prohibition proscribing acts of one branch 
of government which interfere with performance of core functions by another branch. 
Judges must be free to exercise exclusive power to decide cases independently and 
without influence exerted by the executive and legislative branches. Under Utah's 
statutory scheme, municipal governments have been afforded broad authority to control 
and direct justice courts, including the power to whimsically appoint and dismiss judges. 
In addition, municipalities may and are directed to control justice court budgets, 
personnel, and resources. Because Utah law requires that municipalities must fund their 
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own justice courts, local governments will tend to establish local courts only if the courts 
are able to fund their own operations. In practice, some justice courts have become so 
profitable that they serve as a significant source of revenue upon which the 
municipalities they serve rely when planning their annual budgets. This legislative 
scheme presents enormous, if subtle, incentives for justice court judges to generate 
revenue by convicting and fining criminal defendants. These incentives and others 
interfere with the core judicial function of independently and fairly adjudicating criminal 
cases in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 
25. The sentence imposed by the Justice Court as well as by the District Court 
was clearly at odds with the powers extended to cities and towns (and importantly to the 
District Court as well) and was surely "repugnant to law." Allgood vs. Larsen (decided) 
see also State vs. Hemmert (supra) in the Supreme Court of the State of Utah No. 15725 
(an unpublished opinion) Crockett, Hall and Ellet concurring.) If the singular and 
unlawful sentence imposed by the Justice Court and, to some extent, perpetuated by the 
District Court had it not found its basis in an unconstitutional ordinance, this Defendant 
would have been deprived of any power to seek an effective review of the draconian 
pronouncements that plagued this case as found its way through the lower Courts. 
26. Defendant/Appellee filed a Motion and Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities In Support of a Motion To Dismiss in the District Court on or about the 12 th 
day of April, 2007. A Motion to Quash the Justice Court conviction was also filed. Said 
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Motions specifically addressed constitutional issues as related to the validity of 
Plaintiff/Appellant's ordinances and the validity of certain statutes of State of Utah 
regarding nuisance as well as the constitutionality of the sentences imposed. 
27. The District Court did no adequately address its basis for denying 
Defendant/Appellant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Quash and in fact relied on a 
presumption as if it were an item of evidence which tended to negate evidence in 
argument presented by Defendant/Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Are the Plaintiff/Appellee City's nuisance ordinances repugnant to 
and in conflict with the laws of the State of Utah and not in accord with the 
doctrine announced in ALLGOOD v. LARSON (Supra). 
28. The powers conferred on cities and towns within Utah, such as 
Plaintiff/Appellee town are regulated by Title 10 of the Utah Code, U.C.A. § 10-8-60 
significantly provides that: 
" They [cities and town] may declare what shall be a nuisance, and abate 
the same, and impose fines upon persons who may create, continue or 
suffer nuisances to exist." 
This section does not seem to address criminal sanctions and certainly limits the cities 
power to that of imposing fines. Defendant/Appellant suggests that fines can be of either 
a civil or criminal nature. Blacks Law Dictionary, 7th Edition West Group 1999 defines a 
fine as, "a pecuniary criminal punishment or civil penalty payable to the public treasury." 
29. While this section seems to give considerable flexibility to the city/town to 
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fashion its own standards of criminality, this section (even if it authorizes criminal 
sanctions) must be considered in light of other provisions of law and in connection with 
the "Allgood Doctrine" interestingly, Utah Code Annotated 10-8-60 does not seem to 
allow the city to by their ordinances, to impose imprisonment as a punishment. 
30. As a limitation imposed on the Grant found in the above cited statute, 
U.C.A. § 10-8-84 provides that cities and town such as Plaintiff/Appellee may: 
" (1) ... pass all ordinances and rules, and make all regulations, not 
repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into effect or discharging all 
powers and duties conferred by this chapter and as are necessary and 
proper to provide for the safety and preserve the health, and promote 
the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort, and 
convenience of the city and its inhabitants , and for the protection of 
property in the city." 
"(2)... may enforce obedience to ordinances with fines or penalties in 
accordance with Section 10-3-703." 
This provision provides an interesting paradox because it may, by use of the term 
"penalties" allow imprisonment for maintaining a nuisance despite the limitation found in 
10-8-60 (supra) Utah Code Annotated Section 10-3-703 provides: 
" (1) The governing body of each municipality may impose a minimum criminal 
penalty for the violation of any municipal ordinance by a fine not to exceed the 
maximum class B misdemeanor fine under Section 76-3-301 or by a term of 
imprisonment up to six months, or by both the fine and term of imprisonment. 
(2)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), the governing body may prescribe 
a minimum civil penalty for the violation of any municipal ordinance by a fine not 
to exceed the maximum class B misdemeanor fine under Section 76-3-301." 
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The city by limiting the fine to fifty dollars/day seems to be at odds with the minimum 
mandatory requirement found in 10-3-703. 
31. The Utah Supreme Court in ALLGOOD v. LARSON ( Supra) , held that 
the provisions of Article XI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution are "not only a delegation 
of power by the people to a municipality, but is also a limitation" of such powers. The 
"constitutional provision, in conferring police power upon municipalities, limits the grant 
to an area "not in conflict with the general law." The Allgood Court placed a construction 
on the provision found in UCA 10-8-84 "not repugnant to law" as being coextensive 
with the mandate emphasized above. 
32. In determining whether an ordinance is in conflict with general laws, the 
test is whether the questioned ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids 
and prohibits, and likewise whether that same ordinance might eschew conduct permitted 
by the "General Law." RICHFIELD CITY v. WALKER, 790 P.2d 87, 90-91 (Utah 
App. 1990) citing SALT LAKE CITY v. KUSSE, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938).(See 
Appendix R) Based on this test it is apparent that the Plaintiff/ Appellee's nuisance 
ordinances are in conflict with the "general laws" of the State of Utah as the elements of 
each cannot be reconciled one with the other. 
Part 10-331 of the Plaintiff/ Appellee's nuisance ordinance defines a nuisance as 
follows: 
"For the purpose of this part the term "nuisance" is defined 
"to mean any condition of use or premises or of building 
exteriors which are deleterious or injurious, noxious or 
unsightly which includes, but is not limited to keeping or 
depositing on, or scattering over the premises any of the following: 
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A. Lumber, junk, trash, or debris. 
B. Abandoned, discarded, or unused objects or equipment 
such as furniture, stoves, refrigerators, freezers, cans or 
containers."1 
Where in the Utah Nuisance Statutes do prohibitions such as these appear? 
33. All prohibitions in the Utah Code eschew Msuch terms as "noxious" or 
"unsightly" and invoke the requirement that any proscribed condition must be dangerous 
to "human life or health" or create an "impure or unwholesome" condition. [Defendant 
suggests that the latter standard "impure or unwholesome" is unenforceable (infra)]. 
34. The Utah Supreme Court has held that the test as to whether the use of the 
property constitutes a "nuisance" is the reasonableness of the use complained of in the 
particular locality and in the manner and under the circumstances of the case. CANNON 
v. NEUBERGER, 1 Utah 2d 396, 268 P.2d 425 (See Appendix S); DAHL v. UTAH OIL 
REFINING CO.x 71 Utah 1, 262 P.269. (See Appendix T) The question is not whether a 
reasonable person in the Plaintiff/ Appellee's or Defendant/ Appellant's position would 
regard the condition as unreasonable, but whether reasonable persons generally, looking 
at the whole situation impartially and objectively, would consider it unreasonable. 
1
 In the Information and in the Amended Information it is provided that, 
f,NuisanceM is also defined to mean: (2) unsheltered storage or old, unused, stripped and 
junked machinery, implements, equipment or personal property of any kind which is no 
longer safely usable for the purposes for which it was manufactured, for a period of 30 
days or more". This is inconsistent with the existing Plaintiff/Appellant Ordinance as 
acknowledged by a Fax submitted by a city employee, Diane, who acknowledges that the 
ordinance has not been modified since 1978. The verbiage herein is also inconsistent 
with Utah Code 76-10-801, defining "Nuisance". 
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Should Defendant/Appellant's use offend the "Danger to human health" standard, the 
inquiry must nevertheless shift to the reasonableness of the use in the location. (Perhaps 
this is the basis of the three or more persons requirement which basis is problematic in 
that the standard is suspect, invidious and arbitrary). 
35. The Courts have uniformly held that the use of property analogous to 
Defendant/ Appellant's use of the subject property or even for such purposes as public 
garages or for the business of wrecking automobiles and salvaging parts are not 
nuisances per se. HATCH v. HATCH CO., 3 Utah 2d 295, 283 P.2d 217 (Utah 1955) 
citing GEORGE v. GOODVICH, 288 Pa. 48, 135 A. 719, 50 A.L.R. 107 (See Appendix 
U); PARKERSBURG BUILDERS MATERIAL CO. v. BARRACK, 118 W.Va. 608, 
191 S.E. 368, 110 A.L.R. 1461.(See Appendix V) 
Utah Code Annotated, § 76-10-801, (1973 as Amended) defines "nuisance" as 
follows: 
"(1) A nuisance is any item, thing, manner, condition whatsoever that is 
dangerous to human life or health or renders soil, air, water, or food impure 
or unwholesome." 
No such limitation appears in the Plaintiff/Appellee's Ordinance The Utah State statute 
above goes on to provide: 
"(2) Any person, whether as owner, agent, or occupant who creates, aids in 
creating, or contributes to a nuisance, or who supports, continues or retains 
a nuisance, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor." 
36. The Utah Court of Appeals in TURNBAUGH v. ANDERSON, 793 P.2d 
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939 (Utah App. 1990) (See Appendix W) held that Section 76-10-801 encompasses two 
types of nuisance developed under the common law: public and private nuisance. See 
e.g., HELMKAMP v. CLARK READY MIX CO., 214 N.W.2d 126, 129 (Iowa 1974) 
(See Appendix X) (state statutory enumerations do not modify the common-law doctrine 
of nuisance); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts 821A (1979) (See Appendix Y). 
The definition of nuisance in Section 76-10-801 includes acts or conditions that are 
commonly classed as public or private nuisances. 
37. A public nuisance is defined under the provisions of U.C.A. § 76-10-803, 
(1992 Amendment) as follows: 
"(1) A public nuisance is a crime against the order and economy 
of the state and consists in unlawfully doing any act or omitting 
to perform any duty, which act or omission: 
(a) annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health, 
or safety of three or more persons;2 
(b) offends public decency3: 
(c) unlawfully interferes with, obstructs, or tends to obstruct, 
or renders dangerous for passage, any lake, stream, canal, or 
basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway; 
(d) is a nuisance as defined in Section 78-38-9;,(for application 
of which section Plaintiffs do not contend) or 
(e) in any way renders three or more persons insecure in life 
2Which three (3) people? (See Solar Salt) (infra) 
3
 As is noted on page 8, Defendant contends that (a) and (b) are unenforceable as 
vague and imprecise. 
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or the use of property. 
(2) An act which affects three or more persons in any of the ways 
specified in this section is still a nuisance regardless of the extent of 
annoyance or damage inflicted on individuals is unequal.ff 
38. The Utah Supreme Court had defined a public nuisance as affecting "an 
interest common to the general public, rather than peculiar to one individual, or several," 
SOLAR SALT CO. vs. SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSP. CO., 555 P.2d 286, 289 
(Utah 1976) (quoting W. Prosser, Law of Torts 606). c/76-10-803 SUPRA. 
(See Appendix Z) 
39. It is more than clear that the nuisance ordinances of the Plaintiff City are 
repugnant to and in conflict with the general laws of the State of Utah in violation of the 
doctrine of ALLGOOD v. LARSON, supra. The Plaintiff City's nuisance ordinances 
forbid what the "general laws" of the State of Utah permit. 
40. The Plaintiff/ Appellee's nuisance ordinances should therefore be declared 
null and void as being violative of Article XI, § 5 of the Utah Constitution and parallel 
provisions of the Constitution of the United States. 
II. Are the nuisance Ordinances of Plaintiff/ Appellee and the various 
Statutes of the State of Utah addressing nuisance constitutional or 
should said statutes be declared void-for-vagueness because the 
statutes do not adequately define what is a nuisance nor do they 
provide adequate guidelines for the enforcement of said statutes. 
41. There should be no question that the nature of even civil proceedings may 
be, to some extent, quasi- criminal in character. SIMS v. TAX COMMISSION, 841 P.2d 
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6 (Utah 1992). (See Appendix AA) U.C.A. § 76-10-801(2), (1973 as Amended) 
provides as follows: 
"(2) Any person, whether as owner, agent, or occupant who creates, 
aids in creating, or contributes to a nuisance, or who supports, 
continues, or retains a nuisance, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor." 
42. The Defendant/ Appellant contends that Part 10-331 of the Plaintiff/ 
Appellant's nuisance ordinance and U.C.A. § 76-10-801(1) defining nuisance and 
U.C.A. § 76-10-803 defining a public nuisance are unconstitutionally vague in violation 
of Article I, § 7 of the Utah and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
43. The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a statute or ordinance define 
an offense with sufficient definiteness that "ordinary people" can understand what 
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement. KOLENDER v. LAWSON, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 75 L.Ed.2d 
903, 909, 103 S.Ct. 1855 (1983).(See Appendix BB) More important than actual notice 
is the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement. KOLENDER, quoting SMITH v. GOGUEN, 415 U.S. 566, 574, 39 
L.Ed.2d 605, 94 S.Ct. 1242 (1974). It is a basic principle of due process that an 
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibition is not clearly defined. GRAYNED v. 
CITY OF ROCKFORD, 408 U.S. 104, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (1972). (See 
Appendix CC). 
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44. A constitutional vagueness challenge can proceed either as a facial 
challenge or upon its application, based upon the facts of the case. GREENWOOD v. 
CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, 817 P.2d 816 (Utah 1991).(See Appendix DD) A 
facial challenge is permitted when a statute or ordinance has no practical application in 
any case or the law reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. 
HOFFMAN ESTATES v. FLIPSIDE, HOFFMAN ESTATES, INC., 455 U.S. 489, 494, 
71 L.Ed.2d 362, 102 S.Ct. 1186 (1982). (See Appendix EE) Where a statute or ordinance 
imposes criminal penalties, the standard of certainty is higher. WINTERS v. NEW 
YORK, 333 U.S. 507, 515, 92 L.Ed. 840, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948).(See Appendix FF) This 
concern has led the United States Supreme Court to invalidate a criminal statute on its 
face even when it could conceivably have had some valid application. COLAUTTI v. 
FRANKLIN, 439 U.S. 379, 394-401, 58 L.Ed.2d 596, 99 S.Ct. 675 (1979)4 .(See 
Appendix GG). 
45. The challenged ordinances and statutes in the instant case reaches a 
substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. 
Article I, § 1 of the Utah Constitution provides as follows: 
"All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their 
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship 
4 
Utah cases such as Logan City v. Huber 786 P.2d 1372 (Ut App. 1990) 
(See Appendix HH) and Provo City v. Whatcott 200 UT, (Ut. App 1986) 
would seem to rely on this holding. (See Appendix JJ) For ordinances and 
statutes which sweep too broadly. 
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according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, 
protest against wrongs, and petition for redress or grievances; to 
communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the 
abuse of that right." 
46. As a preliminary matter, the Plaintiff/ Appellee must establish and prove in 
connection with an appropriate ordinance that Defendant/ Appellant's use of the subject 
property is a public nuisance as defined under § 76-10-803 and such use has a 
detrimental effect on public comfort, repose, health or safety, or which offends public 
decency. 
47. The Utah Supreme Court has held that municipal ordinances which are 
similar to U.C.A. § 76-10-801 and § 76-10-803, even when only the civil remedy is 
pursued, are unconstitutionally vague. The Court in JONES v. LOGAN CITY CORP., 
19 Utah 2d 169, 428 P.2d 160 (1967) (See Appendix KK) observed as follows: 
"While the statute above mentioned grants to cities the power to declare 
what shall be a nuisance, the ordinance before us does not in fact define 
what a nuisance is. Ordinance No. 120 above referred to, which grants to 
the Board of Condemnation the right to determine whether any building 
constitutes a menace to public health or public safety, does not provide 
standards on which the board can base its findings as to what is or what is 
not a menace to public health or public safety. It would appear that the 
ordinance imposes upon the Board of Condemnation quasi-judicial 
functions without standards or guidelines to govern the Board in its 
determination.ff 
48. U.C.A. § 76-10-801 and § 76-10-803 do not provide sufficient standards or 
guidelines upon which the Court can base its findings as to what is or what is not 
detrimental to public comfort, repose, health or safety and what is or what is not a public 
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nuisance or even what public comfort or repose are. 
49. The United States Supreme Court observed in KOLENDER v. LAWSON, 
(supra, n. 7) "societies concern for minimal guidelines finds it roots as far back as the 
decision in UNITED STATES v. REESE, 92 U.S. 214,221, 25 L.Ed. 563 (1876)" (See 
Appendix LL) 
"It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large 
enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step 
inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at 
large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative 
department of government." 
50. U.C.A. § 76-10-801 and § 76-10-803 are unconstitutionally vague on their 
face because the statues encourage arbitrary enforcement by failing to describe with 
sufficiency what conduct is proscribed by the statutes and also because those statutes 
reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. It is also evident that 
the statutes are unconstitutionally vague in the application of their provisions to the facts 
of this case. Assuming that the Plaintiff/ Appellee's nuisance ordinances are applicable 
in this case, those questioned ordinances are likewise unconstitutionally vague. 
51. Part 10-331 of Plaintiff/ Appellee's nuisance ordinance is susceptible of 
many different meanings and consequently is unconstitutionally vague. For example, the 
ordinance prohibits lumber from being deposited or scattered on any premises. This 
ordinance could incidently preclude a commercial lumber yard from maintaining stock 
on the premises and/or selling lumber. The ordinance might also prohibit the 
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construction of buildings from lumber. Junk, as defined in the ordinance, is also 
susceptible of many different meanings as opposed to a common definition such as might 
be found in a dictionary.5 
52. The questioned ordinance is susceptible of many different meanings and 
encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and should therefore be declared 
unconstitutionally vague. 
III. Is the penalty ordinance No. 10-359 of the Plaintiff/ Appellee 
enforceable on its face as imposed upon Defendant/ Appellant? 
53. Plaintiff/Appellee's Ordinance No. 10-359 PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO 
COMPLY is as follows: 
"A. Any owner, occupant or person having an interest in the property subject to 
this chapter who shall fail to comply with the notice or order given pursuant 
to this chapter shall be guilty of a class C misdemeanor for each offense and 
further sum of $50.00 for each and every day such failure to comply continues 
beyond the date fixed for compliance. 
B. Compliance by any owner, occupant or person to whom a notice has been 
given as provided in this chapter shall not be admissible in any criminal 
proceeding brought pursuant to this section." 
54. For purposes of this argument, we shall dwell only on part A. With regard 
to that portion which reads, "...further sum of $50.00 for each and every day such failure 
to comply continues beyond the date fixed for compliance." 
5
 Old iron, glass, paper, or other waste that may be used again in some form (2): 
secondhand, worn, or discarded articles (3): clutter lb b : something of poor quality : 
trash c: something of little meaning, worth, or significance. (Webster's Dictionary) 
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55. The Utah legislature in 1973 created classes of offenses and in 76-
1-103 (1), the following language appears: 
"The provisions of this code shall govern the construction of, the 
punishment for,...any offense defined in this code.... any offense defined 
outside this code ..." 76-1-104 provides that the code shall be 
constructed in accordance with these general purposes; and 
Subsection (3), dealing with penalties, states; c Prescribe 
penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of offenses..." 
The language was cited in Allgood vs. Larsen (supra). 
56. Ordinances, such as the Plaintiff/Appellee has adopted here, are 
regulated by the State laws and by the courts, the city cannot impose a greater sentence 
than that provided by state law. See Algood v. Larson (supra). It is to be noted that 10-
8-84, by its express terms, limits the grant of power to municipalities to pass ordinances, 
to those "not repugnant to law." It should be further noted that the penalty provisions in 
the city ordinance exceeds the mandates of 10-8-60 by pre-classifying the offense as a 
Class C Misdemeanor which defeats the fine only limitation imposed by 10-8-84.. 
57. If the ordinance penalty conflicts with that of the "general law" of the state 
addressing the same subject, the ordinance penalty is void. The penalty prescribed by the 
city ordinance cannot exceed that set by the state law. [Allgood v. Larson(supra)] 
58. The test as to whether an ordinance is repugnant to or in conflict with state 
law is not necessarily as to whether it deals with the same subject matter in a different 
manner by providing a different penalty, but it is whether the ordinance permits or 
licenses something which the state statute forbids or prohibits, or vice versa. See Algood 
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v. Larson quoting Salt Lake city v. Kusse, supra; and see, e.g. City of Columbus v. Molt, 
36 Ohio St. 2d 94, 304 N.E.2d 245 (supra). 
59. Any violation of the Plaintiff/ Appellee's Nuisance Ordinance shall be 
designated as a single crime, a misdemeanor.6 The Ordinance exceeds the statutory 
limits by providing that a fine of $50.00 shall be assessed "...for each and every day such 
failure to comply continues beyond the date fixed for compliance." There can only be 
one violation and as such there can be only one fine assessed. If the penalty is valid, it 
can only find application to the point that $50.00 represents the maximum which may be 
assessed and then, only once. See State of Utah v. Hemmert, No 15725 1978. (supra) 
(Unpublished opinion) (See Appendix MM). 
IV. The Statutory scheme for Justice Courts interferes with Judicial 
independence by providing monetary incentives to convict criminal defendants and 
by authorizing the administrative arm of municipal government to hire and fire 
judges and to control court operations. 
60. The Utah legislature's scheme for establishing and operating justice courts 
violates the separation of powers doctrine's prohibition proscribing acts of one branch 
of government which interfere with performance of core functions by another branch. 
Judges must be free to exercise exclusive power to decide cases independently and 
without influence exerted by the executive and legislative branches. Under Utah's 
statutory scheme, municipal governments have been afforded broad authority to control 
6
 In this case, the crime was charged as an infraction, presumably to avoid the 
necessity of impaneling a Jury as demanded by the Defendant. 
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and direct justice courts, including the power to whimsically appoint and dismiss judges. 
In addition, municipalities may and are directed to control justice court budgets, 
personnel, and resources. Because Utah law requires that municipalities must fund their 
own justice courts, local governments will tend to establish local courts only if the courts 
are able to fund their own operations. In practice, some justice courts have become so 
profitable that they serve as a significant source of revenue upon which the 
municipalities they serve rely when planning their annual budgets. This legislative 
scheme presents enormous, if subtle, incentives for justice court judges to generate 
revenue by convicting and fining criminal defendants. These incentives, in turn, interfere 
with the core judicial function of independently and fairly adjudicating criminal cases in 
violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 
A. The Utah Constitution Grants Judges the Exclusive Power to Impartially 
Decide Criminal Cases, Independent of any Compulsion Wielded by Executive 
and/or Legislative Branches. 
61. Under the Utah Constitution's separation of powers clause, one branch of 
government may not interfere with the core function of another branch. Although this 
doctrine does not require complete independence between any or all of the three 
branches, it does require that each branch respect the inherent roles of the other two 
branches. The main function of the judicial branch, as an undeniable fact, is to 
impartially interpret the law and fairly decide cases and controversies. 
62. The separation of powers doctrine serves as the very foundation of the 
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American concept of liberty. Article V, section one of the Utah Constitution defines this 
doctrine as follows: 
"The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into 
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; 
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one 
of these departments shall exercise functions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
Utah Const. Art. V, § 1." 
63. As the Utah Court has observed, the separation of the three branches is 
essential to preserve liberty and individual rights: 
"Montesquieu's writings warn us that there can be no liberty if the powers of the 
three branches of government do not remain separate. Madison recognized the 
principle as more sacred than any other in a free constitution, and that no one 
branch should possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the 
others in the administration of its powers. Justice Marshall adhered to the 
principle in Marbury vs. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed, 60.... (See 
Appendix NN). The fundament of the doctrine remained unassailable when the 
United States Supreme Court through Justice Frankfurter reminded the President 
that his action of seizing the nation's steel mills to prevent a national catastrophe 
threatened to be an "accretion of dangerous power" which comes from the 
"unchecked disregard" of the checks and balances that doctrine was created to 
provide. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. Vs. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952) 
(See Appendix PP). Whether implied, as in our federal constitution and in those 
of fourteen states, or whether expressly stated, as in our own state's constitution, 
the doctrine of separation of powers is the control gate harnessing the reservoir of 
powers of a government which functions at the will of the people. Timpanogos 
Planning & Water Management Agency vs. Central Utah Water Conservancy 
Dist. 690 P.2d 562, 564-565 (Utah 1984)." 
64. Notwithstanding the imperative of the above quoted language, the modern 
separation of powers doctrine does not require absolute independence between the 
branches. "[Although the threefold division of powers is the basis for the American 
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Constitution, there are many cases in which the duties of one department are, to a certain 
extent, devolved upon and shared by the other." In re Young, 1999 UT 6, *f 13, 976 P.2d 
581 (quoting Tite vs. State Tax Commission, 57, P.2d 734, 737 (Utah 1963)) (See 
Exhibit QQ). One branch only violates the separation of powers doctrine when it 
exercises the power that is "exclusive to one department..." Id. at ^fl4. Utah Courts have 
characterized exclusive powers as those which are "primary," "core," or "essential," to 
one branch. Id. (quoting Salt Lake City vs. Ohms. 881 P.2d 844, 849 (Utah 1994) 
(Appendix RR); Timpanogas
 % (Supra) at 567; State vs. Gallion. 572 P.2d 683, 688 (Utah 
1977)) (Appendix SS). Stated differently, exclusive means "inherent in the very concept 
of one of the three branches of a constitutional government." Id. at f 26. 
65. The judicial branch's " primary function" includes the duty to fairly and 
independently "hear and determine controversies between adverse parties and questions 
in litigation." Timpanogos Planning and Water Management Agency v. Central Utah 
Water Conservancy Dist., 690 P.2d at 569, 571 (Utah 1984) (quoting Citizens Club vs. 
Welling, 27 P.3d 23, 26 (Utah 1933)) (See Exhibit TT). Judges have the exclusive 
power "to interpret and adjudicate with dispassionate impartiality questions of law 
between adverse parties..." Id. it follows that the separation of powers doctrine bars 
executive or legislative actions that threaten "the fundamental integrity of the judicial 
branch..." Ohms, (supra) (quoting In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 642 (Utah 
1988)). "It is essential in all courts that the judges who are appointed to administer the 
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law should be permitted to administer it under the protection of the law, independently 
and freely, without favor and without fear." In re Hammermaster 985 P.2d 924, 936 
(Wash. 1999) (quoting Bradley vs Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 349 n. 16 (1871) (See Appendix 
UU). 
B. Utah's Legislative Scheme Governing Justice Courts Creates Substantial 
Economic Incentives for Municipalities to Use Justice Courts to Generate Revenue 
for Their General Fund. 
66. The statutes governing justice courts violate principles of Constitutional 
dimension in that justice courts are revenue-driven entities that, by definition, cannot 
independently and impartially adjudicate disputes. Under Utah's legislative scheme, 
state funded district courts have jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses unless a local 
municipality acts to fund its own justice court. Because municipalities retain half of the 
revenue created by justice courts, municipalities, as a practical matter, will only create 
such courts when the elective system can generate sufficient revenue to fund a profitable 
operation. This revenue-producing scheme creates enormous incentives for municipal 
governments and consequently justice court judges to overlook fundamental 
constitutional principles in order to achieve and maximize that profit. 
67. In Utah's courts system, local municipalities may, at their option, elect to 
enforce class B and C misdemeanors either through the state district courts or by creating 
their own justice courts. Article VIII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution authorizes the 
legislature to create "courts not of record..." The legislature has done so in chapter five 
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of Title 78 of the Utah Code. That chapter authorizes municipalities to create and fund 
justice courts with "jurisdiction over class B and C misdemeanors, violation of 
ordinances, and infractions committed within their territorial jurisdiction, except those 
offenses over which the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 78-
5-104(1) (2002); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-101, 78-5-101.5 (2002) (providing for 
the creation of justice courts). In the absence of a justice court, state funded district 
courts have jurisdiction over these criminal offenses. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(8) 
(Supp.2004)7. 
68. Despite this legislative authority to create justice courts, as a practical 
matter, local governments only do so when justice courts exhibit the apparent ability to 
generate sufficient revenue to pay for their own expenses. By statute, the states must 
fund the district courts to enforce class B and C misdemeanors, local ordinances, and 
infractions. Utah Code Ann. §78-3-13.4 (2002). Under this model, the state receives half 
of all fines and forfeitures while the prosecuting agency, usually meaning the county, 
receive the other half. Id. § 78-3-14.5 (2) (Supp. 2004). Local municipalities receive no 
portion of this revenue because they provide no funding to the district courts. 
69. When municipalities purport to create justice courts to supplant the state 
funded court operations, Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-110 (Supp. 2004), 78-5-111 (2002); 
7
 The Justice Court, by some mechanism, retains the entire fee generated by Plea 
in Abeyance Agreements. 
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they must, as a preliminary requirement and in order to receive favorable action on an 
application to create a justice court, demonstrate a "need" for a local court, including 
demonstration of the ability to fund the proposed court. Id § 78-5-101.5 (2002). As 
previously noted, in a justice-court system, municipalities retain half of all fines and 
forfeitures; the other half goes to the state. Id. § 78-5-116 (1) (Supp. 2004). 
70. Given these fiscal realities, municipalities only create justice courts when 
doing so makes economic sense. Because the state has a statutory obligation to enforce 
class B and C misdemeanors, local ordinances, and infractions without charge visited on 
local governments, municipalities would have no incentive to establish local justice 
courts unless such courts generate adequate revenue to retire the operational cost.. A 
recent study of justice courts in Salt Lake County established that all justice courts, 
"produce revenues in excess of expenditures in varying degrees." Institute for Law and 
Policy Planning, Salt Lake County Criminal Justice Assessment 6.11 (2004) (hereinafter 
referred to as "County Justice Court Assessment") (See Appendix VV). 
71. Many justice courts show a profit and thereby generate revenue for cities. 
The previously referenced County Justice Court Assessment discloses that justice court 
"[j]udges and administrators freely admit that they believe the justice courts are a source 
of significant revenue for their cities." Id. In fact, municipalities "view the [justice] 
courts as a prime source worthy of protection and expansion." Id. 
72. Municipalities have further capitalized on the justice court system by 
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refusing to reimburse the host county for incarcerating justice court offenders. Id. at 3.9. 
Although some county sheriffs bill municipalities for housing offenders, most cities 
maintain that they already contribute to the County's general fond, and that such 
contributions should provide compensation for operating the jail. Id. at 3.10 . As a 
result, in Salt Lake County, "municipalities generated nearly $17 million dollars in court 
fees [gross revenue] during 2000, yet paid nothing towards the approximately $7 million 
in jail billings". 
73. In addition to confinement at no cost to the involved city , municipalities 
are the recipient of additional services from counties. "Justice Courts have unfettered 
access to the larger system through the jail, the county probation department, the legal 
defender, etc. with little or no financial obligation. Id. at 3.9. For these very reasons, 
justice courts have, not surprisingly, proliferated in recent years. Id. at 6.5. In Cache 
County, courts have even been established in minor villages such as Trenton & 
Clarkston. 
C. The Legislative Scheme Coupled With Municipalities' Lack of Financial 
Accountability For Incarcerated Offenders Undermines Justice Court 
Independence and Creates Unconstitutional Pecuniary Incentives to do Other Than 
Justice as well as to Dispense with Fairness and impartiality. 
74. The legislature's funding mechanism coupled with the political realty that 
municipalities use justice courts to generate revenue for the general fund directly 
undermine justice court judges' independence. Justice court judges must produce 
sufficient revenue to maintain the very existence of their courts, and thereby incentive 
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exists to meet a municipalities' revenue projections. The County Justice Court 
Assessment study substantiates this proposition of "the fear that cities will become 
dependent on the money generated through enforcement, thus increasing the likelihood 
that police and judges will be overly aggressive as a way to meet financial expectations 
and demands." Id. at 3.8. 
75. The conclusion quoted above directly conflicts with certain official 
assumptions that monetary demands on justice court judges are "unlikely" and 
"speculative." Indeed, the revenue-generating impetus for establishing justice courts is 
obvious. As the editorial staff of the Salt Lake Tribune observed, "the justification for 
creating justice courts explicitly includes being a revenue source for the wider city 
government..." Editorial, Justice Peeks, Salt Lake Tribune, July 20, 2005. The County 
Justice Court Assessment concluded that "the importance of revenue generation to 
municipalities is apparent from the fact that municipal judges are directly responsible to 
the executive branch, unlike county judges who must stand for retention by the 
electorate." County Justice Court Assessment at 6.5. 
76. The separation of powers doctrine bars judges from being subject to 
financial blandishments when deciding cases. Statutes "granting a pecuniary interest" to 
judges are clearly unconstitutional. Blankenship vs. Minton Chevrolet, Inc., 266 S.E.2d 
902, 903 (W.V. 1979) (See Appendix WW). The Utah Courts have similarly held that 
judges must have "no favors to grant, no patronage to dispose of, and no friends to 
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reward." Timpanogo, 690 P.2d at 568 (quoting In re O'Sullivan, 158 P.2d 306, 309 
(Mont. 1945). In the Timpanogos case, the Supreme Court held that the legislature 
violated the separation of powers doctrine when it empowered district court judges to 
appoint board members of a water conservancy district. Id. at 570. Citing the possibility 
that the same judges who appointed board members might later review board decisions, 
this Court concluded that the district court judges might "feel constrained in passing 
upon board action." Id. at 570. 
77. Financial incentives need not be explicit in order to violate the separation 
of powers doctrine. In defining governmental branch powers, the Utah Court observed 
that there is a natural tendency of all persons, even judges, to unconsciously protect their 
interest: 
Due to the manner in which our system was created and has developed, the 
judiciary has the awesome prerogative and responsibility of judging the 
scope of powers of the executive, legislative, and of its own. For this 
reason it is essential that the judiciary be especially circumspect in maintaining 
an awareness of the natural propensity of human nature: that when anyone 
has the power to decide wherein his own interests are involved, there is danger 
of consciously or subconsciously leaning toward the protection, and perhaps 
the magnification, of his own self-interest. Jones, 550 P.2d at 210 (footnote 
omitted) (See Appendix XX). 
Knowing that justice courts will only survive if they produce adequate revenue, a justice 
court judge might well have an incentive to convict and fine persons without due regard 
to their core function to fairly adjudicate cases. Timpanogos, 660 P.2d at 571.. 
78. Municipalities' refusal to reimburse jails for costs associated with 
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confinement compounds justice court judges' incentives to generate revenue. This 
stance allows justice court judges to use county jails "with little restriction and complete 
financial impunity." County Justice Court Assessment at 3.9. A direct consequence of 
un-reimbursed jail services is the common practice injustice courts of ordering criminal 
defendants to "pay or serve" their sentences. Id. 6.5. This device allows justice court 
judges to threaten to and/or to incarcerate offenders who fail to pay fines in a timely 
manner. Id.. The absence of any financial obligation to municipalities for jail services 
has resulted injustice court judges employing incarceration to excess in order to collect 
revenue. Id. at 3.9. 
79. The "pay or serve" practice is particularly offensive because it tends to 
foment an unwarranted deprivation of a persons liberty. In defining separation of powers 
violations, the Utah Court has held that it will tolerate shared powers "when it is 
essential to the discharge of a primary function, when it is not an assumption of the 
whole power of another department, and when the exercise of the other power does not 
jeopardize individual liberty." Timpanogos, 690 P.2d at 567 (quoting C. Sand, 
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 3.06). The absence of any financial obligation 
resulting from the incarceration of offenders who fail to pay fines, Defendant/Appellant 
suggests, violates this test. 
D. Municipalities' Statutory Control Over Justice Courts Further Frustrates 
the Fair Adjudication of Criminal Cases. 
80. Even if financial incentives did not interfere with judicial independence, 
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Utah's legislative scheme governing justice courts also violates separation of powers 
principles because it foments exertion of inordinate control over administration of 
justice courts., Municipalities have statutory authority to hire and fire judges, to fund 
court operations, and to supervise court personnel. These powers, coupled with the use 
of justice courts as sources of general revenue, create a legislative scheme that invades 
the core function of the judicial branch to fairly and independently deciding cases. 
81. Of greatest concern, the legislature has authorized the executive, without 
meaningful guidelines, to hire and fire justice courts judges. Utah Code Annotated 
section 78-5-134 (2)(2002) designates the municipal leader, whether a mayor, council 
chair, or city manager, generically called the "appointing authority," to "appoint "justice 
court judges. The entity's legislative body must then confirm the appointment by a 
majority vote. Id § 78-5-134(2). Justice Court judges serve four-year terms. Id. § 78-5-
132 (1). Upon completion of the term, Utah law mandates that justice court judges "shall 
be reappointed absent a showing of good cause." Id. § 78-5-134(5). In determining 
whether "good cause" exists, municipalities "shall consider" (1) whether the state Judicial 
Council has certified the judge; and, (2) "any other factors considered relevant by the 
appointing authority." Id. § 78-5-134(5)(d). (Emphasis mine) 
82. Although this scheme purports to model the appointment of justice court 
judges after the traditional appointment process for Federal judges, it allows for 
expansive executive and legislative influence over judges. Because appointing 
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authorities may "consider any other factor'1 in deciding whether to reappoint a judge, 
justice court judges essentially serve at the whim of the executive. Id. § 78-5-134(5)(d). 
Given this broad discretion as to whether to reappoint, the economic realities 
surrounding justice courts and the pressure to generate revenue might directly influence 
how judges handle cases. At its most extreme, such influence is manifested if a judge 
fails to meet a municipality's revenue projections8 whereupon the appointing authority 
might employ the grant of power as a means of expressing frustration or displeasure. In 
a plausible scenario, the justice court judge might indeed, sense pressure, whether 
"consciously or subconsciously" to maximize collections and, thus, preserve his or her 
"own self-interest." Jones, 550 p.2d at 210. Pressure to collect revenue might not 
necessarily be overt, unspoken or unrealized expectations of "favors," "patronage," or 
"reward" but might well be enough to violate separation of powers principles. 
Timpanogos, 690 P.2d at 568 (quoting In re O'Sullivan, 158 P.2d at 309). 
83. At the very least, the appointment and reappointment process tend to create 
an appearance of impropriety. Canon 2 of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct charges 
judges to avoid even "the appearance of impropriety" to ensure "public confidence" in 
the judiciary. The County Justice Court Assessment pointed to such an appearance of 
patronage when it concluded that justice court judges are "directly responsible to the 
executive branch" for their very existence. County Justice Court Assessment at 6.5. 
8
 Surely a significant "factor" 
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Although the assessment did not observe anything "sinister or improper" the stated 
concern was that the "appointive power of the mayors presents an interesting if not 
conflicted situation in that the Executive branch literally creates the judicial branch via 
appointment.ff Id. at 6.10. The editorial staff of the Salt Lake Tribune eliminated any 
doubt about the appearance of impropriety when it recently observed that "because the 
justification for creating justice courts explicitly includes being a revenue source for the 
wider city government, judicial impartiality is seriously compromised." Editorial, Justice 
Peeks, Slat Lake Tribune, July 20, 2005. 
84. Given the sheer numbers of persons who appear before justice courts, 
appearance of impartiality is essential to maintenance of public confidence in those 
courts. The Utah State court website points out that in fiscal year 2004 justice courts 
presided of over 450,000 traffic cases. In addition, the justice courts disposed of an 
additional 85,000 misdemeanor cases during that same year. By comparison, the district 
courts disposed of only about 100,000 misdemeanors during fiscal year 2004. See 
http://www.utcourts.gov/stats/FY04/dist/fy2004_9.htm. A person, citizen or otherwise, 
is most likely to experience the Utah justice system through justice courts. These 
numbers present a compelling case to ensure "public confidence" in the justice courts. 
Hammermaster, 985 P.2d at 936. 
85. Moreover, an appearance of impropriety undermines the independence of 
justice courts because public perception affects judicial decision-making. Utah Courts 
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have held that appearances erode public confidence and alter judges' decisions 
discussing the point as follows: 
"A judge cannot engage in political debate or make public defense of his acts. 
When his action is judicial he may always rely upon the support of the define 
record upon which his action is based...But when he participates in the action 
of the executive or legislative departments of government he is without those 
supports. He exposes himself to attack and indeed invites it, which because 
of his peculiar situation inevitable impairs his value as a judge and the appropriate 
influence of his office." Timponogos, 690 P.2d at 572 (quoting a letter from 
former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Harlan Fiske Stone to Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, July 20, 1942, in Mason, Extra-Judicial Work for Judges: 
The Views of Chief Justice Stone, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 203-204 (1953). 
86. In addition to the appointment process, the legislature has granted 
municipalities control over justice court personnel and resources. Utah law entrusts 
municipalities with funding physical facilities, hiring and supervising court staff, and 
administering personnel policies. Utah Code Annotated § 78-5-108 (Supp. 2004), 78-5-
110 (Supp. 2004), 78-5-111 (2002). Utah law thereby empowers local executives to 
control every aspect of justice court operations and to determine, and thereby fix, each 
budgetary item. The executive branch also appoints the administrative staff who serve 
"at will' or are hired via the merit system as any other city employees" in the executive 
department. County Justice Court Assessment at 6.10. 
87. These extensive powers emphasize the appearance of impropriety and tend 
to reinforce the actual conflicts discussed above. Executive control over justice courts' 
budgets, staff, and resources presents "the perception (if not the reality) of dominance 
that elected officials exercise over the judiciary they created." Id. Executive action 
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violates the separation of powers doctrine "when there is an attempt by one branch to 
dominate another in that other's proper sphere of influence." Young, 1999 UT 6, f23, 
976 P.2d 581. Because the legislative scheme allows local executives to "effectively 
control " the justice courts, that scheme unconstitutionally invades the province of the 
judiciary. Id.9 
E. No Valid Reasons Support Or Justify Municipalities' Revenue-Motivated 
Control Over Justice Courts. 
88. Although one might present several unpersuasive rebuttals to the 
suggestion that municipalities are revenue-driven to creation of justice courts; none of 
those arguments change the legislative landscape that fosters executive and legislative 
interference with justice courts based on budgetary considerations. Neither judicial 
oversight, nor case law, nor the theoretical advantages and efficiencies presented by use 
of the justice court system sanitizes the separation of powers obstacles presented by 
Utah's legislative scheme. Such argument as has been presented in proceedings to date 
fail to resolve the main question presented by this motion which question requires an 
answer as to whether the legislative scheme governing justice courts jeopardizes the 
"dispassionate" adjudication of criminal cases. Timponogos, 690 P.2d at 571. Although 
one might reason that no particular Defendant can provide a showing that revenue 
9
 Most attorneys who have significant experience with criminal defense can tell 
horror stories of jury trials held on folding chairs in a bay of the local fire departments or 
amongst the garden tools in the justice court Judge's garage (so much for public 
confidence). 
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concerns actually motivated any particular justice court judges' decisions the discussion 
above demonstrates the superficiality of such an argument given the reality that justice 
courts are essentially revenue-driven. See County Justice Court Assessment at 3.9, 3.9, 
6.11.10 Additionally, proper application of the separation of powers doctrine does not 
require such a showing in that the Utah Supreme Courts opinion in Timponogos 
establishes that no actual bias need occur when one branch is provided authority to 
influence another's core function. In that case, the Utah Court struck down district court 
judges' authority to appoint water conservancy board members even though the parties 
neither alleged nor proved actual favoritism. Timponogos, 690, P.2d at 570-72. This 
appointment system violated the separation of powers doctrine on the reasoning that 
judges might "feel constrained" and "would avoid confrontations" while adjudicating 
disputes involving water boards. Id. at 570-71. 
89. Any position taken to the effect that no other jurisdictions have struck 
down similar justice court systems based on separation of powers considerations is 
manifestly without foundation. State by and through the Town of South Carthage vs. 
Barrett, 840 S.W.2d 895 (Tenn. 1992) (See Appendix YY), the Tennessee Supreme 
Court held that a legislatively-established justice court system violated separation of 
powers principles without a showing of any actual harm to any defendant. The 
10
 There is some tacit recognition of the "revenue driven' nature of the courts 
origination and operation by the promulgation of a bail schedule. 
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Tennessee Constitution contains provisions similar to Utah's as they require the 
separation of the three branches and as they allow for the legislature to create justice 
courts. Id at 897 (citing Tenn. Const. Art. II, § 2, Art. VI, § 1). Like Utah, the 
Tennessee legislature empowered municipalities to appoint justice courts judges to 
"serve at the pleasure" of the mayor and local legislative leaders. Id at 896. 
90. The Tennessee Supreme Court held that this system violated the mandate 
of the separation of powers doctrine because of the potential for city leaders to influence 
justice court judges "to increase city revenue...and to impose harsher sentences" on DUI 
offenders. Id. at 897 (quoting Summers vs. Thompson, 764 S.W.2d 182, 183 (Tenn. 
1988)) (See Appendix ZZ). Although that court relied on a prior decision in which city 
leaders had actually attempted to influence a justice court judge, no similar allegations 
arose with respect to the case under review. Carthage, 840 S.W.2d at 897 . The court 
held without necessity of reference to the previous case that the mere potential for 
influence violated justice court judges' ability to fairly adjudicate cases: 
The instant scenario demonstrates the danger posed to an independent judiciary 
and to the impartial administration of justice through the exercise of arbitrary 
power by a separate branch of government motivated by policy and political 
concerns inimical to an independent system of justice. Judicial independence by 
all respected political thought indispensably is essential to the effective operation 
of constitutional government. Id. at 899. 
91. To ensure a judiciary independent from the political caprice and whims of 
other government branches, the Tennessee Supreme Court required justice court judges 
to be elected rather than to be appointed and supervised by local municipalities. Id. The 
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Tennessee Constitution employs popular elections to preserve judicial independence 
from the other branches of government. Id. at 896 (citing Tenn. Const. Art. IV, § 4). 
Although Utah does not rely on popular elections, the "danger" attendant to influence of 
justice court judges as enunciated in Carthage would seem to apply equally under 
Utah's justice court system. 
92. Similarly, in Calligy vs. Mayor and Council of the City of Hoboken, 665 
A.2d 408, 409 (N.J. Super. 1995) (See Appendix AAA), a taxpayer claimed that an 
ordinance placing a municipal court in a city's department of administration violated 
separation of powers principles. That opinion invalidated the justice court because the 
"authority conferred by the ordinance is inconsistent with both the fact and appearance of 
judicial independence required by law." Id. at 412. The Court reached this conclusion 
despite the absence of any allegation that city officials had ever interfered with the 
court. Id. at 411. Instead, the court held that placing the justice court in the executive 
branch was "inconsistent with that court's independence." Id. 
93. This instant case in analogous. Although Defendant/Appellant does not 
and cannot allege that the justice court judge is actually influenced by the fact that he is 
beholden to the City's leaders11 under Utah's legislative scheme, the fact remains that 
local executive officials "literally create[] the judicial branch via appointment." County 
1
 * Other than the inferences that might be drawn from Judicial adherence to the 
singular and unlawful fine schedule imposed by the legislative act of the Hyde Park City 
council. 
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Justice Court Assessment at 6.10. Thus, justice court judges are "directly responsible to 
the executive branch..." County justice Court Assessment at 6.5. This situation allows 
municipalities to "dominate" justice courts in violation of the separation of powers 
doctrine. Young, 1999 UT 6, t 23, 976 P.2d 581. 
94. Even more to the point, in the State of Washington that State's experience 
points to the very dangers that the reality of revenue-generating justice courts suggest 
might happen in Utah. In In re Hammermaster, 985 P.2d 924 (Wash. 1999), the 
Washington Supreme Court sanctioned a justice court for violating numerous ethical 
duties and abusing his authority. The court reprimanded the judge for threatening to 
incarcerate offenders up to a "life" term for failing to pay court-ordered fines. Id. at 935-
36. In doing so, the court held that "[a] judge's primary function is the administration of 
justice, not the collection of fines." Id. at 936. 
95. One justice fully concurred in the court's judgment and provided specific 
examples of justice court judges who were motivated by financial considerations in 
adjudicating criminal cases and observed: 
Our opinion today conveys a very strong message to the judiciary and local 
governments in Washington that the Supreme Court will not tolerate short 
cuts in due process. While many municipalities have established municipal 
courts because they want to administer justice locally, it is also true many 
jurisdictions establish municipal court for purely avaricious reasons- as 
revenue agencies to be operated if they "make money" and be dispensed 
with if they become inconvenient to administer or generate insufficient 
revenues. Some local jurisdictions have even attempted to control 
performance of duties by municipal court judges through devices such as 
performance audits, the provision of substandard court facilities, or nonjudicial 
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control of court personnel. Occasionally, in some jurisdictions, when the 
judge has been too independent and has refused to generate sufficient revenue 
for the municipality, the city's legislative or executive authorities have forced 
the ouster of the judge. Id. at 249 (Talmadge, J. Concurring)(cites omitted). 
96. Arguments that "section 8 judges" exercise "meaningful oversight" of 
justice courts are advanced with misplaced confidence. There is no dispute but that other 
courts, the Judicial Conduct Commission and the state Judicial Council oversee justice 
courts. The fact that supervision is available fails to address the multitude of problems 
inherent in Utah's justice court system. Even given the supervision available, the 
legislative scheme does, nonetheless, provide justice courts with strong incentives to 
generate revenue contrary to the impartial administration of justice. Any such argument 
similarly fails to address a municipalities' power and influence with respect to 
appointment and reappointment of judges, to push for increased collections, and to 
manipulate budgets, personnel, and resources whether it be explicitly or implicitly. In 
any event, actual municipal pressure need not invite the Utah court's attention or violate 
the Canons of Judicial Conduct in order to influence justice court judges' decision-
making. As detailed above, this Court has recognized that subtle pressures can be as 
effective to subvert the system as can overt influence. Timponogos, 690 P.2d at 571; 
Jones, 550 P.2d at 210. 
97. Any argument that the Utah legislature has authorized justice courts for 
over 100 years without problem does no more than beg the point. Aside from the 
obvious response that the law as well as jurisprudence evolves over time, Utah's present 
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legislative scheme directly defeats the purposes behind establishing local courts. "Justice 
Courts 'are designed, in the interest of both the defendant and the state, to provide 
speedier and less costly adjudications than may be possible in criminal courts of general 
jurisdiction.'" Bernat vs. Allphin, 2005 UT 1, If 32.106 P.3d 707 (quoting Colten vs. 
Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 114 (1972)) (See Appendix BBB). But, the separation of 
powers doctrine bars government from sacrificing "liberty" for the sake of efficiency. 
Timponogos, 690 P.2d at 567. In Timponogos, denial of the power to appoint water 
conservancy board members because such a "centralization and consolidation of power 
would seem to us tantamount to loss of democracy in the name of efficiency, an 
untenable proposition under our system of jurisprudence." Id. at 571. points up the basic 
flaw in any such argument. 
98. Like judges' power to appoint officers whom appear before those same 
judges, municipal control and influence over justice court judges who may generate 
revenue to that municipality undermines "essential" constitutional liberties. Id. at 567. 
Indeed, the framers of the federal constitution founded the justice system on judicial 
independence in criminal matters. Hammermaster, 985 P.2d at 935-36. An independent 
judiciary, free from fiscal constraints, "is an essential tool in guarding the constitution 
and the rights of individuals." Id. at 936. 
99. Finally, any contention that the right to appeal to the district court and 
request a trial de novo "sanitizes " any problems with justice courts is without basis in 
50 
theory or as practiced. Any such argument grossly underrates the impact justice courts 
have on criminal defendants. Even though justice courts handle only class B and C 
misdemeanors, local ordinance violations and infractions, with intermediate punishment 
authority, conviction of even the least of these crimes can devastate lives. Incarceration 
visits destruction on the most routine daily activities and deprives persons of the 
fundamental right to liberty. As the United States Supreme Court has observed, even 
"[pjenalties such as probation or a fine may engender 'a significant infringement of 
personal freedom,' but they cannot approximate in severity the loss of liberty that a 
prison term entails." Blanton vs. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989) 
(quoting Frank vs. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 151 (1969)) (See Appendix CCC). 
Beyond the possibility of a jail sentence, fine, or probation, numerous collateral 
consequences disrupt the lives of persons who are convicted injustice courts. These 
disruptions include the loss of employment, driving privileges, government benefits, and 
even student loans. Sam Newton, Justice Court Appeal: The Good, the Bad, and the 
Unintended, 18 Utah Bar J. No. 1 at 25 (January/February 2005) (See Appendix DDD). 
100. The appellate process as contemplated by the legislature and as it is 
employed with respect to Justice court cases is flawed. By statutory mandate, an 
ordinance imperfection is dealt with differently than an imperfect constitutional ruling 
by a judge, albeit the appointment of that Justice Court Judge might have been for all the 
wrong reasons. The fact of this legislative distinction violates the right of a Defendant to 
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due process and equal protection under the law, particularly in view of the fact that a 
singular protection is thereby extended to a flawed system.12 
V. Did the Trial Court both at the Justice Court level and at the District 
level abuse their respective discretions and exceed the Maximum sentence as 
allowed by State Law thereby denying Due Process as guaranteed by the Utah 
Constitution and by the United States Constitution. 
101. The Court sentenced the Defendant orally from the bench on the 19th day of 
September, 2007 as follows: 
"The Court finds you guilty of the offense....It will be the order of the 
Court that the Defendant pay a fine in the amount of $50 for maintaining 
that nuisance. The Court will place the Defendant on probation and will 
review this matter on the 26th of November at 10:00 a.m. At that point in 
time I'll expect Mr. Grunig in his capacity to come back and report to the 
Court, and the Defendant is to be present at that time as well with his 
counsel, and represent to me that the property has been cleaned up 
satisfactory to the norms of society. If not, the Defendant will be placed in 
contempt and then the Court will impose a jail sentence at that point in 
time." (See Transcript No. 1 pg. 46 and 47) 
This sentence was clearly at odds with the powers extended to cities and towns 
(and more importantly to the District Court) and was surely "repugnant to law." Allgood 
vs. Larsen (supra) see also State vs. Hemmert (supra) in the Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah No. 15725 (an unpublished opinion) Crockett Hall and Ellet concurring. If the 
singular and unlawful sentence imposed by the Justice Court and perpetuates by the 
District Court had not found its basis in an unconstitutional ordinance, this Defendant 
would have been deprived of any power to seek an effective review of this draconian 
12
 The Defendant/Appellant is particularly grateful for the assistance provided in 
connection with the text and argument used in connection with presentation of this issue. 
52 
pronouncement. 
VI. Did the District Court rule by its ruling appropriately dispose of the 
issues as to constitutionality of a statute or ordinance when it denied the 
Defendant/Appellant's motion to dismiss and the motion to quash the justice court 
conviction. 
102. Defendant/Appellee filed a Motion and Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities In Support of Motion To Dismiss in the District Court on or about the 12 th 
day of April, 2007. A Motion to Quash the Justice Court conviction was also filed. Said 
Motions specifically addressed constitutional issues as related to the validity of 
Plaintiff/Appellant's ordinances and the validity of certain statutes of State of Utah 
regarding nuisance. 
2. The District Judge in a Hearing held on the 30th day of July, 2007 
ruled on the issues in said Motion To Dismiss in the Court's Minutes regarding that 
Ruling recites: 
"The Court denies both of defendant's motions." (See Appendix EEE) 
The actual transcript of that hearing is found in Transcript #1, Page 3 and reads as 
follows: 
fTn regards to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Court finds that the 
Defendant has not overcome the long-standing presumptions regarding 
constitutionality. The court finds that Plaintiffs ordinance is not 
unconstitutionally vague and therefore defendant's motion is denied. " 
103. The Plaintiff/Appellee was charged with preparing the Order On Motion to 
Dismiss And To Quash Conviction and the proposed order recited as follows: 
"Based upon the pleadings and other arguments made in this matter, the 
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Court finds that Defendant has failed to overcome the burden necessary to 
show that the Hyde Park City nuisance ordinance is unconstitutional; that 
the Hyde Park City nuisance ordinance is in conflict with state statutes; and 
that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague or over broad." 
The Defendant/Appellant filed timely objections to the Oral Order of the Court and to the 
Judgement of conviction (Appendix FFF). 
CONCLUSION 
In keeping with prior points regarding sensitivity to the revenue potential inherent 
in operation of Justice Courts one need only look at the sentencing process employed in 
this case. In the Justice Court the mandate of municipalities legislative arm insured a 
steady flow to city coffers at the rate of fifty dollars per day, not just from the date of 
conviction but from the date of Notice. When appealed to the District Court an even less 
subtle approach was employed in order to circumvent the above unconstitutionality by 
invoking the tool of civil contempt, a punishment without end so to speak, all without the 
safeguards afforded by the right to appeal provided by a system created without 
deference to the concept of separation of powers. 
The general purpose of all laws and regulations, is that of allowing an owner the 
highest possible degree of freedom of use of his property so long as it is not an 
infringement upon recognition of similar rights of others or inconsistent with the general 
welfare while not infringing upon the safety and health of others. Notwithstanding those 
laudable goals, a well ordered State must insure that the functions inherent injustice and 
punishment he insulated from local prejudices or proclivities that might erupt in certain 
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areas within the general sovereignty. 
Utah's legislative scheme governing justice courts invades the judges' core 
function to "adjudicate with dispassionate impartiality." Instead of administering justice, 
justice courts risk being relegated to "collection agencies" for "government officials 
intent on revenue" generation. The separation of powers doctrine demands "[jjudicial 
independence...without intrusion from or intruding upon the other branches of 
government." 
Upon the reasoning supporting the above conclusions this court should reverse the 
ruling of the District Court for want of jurisdiction and thereby invalidate" Utah's 
legislative scheme creating and maintaining justice courts. 
Alternatively, should this Court conclude that the Justice Court have jurisdiction 
to try criminal cases the conviction of Defendant should be reversed in that the ordinance 
of Hyde Park City is flawed in that the elements of that ordinance, if proved, forbids 
conduct which a state statute protects and metes out punishment which the Utah 
Constitution and the acts of the State legislature forbid. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
/flW./ Lauritzen 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Foregoing document(s), 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, was delivered on the following in the manner indicated 
on the 16th day of July, 2008. [ ] U.S. mail [X] Hand delivery [ ] Fax 
Jonathan Jenkins 
108 North Main 
Logan, UT 84321 
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APPENDIX A 
Motions to Dismiss 
A. W. Lauritzen(1906) 
Attorney at Law 
610 North Main 
P.O.Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-3391 
IN THE JUSTICE COURT FOR HYDE PARK CITY 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
L.1 
HYDE PARK CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RIO DAVIS 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
PLAINTIFF'S INFORMATION 
Case No. HP05-05 
Judge David C. Marx 
Oral Arguments Requested 
COMES NOW the Defendant's and hereby respectfully moves this Honorable Court for 
an Order to Dismiss the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
The prosecution must be dismissed on the following reasoning and grounds: 
1. The nuisance ordinance of the Plaintiffs City has not been properly enacted, 
published, posted or adopted in accordance with the statutes and laws of the State of Utah. 
2. The Plaintiff City's nuisance ordinances are repugnant to and in conllici with the 
ueneral laws of the State of Utah. 
3. The Plaintiffs City's nuisance ordinances and tl 
are unconstitutionally vague both facially and as applied 
Dated thisxH— day ol February. 2006. 
statutes of (he State ofUtah 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of a Foregoing documents, DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S INFORMATION and MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS was served on the following in the 
manner indicated on the 2nd day of March, 2006.V] U.S. mail [ ] Hand delivery [ ] Fax 
mua- zd^Kdd 
Scott Wyatt 
113 East Center 
Hyde Park, Utah 84318 
A. W. Lauritzen(1906) 
Attorney at Law 
610 North Main 
P.O.Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-3391 
IN THE JUSTICE COURT FOR HYDE PARK CITY 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
HYDE PARK CITY. 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
RIO DAVIS 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
PENDING ACTION 
Oral Arguments Requested 
Case No. HP05-05 
Judge: David C. Marx 
COMES NOW Rio Davis and moves this court to Dismiss the action pending on the 
grounds previously argued and upon the further ground that the trial/appeal piocess an 
promulgated b\ the Utah Legislature and as practiced in the Justice Court and m the District 
Court are ilawed and deny this Defendant due process of law follows: 
1. The Statute UCA 10-8-60 in prescribing that determination of c\ idence employed 
regarding what constitutes a Nuisance be relegated to each city and town constitutes violation of 
Defendant's right to due process and violated the Doctrine of Separation of powers as mandated 
by Article VIII Section 4 of the Utah Constitution and as construed by authorities. 
2. This court by its very existence and as governed pursuant to State Law constitutes 
a violation of Article VIII Section 4 of the Utah Constitution and thereby possesses no 
jurisdiction to decide cases or controversies. 
J . A Memorandum of Points and Authorities are provided herewith 
Wherefore this action should be dismissed. 
Dated this the <fW day of October, 2006. 
/ 
A.W. La'uittzdn 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING \ 
\ 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
i 
Foregoing document(s),MOTION TO DISMISS PENDING ACTION, was 
served on the following in the manner indicated on the y*(£&- day 
of October, 2006. \/\ U.S. mail [ ] Hand delivery [ ] Fax. 
Scott Wyatt 
lo<& w. M a m 
lo<$CL.y\} LK.T 
A. W. Lauritzen(1906) 
Attorney at Law P.O. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 753-3391 
IN THE JUSTICE COURT IN AND FOR HYDE PARK CITY 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
HYDE PARK CITY, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
Plaintiff, MOTION TO DISMISS AND QUASH 
CONVICTION 
vs. 
JERALD RIO DAVIS, 
Defendant, 
Case No. HP05-0503 
FACTS 
1. Relying on a Hyde Park Ordinance, y / p - ~33P- , said ordinance 
widely divergent from State Statute both as to punishment and elements proof of which is 
required to support a conviction Defendant stands convicted of the town ordinance and now 
awaits sentencing before a town justice who is as to this case, not legally trained. 
ISSUES 
POINT I. The Statutory scheme for Justice Courts interferes with Judicial 
independence by providing monetary incentives to convict criminal defendant's and 
authorizing municipal government to hire and fire judges and to control court operations. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT 
THE STATUTORY SCHEME PROMULGATED FOR THE PURPOSE OF CREATING 
AND REGULATING JUSTICE COURTS INTERFERES WITH JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE BY PROVIDING MONETARY INCENTIVES TO CONVICT 
AND/OR SANCTION CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS AND BY AUTHORIZING 
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS TO HIRE AND FIRE JUDGES AND BY GRANTING 
CONTROL OF COURT OPERATIONS. 
3. The Utah legislature's scheme for establishing and operating justice courts violates the 
separation of powers doctrine's prohibition proscribing acts of one branch of government which 
interfere with performance of core functions by another branch. Judges must be free to exercise 
exclusive power to decide cases independently and without influence exerted by the executive 
and legislative branches. Under Utah's statutory scheme, municipal governments have obtained 
broad authority to control and direct justice courts, including the power to whimsically appoint 
and dismiss judges. In addition, municipalities may and are directed to control justice court 
budgets, personnel, and resources. Because Utah law requires that municipalities must fund their 
own justice courts, local governments will tend to establish local courts only if the courts are 
able to fund their own operations. In practice, some justice courts have become so profitable that 
they serve as a significant source of revenue upon which the municipalities they serve rely when 
planning their annual budgets. This legislative scheme presents enormous, if subtle, incentives 
for justice court judges to generate revenue by convicting and fining criminal defendants. These 
incentives, in turn, interfere with the core judicial function of independently and fairly 
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adjudicating criminal cases in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 
A. The Utah Constitution Grants Judges the Exclusive Power to Impartially Decide 
Criminal Cases, Independent of any Compulsion Wielded by Executive and Legislative 
Branches. 
4. Under the Utah Constitution's separation of powers clause, one branch of government 
may not interfere with the core function of another branch. Although this doctrine does not 
require complete independence among the three branches, it does require each branch to respect 
the inherent roles of the other two branches. The main function of the judicial branch, as an 
undeniable fact, is to impartially interpret the law and fairly decide cases and controversies. 
5. The separation of powers doctrine serves as the very foundation for the American 
concept of liberty. Article V, section one of the Utah Constitution defines this doctrine as 
follows: 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into 
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; 
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one 
of these departments shall exercise functions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
Utah Const. Art. V, § 1. 
6. As the Utah Court has observed, the separation of the three branches is essential to 
preserve liberty and individual rights: 
Montesquieu's writings warn us that there can be no liberty if the powers of the three 
branches of government do not remain separate. Madison recognized the principle as 
more sacred than any other in a free constitution, and that no one branch should possess, 
directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in the administration of its 
powers. Justice Marshall adhered to the principle in Marbury vs. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 
1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed, 60....The fundament of the doctrine remained unassailable when 
the United States Supreme Court through Justice Frankfurter reminded the President that 
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his action of seizing the nation's steel mills to prevent a national catastrophe threatened to 
be an "accretion of dangerous power" which comes from the "unchecked disregard" of 
the checks and balances that doctrine was created to provide. Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. Vs. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952). Whether implied, as in our federal 
constitution and in those of fourteen states, or whether expressly stated, as in our own 
state's constitution, the doctrine of separation of powers is the control gate harnessing 
the reservoir of powers of a government which functions at the will of the people. 
Timpanogos Planning & Water Management Agency vs. Central Utah Water 
Conservancy Dist. 690 P.2d 562, 564-565 (Utah 1984). 
7. Notwithstanding the imperative of the above quoted language, the modern separation 
of powers doctrine does not require absolute independence between the branches. "[Although 
the threefold division of powers is the basis for the American Constitution, there are many cases 
in which the duties of one department are to a certain extent devolved upon and shared by the 
other." In re Young, 1999 UT 6, [^13, 976 P.2d 581 (quoting Tite vs. State Tax Commission, 
57, P.2d 734, 737 (Utah 1963)). One branch only violates the separation of powers doctrine 
when it exercises the power that is "exclusive to one department..." Id. at }^14. Utah Courts have 
characterized exclusive powers as those which are "primary," "core," or "essential," to one 
branch. Id. (quoting Salt Lake City vs. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 849 (Utah 1994); Timpanogas, 
690 P.2d at 567; State vs. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683, 688 (Utah 1977)). Stated differently, 
exclusive means "inherent in the very concept of one of the three branches of a constitutional 
government." Id. at % 26. 
8. The judicial branch's " primary function" includes the duty to fairly and independently 
"hear and determine controversies between adverse parties and questions in litigation." 
Timpanogos, 690 P.2d at 569, 571 (quoting Citizens Club vs. Welling, 27 P.3d 23, 26 (Utah 
1933)). Judges have the exclusive power "to interpret and adjudicate with dispassionate 
impartiality questions of law between adverse parties..." Id. it follows that the separation of 
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powers doctrine bars executive or legislative actions that threaten "the fundamental integrity fo 
the judicial branch..." Ohms, 881 P.2d at 849 (quoting In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 
633, 642 (Utah 1988)). "It is essential in all courts that the judges who are appointed to 
administer the law should be permitted to administer it under the protection of the law 
independently and freely, without favor and without fear." In re Hammermaster 985 P.2d 924, 
936 (Wash. 1999) (quoting Bradley vs Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 349 n. 16 (1871)). 
B. Utah's Legislative Scheme Governing Justice Courts Creates Substantial Economic 
Incentives for Municipalities to Use Justice Courts to Generate Revenue for Their General 
Fund. 
9. The statutes governing justice courts violate principles of Constitutional dimension in 
that justice courts are revenue-driven entities that, by definition, cannot independently and 
impartially adjudicate disputes. Under Utah's legislative scheme, state funded district courts 
have jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses unless a local municipality acts to fund its own 
justice court. Because municipalities retain half of the revenue created by justice courts, 
municipalities, as a practical matter, will only create such courts when the elective system can 
generate sufficient revenue to fund a profitable operation. Consequently, this revenue-producing 
scheme creates enormous incentives for municipal governments and justice court judges to 
overlook fundamental constitutional principles in order to achieve and maximize that profit. 
10. In Utah's courts system, local municipalities may, at their option, elect to enforce 
class B and C misdemeanors either through the state district courts or by creating their own 
justice courts. Article VIII, section one of the Utah Constitution authorizes the legislature to 
create "courts not of record..." The legislature has done so in chapter five of Title 78 of the Utah 
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Code. 1 hat chapter authorizes municipalities to create and fund justice courts with "jurisdiction 
over class B and C misdemeanors, violation of ordinances, and infractions committed with their 
territorial jurisdiction, except those offenses over which the juvenile court has exclusive 
jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-104(1) (2002); see also Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-5-101, 
78-5-101.5 (2002) (providing for the creation of justice courts). In the absence of a justice 
court, state funded district courts have jurisdiction over these criminal offenses. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3-4(8) (Supp. 2004). 
11. Despite this legislative authority to create justice courts, as a practical matter, local 
governments only do so when justice courts can generate sufficient revenue to pay for their own 
expenses. By statute, the states must fund the district courts to enforce class B and C 
misdemeanors, local ordinances, and infractions. Utah Code Ann. §78-3-13.4 (2002). Under 
this model, the state receives half of all fines and forfeitures while the prosecuting agency, 
usually meaning the county, receive the other half. Id. § 78-3-14.5 (2) (Supp. 2004). Local 
municipalities receive no portion of this revenue because they provide no funding to the district 
courts. 
12. When municipalities purport to create justice courts, to supplant the state fund court 
operations, Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-110 (Supp. 2004), 78-5-111 (2002); they must, as a 
preliminary requirement and in order to receive favorable action on an application to create a 
justice court, demonstrate a "need" for a local court, including demonstration of the ability to 
fund the proposed court. Id § 78-5-101.5 (2002). As previously noted, in a justice-court 
system, municipalities retain half of all fines and forfeitures; the other half goes to the state. 
Id. § 78-5-116 (1) (Supp. 2004). 
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13. Given these fiscal realities, municipalities only create justice courts when doing so 
makes economic sense. Because the state has a statutory obligation to enforce class B and C 
misdemeanors, local ordinances, and infractions without charge visited on local governments, 
municipalities would have no incentive to establish local justice courts unless such courts 
generate adequate revenue to retire the operational cost.. A recent study of justice courts in Salt 
Lake County established that all justice courts, "produce revenues in excess of expenditures in 
varying degrees." Institute for Law and Policy Planning, Salt Lake County Criminal Justice 
Assessment 6.11 (2004) (hereinafter referred to as "County Justice Court 
Assessment")(relevant portions are attached hereto ). 
14. Many justice courts show a profit and thereby generate revenue for cities. The 
previously referenced County Justice Court Assessment discloses that justice court "[j]udges and 
administrators freely admit that they believe the justice courts are a source of significant revenue 
for their cities." Id. In fact, municipalities "view the [justice] courts as a prime source worthy of 
protection and expansion." Id. 
15. Municipalities have further capitalized on the justice court system by refusing to 
reimburse the host county for incarcerating justice court offenders. Id. at 3.9. Although some 
county sheriffs bill municipalities for housing offenders, most cities maintain that they already 
contribute to the County's general fund, and that such contributions should provide 
compensation for operating the jail. Id. at 3.10. As a result, in Salt Lake County "municipalities 
generated nearly $17 million dollars in court fees [gross revenue] during 2000, yet paid nothing 
towards the approximately $7 million in jail billings". Id. 
16. In addition to confinement at no cost to the involved city , municipalities are the 
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recipient of additional services from counties. "Justice Courts have unfettered access to the 
larger system through the jail, the county probation department, the legal defender, and so forth 
with little or no financial obligation. Id. at 3.9. For these very reasons, justice courts have, 
unsurprisingly, proliferated in recent years. Id. at 6.5. Courts have even been established in 
minor villages such as Trenton & Clarkston. 
C. The Legislative Scheme Coupled With Municipalities' Lack of Financial Accountability 
For Incarcerated Offenders Undermines Justice Court Independence and Creates 
Unconstitutional Pecuniary Incentives do Other Than Justice to Dispense with Fairness 
and impartiality. 
17. The legislature's funding mechanism coupled with the political realty that 
municipalities use justice courts to generate revenue for the general fund directly undermine 
justice court judges' independence. Justice court judges must produce sufficient revenue to 
maintain the very existence of their courts, and thereby incentive exists to meet a municipalities' 
revenue projections. The County Justice Court Assessment study substantiates this proposition 
of "the fear that cities will become dependent on the money generated through enforcement, thus 
increasing the likelihood that police and judges will be overly aggressive as a way to meet 
financial expectations and demands." Id. at 3.8. 
18. The conclusion quoted above directly conflicts with certain official assumptions that 
monetary demands on justice court judges are "unlikely" and "speculative." Indeed, the revenue-
generating impetus for establishing justice courts is obvious. As the editorial staff of the Salt 
Lake Tribune recently observed, "the justification for creating justice courts explicitly includes 
being a revenue source for the wider city government..." Editorial, Justice Peeks, Salt Lake 
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Tribune, July 20, 2005. The County Justice Court Assessment concluded that "the importance 
of revenue generation to municipalities is apparent from the fact that municipal judges are 
directly responsible to the executive branch, unlike county judges who must stand for retention 
by the electorate." County Justice Court Assessment at 6.5 
19. The separation of powers doctrine bars judges from being subject to financial 
blandishments when deciding cases. Statutes "granting a pecuniary interest" to judges are clearly 
unconstitutional. Blankenship vs. Minton Chevrolet Inc., 266 S.E.2d 902, 903 (W.V. 1979). 
The Utah Courts have similarly held that judges must have "no favors to grant, no patronage to 
dispose of, and no friends to reward." Timpanogo, 690 P.2d at 568 (quoting In re O'Sullivan, 
158 P.2d 306, 309 (Mont. 1945). In the Timpanogos case, the Supreme Court held that the 
legislature violated the separation of powers doctrine when it empowered district court judges to 
appoint board members of a water conservancy district. Id. at 570. Because the same judges 
who appointed board members would later review board decisions, this Court concluded that the 
district court judges might "feel constrained in passing upon board action." Id. at 570. 
20. Financial incentives need not be explicit in order to violate the separation of powers 
doctrine. In defining governmental branch powers, the Utah Court observed that there is a 
natural tendency of all persons, even judges, to unconsciously protect their interest: 
Due to the manner in which our system was created and has developed, the 
judiciary has the awesome prerogative and responsibility of judging the 
scope of powers of the executive, legislative, and of its own. For this 
reason it is essential that the judiciary be especially circumspect in maintaining 
an awareness fo the natural propensity fo human nature: that when anyone 
has the power to decide wherein his own interests are involved, there is danger 
of consciously or subconsciously leaning toward the protection, and perhaps 
the magnification, of his own self-interest. Jones, 550 P.2d at 210 (footnote omitted). 
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Knowing that justice counts will only survive if they produce adequate revenue, a justice court 
judge might well have an incentive to convict and fine persons without due regard to their core 
function to fairly adjudicate cases. Timpanogos, 660 P.2d at 571. 
21. Municipalities' refusal to reimburse jails compounds justice court judges' incentives 
to generate revenue. This stance allows justice court judges to use county jails "with little 
restriction and complete financial impunity." County Justice Court Assessment at 3.9, A 
direct consequence of un-reimbursed jail services is the common practice injustice courts of 
ordering criminal defendants to "pay or serve" their sentences. Id. 6.5. This device allows 
justice court judges to threaten to and/or to incarcerate offenders who fail to pay fines in a timely 
manner. Id.. The absence of any financial obligation to municipalities for jail services has 
resulted injustice court judges employing incarceration to excess in collecting revenue. 
Id. at 3.9. 
22. The "pay or serve" practice is especially offensive because it tends to foment an 
unwarranted deprivation of a persons liberty. In defining separation of powers violations, the 
Utah Court has held that it will tolerate shared powers "when it is essential to the discharge of a 
primary function, when it is not an assumption of the whole power of another department, and 
when the exercise of the other power does not jeopardize individual liberty." Timpanogos, 690 
P.2d at 567 (quoting C. Sand, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 3.06). The absence of 
any financial obligation resulting from the incarceration of offenders who fail to pay fines, 
Defendant suggests, violates this test. 
D. Municipalities' Statutory Control Over Justice Courts Further Frustrates the Fair 
Adjudication of Criminal Cases. 
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23. Even if this financial incentive did not interfere with judicial independence, Utah's 
legislative scheme governing justice courts also violates separation of powers principles 
because it foments exertion of inordinate control over administration of justice courts. 
Municipalities have statutory authority to hire and fire judges, to fund court operations, and to 
supervise court personnel. These powers, coupled with the use of justice courts as revenue 
boosters create a legislative scheme that invades the core function of the judicial branch to fairly 
and independently deciding cases. 
24. Of greatest concern, the legislature has authorized the executive, without meaningful 
guidelines, to hire and fire justice courts judges. Utah Code Annotated section 78-5-134(), 
(2)(2002) designates the municipal leader, whether a mayor, council chair, or city manager, 
generically called the "appointing authority," to "appoint "justice court judges. The entity's 
legislative body must then confirm the appointment by a majority vote. Id § 78-5-134(2). 
Justice Court judges serve four-year terms. Id. § 78-5-132 (1). Upon completion of the term, 
Utah law mandates that justice court judges "shall be reappointed absent a showing of good 
cause." Id. § 78-5-134(5). Iin determining whether "good cause" exists, municipalities "shall 
consider" (1) whether the state Judicial Council has certified the judge; and, (2) "any other 
factors considered relevant by the appointing authority." Id. § 78-5-134(5)(d). (Emphasis mine) 
25. Although this scheme purports to model the appointment of justice court judges after 
the traditional appointment process of Federal judges, it allows for expansive executive and 
legislative influence over judges. Because appointing authorities may "consider any other 
factor" in deciding whether to reappoint a judge, justice court judges essentially serve at the 
whim of the executive. Id. § 78-5-134(5)(d). Given this broad discretion as to whether to 
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reappoint, the economic ?ealities surrounding justice courts and the pressure to generate revenue 
directly influence how judges handle cases. At its most extreme, such influence is manifested if 
a judge fails to meet a municipality's revenue projections1 and the appointing authority uses the 
grant of power as a means of expressing displeasure. In a plausible scenario, the justice court 
judge might indeed, sense pressure, whether "consciously or subconsciously" to maximize 
collections and, thus, preserve his or her "own self-interest." Jones, 550 p.2d at 210. Pressure 
to collect revenue might not necessarily be overt, unspoken or unrealized expectations of 
"favors," "patronage," or "reward" might well be enough to violate separation of powers 
principles. Timpanogos, 690 P.2d at 568 (quoting In re O'Sullivan, 158 P.2d at 309). 
26. At the very least, the appointment and reappointment process tend to create an 
appearance of impropriety. Canon 2 of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct charges judges to 
avoid even "the appearance of impropriety" to ensure "public confidence" in the judiciary. The 
County Justice Court Assessment pointed to such an appearance of patronage when it concluded 
that justice court judges are "directly responsible to the executive branch" for their very 
existence. County Justice Court Assessment at 6.5. Although the assessment did not observe 
anything "sinister or improper" the stated concern was that the "appointive power of ihe mayors 
presents an interesting if not conflicting situation in that the Executive branch literally creates the 
judicial branch via appointment." Id. at 6.10. The editorial staff of the Salt Lake Tribune 
eliminated any doubt about the appearance of impropriety when it recently observed that 
"because the justification for creating justice courts explicitly includes being a revenue source for 
the wider city government, judicial impartiality is seriously compromised." Editorial, Justice 
'Surely a significant "factor" 
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Peeks, Slat Lake Tribune, July 20,2005. 
27. Given the sheer numbers of persons who appear before justice courts, appearance of 
impartiality is essential to maintain public confidence in those courts. The Utah State court 
website points out that in fiscal year 2004 justice courts presided of over 450,000 traffic cases. 
See http://www.utcourts.gov/stats/FY04/justice/fy2004_statewide.htm. In addition, the 
justice courts disposed of an additional 85,000 misdemeanor cases during the same year. By 
comparison, the district courts disposed of only about 100,000 misdemeanors during fiscal year 
2004. See http://www.utcourts.gov/stats/FY04/dist/fy2004 9.htm. A person, citizen or 
otherwise, is most likely to experience the Utah justice system through justice courts. These 
numbers present a compelling case to ensure "public confldence,, in the justice courts. 
Hammermaster, 985 P.2d at 936. 
28. Moreover, an appearance of impropriety undermines the independence of justice 
courts because public perception affects judicial decision-making. Utah Courts have held that 
appearances erode public confidence and alter judges' decisions discussing the point as follows: 
"A judge cannot engage in political debate or make public defense of his acts. 
When his action is judicial he may always rely upon the support of the define 
record upon which his action is based...But when he participates in the action 
of the executive or legislative departments of government he is without those 
supports. He exposes himself to attack and indeed invites it, which because 
of his peculiar situation inevitable impairs his value as a judge and the appropriate 
influence of his office." Timponogos, 690 P.2d at 572 (quoting a letter from 
former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Harlan Fiske Stone to Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, July 20, 1942, in Mason, Extra-Judicial Work for Judges: 
The Views of Chief Justice Stone, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 203-204 (1953)). 
29. In addition to the appointment process, the legislature has granted municipalities 
control over justice court personnel and resources. Utah law entrusts municipalities with funding 
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physical facilities, hiring %nd supervising court staff, and administering personnel policies. Utah 
Code Annotated §§ 78-5-108 (Supp. 2004), 78-5-110 (Supp. 2004), 78-5-111 (2002). Utah 
law thereby empowers local executives to control every aspect of justice court operations and to 
determine and thereby fix, each budgetary item. The executive branch also appoints the 
administrative staff who serve "at wilV or are hired via the merit system as any other city 
employees" in the executive department. County Justice Court Assessment at 6.10. 
30. These extensive powers emphasize the appearance of impropriety and tend to 
reinforce the actual conflicts discussed above. Executive control over justice courts' budgets, 
staff, and resources presents "the perception (if not the reality) of dominance that elected officials 
exercise over 1he judiciary they created." Id. Executive action violates the separation of powers 
doctrine "when there is an attempt by one branch to dominate another in that other's proper 
sphere of influence." Young, 1999 UT 6, [^23, 976 P.2d 581. Because the legislative scheme 
allows local executives to "effectively control " the justice courts, that scheme unconstitutionally 
invades the province of the judiciary. Id. 
E. No Valid Reasons Support Or Justify Municipalities' Revenue-Motivated Control Over 
Justice Courts. 
31. Although one might present several unpersuasive rebuttals to the suggestion that 
municipalities are revenue-driven to creation of justice courts; none of those arguments change 
the legislative landscape that fosters executive and legislative interference with justice courts 
based on budgetary considerations. Neither judicial oversight, case law, nor the theoretical 
advantages present through the justice court system sanitizes the separation of powers obstacles 
presented by Utah's legislative scheme. Such argument as has been presented in proceedings to 
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date fail to resolve the main question presented by this motion: whether the legislative scheme 
governing justice courts jeopardizes the "dispassionate" adjudication of criminal cases. 
Timponogos, 690 P.2d at 571. Although one might reason that no particular Defendant can 
provide a showing that revenue concerns actually motivated any particular justice court judges' 
decisions the discussion above demonstrates the superficiality of such an argument given the 
reality that justice courts are essentially revenue-driven. See County Justice Court Assessment 
at 3.9,3.9, 6.11.2 Additionally, proper application of the separation of powers doctrine does not 
require such a showing in that the Utah Supreme Courts opinion in Timponogos establishes that 
no actual bias need occur when one branch is provided authority to influence another's core 
function. In that case, the Utah Court struck down district court judges' authority to appoint 
water conservancy board members even though the parties neither alleged nor proved actual 
favoritism. Timponogos, 690, P.2d at 570-72. This appointment system violated the 
separation of powers doctrine on the reasoning that judges might "feel constrained" and "would 
avoid confrontations" in adjudicating disputes involving water boards. Id. at 570-71. 
32. Any position taken to the effect that no other jurisdictions have struck down similar 
justice court systems based on separation of powers considerations is manifestly without 
foundation. . State vs. Town of South Carthage, 840 S.W.2d 895 (Tenn. 1992), the 
Tennessee Supreme Court held that a legislatively-established justice court system violated 
separation of powers principles without a showing of any actual harm to the defendant. The 
Tennessee Constitution contains provisions similar to Utah's as they require the separation of 
2There is some tacit recognition of the "revenue driven' nature of the courts origination 
and operation by the promulgation of a bail schedule. 
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the three branches and as t^hey allow for the legislature ot create justice courts. Id at 897 (citing 
Tenn. Const. Art. II, § 2, Art. VI, § 1). Like Utah, the Tennessee legislature empowered 
municipalities to appoint justice courts judges to "serve at the pleasure" of the mayor and local 
legislative leaders. Id at 896. 
33. The Tennessee Supreme Court held that this system violated the mandate of the 
separation of powers doctrine because of the potential for city leaders to influence justice court 
judges "to increase city revenue...and to impose harsher sentences" on DUI offenders. Id. at 897 
(quoting Summers vs. Thompson., 764 S.W.2d 182, 183 (Tenn. 1988)). Although that court 
relied on a prior decision in which city leaders had actually attempted to influence a justice court 
judge, no similar allegations arose with respect to the case under review. Carthage, 840 
S.W.2d at 897. The court held without necessity of reference to the previous case that the 
mere potential for influence violated justice court judges' ability to fairly adjudicate cases: 
The instant scenario demonstrates the danger posed to an independent judiciary 
and to the impartial administration of justice through the exercise of arbitrary power 
by a separate branch of government motivated by policy and political concerns 
inimical to an independent system of justice. Judicial independence by all respected 
political thought indispensably is essential to the effective operation of constitutional 
government. Id. at 899. 
34. To ensure an judiciary independent from the political caprice and whims of other 
government branches, the Tennessee Supreme Court required justice court judges to be elected 
rather than to be appointed and supervised by local municipalities. Id. The Tennessee 
Constitution employs popular elections to preserve judicial independence from the other 
branches of government. Id. at 896 (citing Tenn. Const. Art. IV, § 4). Although Utah does 
not rely on popular elections, the "danger" attendant to influence of justice court judges as 
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enunciated in Carthage &ould seem to apply equally under Utah's justice court system. 
35. Similarly, in Calligy vs. Mayor and Council fo the City of Hoboken, 665 A.2d 
408, 409 (N.J. Super. 1995), a taxpayer claimed that an ordinance placing a municipal court in a 
city's department of administration violated separation of powers principles. That opinion 
invalidated the justice court because the "authority conferred by the ordinance is inconsistent 
with both the fact and appearance of judicial independence required by law." Id. at 412. The 
Court reached this conclusion despite the absence of any allegation that city officials had ever 
interfered with the court. Id. at 411. Instead, the court held that placing the justice court in the 
executive branch was "inconsistent with that court's independence." Id. 
36. This instant case in analogous. Although Defendant does not and cannot allege that 
the justice court judge is actually influenced by the fact that he is beholden to the City's leaders 
under Utah's legislative scheme, the fact remains that local executive officials "literally create[] 
the judicial branch via appointment." County Justice Court Assessment at 6.10. Thus, justice 
court judges are "directly responsible to the executive branch..." County justice Court 
Assessment at 6.5. This situation allows municipalities to "dominate" justice courts in violation 
of the separation of powers doctrine. Young, 1999 UT 6, f 23, 976 P.2d 581. 
37. Even more to the point, in the State of Washington that states experience points to 
the very dangers that the reality of revenue-generating justice courts suggest might happen in 
Utah. In In re Hammermaster, 985 P.2d 924 (Wash. 1999), the Washington Supreme Court 
sanctioned a justice court for violating numerous ethical duties and abusing his authority. The 
court reprimanded the judge for threatening to incarcerate offenders up to a "life" term for failing 
to pay court-ordered fines. Id. at 935-36. In doing so, the court held that "[a] judge's primary 
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function is the administration of justice, not the collection of fines." Id. at 936. 
38. One justice fully concurred in the court's judgment and provided specific examples 
of justice court judges who were motivated by financial considerations in adjudicating criminal 
cases and observed: 
Our opinion today conveys a very strong message to the judiciary and local 
governments in Washington that the Supreme Court will not tolerate short 
cuts in due process. While many municipalities have established municipal 
courts because they want to administer justice locally, it is also true many 
jurisdictions establish municipal court for purely avaricious reasons-as 
revenue agencies to be operated if they "make money" and be dispensed 
with if they become inconvenient to administer or generate insufficient 
revenues. Some local jurisdictions have even attempted to control 
performance of duties by municipal court judges through devices such as 
performance audits, the provision of substandard court facilities, or nonjudicial 
control of court personnel. Occasionally, in some jurisdictions, when the 
judge has been too independent and has refuse dot generate sufficient revenue 
for the municipality, the city's legislative or executive authorities have forced 
the ouster of the judge. Id. at 249 (Talmadge, J. Concurring)(cites omitted). 
39. Arguments that "section 8 judges" exercise "meaningful ovesight" of justice courts. 
Are advanced with misplaced confidence. There is no dispute that other courts, the Judicial 
Conduct Commission and the state Judicial Council oversee justice courts. The fact that 
supervision is available fails to address the multitude of problems inherent in Utah's justice court 
system. Even given the supervision available, the legislative scheme does, nonetheless, provide 
justice courts with strong incentives to generate revenue contrary to the impartial administration 
of justice. Any such argument similarly fails to address a municipalities' power and influence 
with respect to appointment and reappointment of judges, to push for increased collections, and 
to manipulate budgets, personnel, and resources whether it be explicitly or implicitly. In any 
event, actual municipal pressure need not invite the Utah court's attention or violate the Canons 
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of Judicial Conduct in orSer to influence justice court judges' decision-making. As detailed 
above, this Court has recognized that subtle pressures can be as effective, to subvert the system 
as can overt influence. Timponogos, 690 P.2d at 571; Jones, 550 P.2d at 210. 
40. Any argument that the Utah legislature has authorized justice courts for over 100 
years without problem does no more than beg the point. Aside from the obvious response that 
the law as well as jurisprudence evolves over time, Utah's present legislative scheme directly 
defeats the purposes behind establishing local courts. "Justice Courts 'are designed, in the 
interest of both the defendant and the state, to provide speedier and less costly adjudications than 
may be possible in criminal courts of general jurisdiction.'" Bernat vs. Allphin, 2005 UT 1, % 
32.106 P.3d 707 (quoting Colten vs. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 114 (1972)). But, the separation 
of powers doctrine bars government from sacrificing "liberty" for the sake of efficiency. 
Timponogos, 690 P.2d at 567. In Timponogos, denial of the power to appoint water 
conservancy board members because such a "centralization and consolidation of power would 
seem to us tantamount to loss of democracy in the name of efficiency, an untenable proposition 
under our system of jurisprudence." Id. at 571. points up the basic flaw in such an argument. 
41. Like judges' power to appoint officers whom appear before those same judges, 
municipal control and influence over justice court judges to generate revenue undermines 
"essential" constitutional liberties. Id. at 567. Indeed, the framers of the federal constitution 
founded the justice system on judicial independence in criminal matters. Hammermaster, 985 
P.2d at 935-36. An independent judiciary, free from fiscal constraints, "is an essential tool in 
guarding the constitution and the rights of individuals." Id. at 936. 
42. Finally, any contention that the right to appeal to the district court and request a trial 
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de novo "sanitizes " any problems with justice courts is without basis in theory or as practiced. 
Any such argument grossly underrates the impact justice courts have on criminal defendants. 
Even though justice courts only handle class B and C misdemeanors, local ordinance violations, 
with intermediate punishment schedules, and infractions, conviction of these crimes can 
devastate lives. Incarceration visits destruction on the most routine daily activities and deprives 
persons of the fundamental right to liberty. As the United States Supreme Court has observed, 
even "[penalties such as probation or a fine may engender ca significant infringement of 
personal freedom,' but they cannot approximate in severity the loss of liberty that a prison term 
entails." Blanton vs. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989) (quoting Frank vs. 
United States, 395 U.S. 147,151 (1969)). Beyond the possibility of a jail sentence, fine, or 
probation, numerous collateral consequences disrupt the lives of persons who are convicted in 
justice courts. These disruptions include the loss of employment, driving privileges, government 
benefits, and even student loans. Sam Newton, Justice Court Appeal: The Good, the Bad, 
and the Unintended, 18 Utah Bar J. No. 1 at 25 (January/February 2005). 
43. The appellate process as contemplated by the legislature and as it is employed with 
respect to Justice court cases is flawed. By statutory mandate, an ordinance imperfection is dealt 
with differently than an imperfect constitutional ruling by a judge, albeit his appointment might 
be for all the wrong reasons. The fact of this legislative distinction violates the right of a 
Defendant to due process and equal protection under the law. 
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CONCLUSION 
In summary, Utah's legislative scheme governing justice courts invades the judges' core 
function to "adjudicate with dispassionate impartiality." Timponogos, 690 P.2d at 571. Instead 
of administering justice, justice courts risk being relegated to "collection agencies" for 
"government officials intent on revenue" generation. Hammermaster, 985 P.2d at 943 
(Talmage, J. Concurring). The separation of powers doctrine demands "[jjudicial 
independence...without intrusion from or intruding upon the other branches of government." Id. 
at 936 (majority opinion). 
Upon the reasoning supporting the above conclusions this Defendant requests this Court 
Dismiss this pending action for want of jurisdiction and thereby invalidate^ Utah's legislative 
scheme for creating and maintaining justice courts. 
Respectfully submitted thisjD day off )Cff,. , 2006 
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APPENDIX B 
Sentence & Judgement 
Hyde FarK Municipal jusuce v^uui i 
Cache County, State of Utah 
113 East Center Street, Hyde Park City, Utah 84318 (435)563-6923 
rATE OF UTAH/ Hyde Park 
Plaintiff, 
raid Rio Davis DOB: 11-11-58 
Defendant 
JUDGMENT 
As Modified at Sentence Review 
Case: HP05-0503 
efendant either having been adjudged or entered a plea of GUILTY/NO CONTEST to the charge of: 
Dunt No. 1 Maintaining a Nuisance Hyde Park Ordinance 10-332 Infraction 
Misdemeanor, and no legal reason having been shown why judgment should not be pronounced, and Defendant being present with or 
iving waived Counsel. It is the judgment and sentence of the Court ( Judgment and sentence is modified) as follows: 
ount No. 1 Defendant is fined $ and sentenced to 
il and $ are suspended upon satisfactory completion of 
ifendant to appear personally before the Court on the 
_ days in the Cache County Jail; and * days in the Cache County 
months probation to: Formal Court probation requiring 
Wednesday of each month between 2:00 & 5:00 p.m. beginning ; OR 
Informal Court probation to submit a written report to the Court prior to the first Wednesday of each month. Terms of probation are as 
Hows: 
hours community service as follows: $_ per month beginning a. Payment of total fine(s) $ or 
and by the same day of each month thereafter until paid in full. $20 late fee for all delinquent payments. 
b. No violation of federal, state, or local law. Keep Court informed of current address and phone number at all times. Submit to search of 
person, premises, or property and seizure of any evidence without a search warrant, any time of day or night, upon reasonable suspicion as 
ascertained by probation officer or police officer to verify compliance with probation terms. 
c. $ restitution to . Restitution is to be paid before Court fines. 
d. Do not possess or consume any alcoholic beverages, and do not frequent any place where alcohol is the main item on the menu; in 
particular: liquor stores, bars, and parties. Submit to urinalysis and/or blood tests at request of alcohol counselor, police officer, or Court. 
e. Contact Bear River Alcohol and Drug OR Court approved agency by 
for evaluation and complete recommended treatment, pay directly to provider the cost for treatment and sign a release of information to the 
Court. 
f. Provide all new receipts for proof of payment of all counseling upon each appearance before the Court. No credit given without receipts. 
g. No association with anyone wanted by the law or performing illegal activity, 
h. Maintain full time employment or educational program. 
i. Contact Private Probation Services Incorporated by to arrange for supervised probation. OR Participate in the PPSI 
House Arrest Program and pay the costs of the same, 
j . Complete and pay for: SA course Victim Impact Panel course Values course high school diploma/GBD 
certificate by _. 
Written report about 
Attend Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) 
.by. 
Narcotics Anonymous (NA) or other Court pre-approved rehabilitation group 
times within days every week and provide proof of attendance to Court at time of probation appearance on the 
next required appearance or each month, whichever is applicable. Must complete a written summary on each meeting attended. 
m. Contact assigned agency for community service hours on or before and schedule work hours days which are 
to be completed by . 
n. Pay restitution for any jail time required^) serve at the then^current State approved rate. 
nd other conditions set forth by the Court. 
^VJ \\J .JS^l TV/ t*t U 1 V U I V U s V U l l V l l l w j l l l l l . U J J J J U J V L U 1CIIV/. C- fVpfi/v/ b3\.NCh 
UE-TM op&ntJf\*>cJb., 
rount No. 2 Defendant is fined $ 
less the following suspend 
TOTAL TO BE PAID 
»d $ 
and 
o be imprisoned for 
>robation. 
:
 days in the Cache County Jail with days to be suspended on payment of fine and successful completion of 
rount No. 3 Defendant is fined $ $_ 
less the following suspended $_ 
TOTAL TO BE PAID $ and 
o be imprisoned for 
)robation. 
* days in the Cache County Jail with 
Defendant may appeal this judgment within thirty (30) days to Cache 
Date of Judgment f\jU/^C^ 
"opy delivered/mailed to Defendant on / - I 8LQ 7 by 
days to be suspended on payment of fine and successful completion o[ 
)isflrict Court by/nptifying this Court's clerk. 
/ 
C f V\' T ^ . , Judge 
APPENDIX C 
Notice of Appeal 
A. W. Lauritzen( 190ft) 
Attorney at Law/ Attorney for Defendant 
P.O.Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 753-3391 
IN THE JUSTICE COURT IN AND FOR HYDE PARK CITY 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
HYDE PARK CITY 
Plaintiff. 
vs 
JERALD RIO DAVIS 
Defendant 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. HP05-0503 
Judge: David C. Marx 
You will please take notice that the Defendant appeals the decision oi ihc Hyde Park City 
Justice Court for Cache County. State of Utah, made and entered on the Is1 d.n oi November. 
2006 to the District Court for Cache County. State of Utah; said decision amounting to a 
Judgment of conviction and sentence in the above entitled action. 
"-> „L Dated the^v^ dav of November, 2006. 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
A.W. Lauritzen being first duly sworn does depose and say that I hereby certify that there 
are valid grounds for the taking of appeal in the above entitled matter and that the appeal is not 
taken for the hindrance or delay ro to obstruct justice. 
Seal: 
I 
DENNIS N CLARK I 
Notary Public | 
**&r State of Utah | 
My Commission Expires Feb. 8, 2007 L 
505 N. 400W, Logan, UT 84321 I 
vnr *><\> *v v v v f www » » » * V P <FV 
w>/? M. 
Notary Public 
? 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hcrebv certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing. X( )TICE OF 
APPEAL, postage prepaid, to the following listed below on the day of November. 2006. 
Scott Wyatt, Esq. 
108 North Main 
Logan, UT 84321 
J 
APPENDIX D 
Motions to Dismiss 
A._W.Lauritzen(1906$ 
Attorney at Law 
610 North Main 
P.O.Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801)753-3391 
rN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
PENDING ACTION 
Oral Arguments Requested 
Case No. 071100143 
Judge: Judkins 
COMES NOW Rio Davis and moves this court to Dismiss the action pending on the 
grounds previously argued in Justice Court upon rhc ground that the trial and appeal process as 
promulgated by the Utah Legislature and as practiced in the Justice Court ana in. the District 
Court are flawed and deny this Defendant due process of law follows: 
1. The Statute UCA 10-8-60 in prescribing the nature and quality of evidence 
employed regarding what constitutes a Nuisance be relegated to each city and town constitutes a 
violation of Defendant's right 10 due process and violates the Doctrine of Separation ol powers as 
mandated by Article VIII Section 4 of the Utah Constitution and as construed by authorities such 
as Burns v. Boyden 133 P3d. 370 (Utah 2006). 
2. The Justice Court by its very existence and as governed pursuant to State Law, 
constitutes a violation of Article VIII Section 4 of the Utah Constitution and thereby may assert 
no jurisdiction to decide criminal cases ov controversies. 
HYDE PARK CITY, [ 
Plaintiff I 
vs. | 
RIO DAVIS j 
Defendant. I 
3. A Men^prandum of Points and Authorities is provided herewith. 
Wherefore this action should be dismissed. 
Dated this the I'^-xtey of April, 2007. 
CERTIFICATE uiv MAILING 
I herebv certit'v that a true and correct copy of'he iinvyoinii document! s).NT 'ION TO 
DISMISS PENDING ACTION, was served on the followirm in the manner indicated on the 
\<" ^_ day of April, 2007. $ U.S. mail [ ] Hand delivery [ ] Fax. 
HttlAMk 
Scott Wyatt 
108 North Main. #200 
Louan, Utah 84321 
A. W. Lauritzen(1906) 
Attorney at Law/ Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 753-3391 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT IN 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
HYDE PARK CITY 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
JERALD RIO DAVIS ] 
Defendant ] 
) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
) AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION TO DISMISS 
) Case No.071003 
) Judge: Judkins 
Oral Arguments Requested 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Ira B. (Friday) Davis, the father of Defendant Jerald Rio Davis was a long time 
resident of Hyde Park City, owning lands located at 187 East 200 North consisting of 1.07 acres 
upon which stood a home and shop which housed the business licensed and operated as Ira B. 
Davis Body and Fender. 
2. During the lifetime of Ira B. Davis the minutes of the Hyde Park City Counsel 
(examined during the period of 1970 onward) no discussion concerning said lands is noted 
except that respecting a Trailer House which was moved onto the property, there was a brief 
discussion but no action was taken at that time and no further discussion regarding this topic or 
any other was addressed until the end of 1979. 
3. For the purposes of this argument and for no other purpose, it is conceded by the 
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Defendant that Hyde Park City has purported to have enacted Chapter 10-300 through" 10-343 
which, from time to time, will be referred to as the "nuisance ordinance." This ordinance appears 
to have been enacted on the 10th day of January, 1979 and is said to have been revised on the 1st 
day of February, 1979. 
4. The nuisance ordinance, as adopted by the Plaintiff City, differs significantly from 
the nuisance statutes which have been and are in effect in Utah during the time coextensive with 
this litigation. 
5. On August 11, 1998 a letter from Mayor Mark E. Daines to Ira Davis advised that 
the City has received complaints about the "appearance of your property." 
6. In a letter dated November 9, 1998 from Mayor Mark E. Daines, observes that, 
"... We have noticed the removal of some vehicles and very much appreciate 
your willingness to comply with the ordinance and at the same time not 
jeopardize your repair business." 
7. Ira Davis died on May 18, 2001 and his estate ultimately passed to Rio Davis who 
continued to operate the business under a license issued by the executive branch of the Municipal 
Government. 
8. After taking possession of the property at 187 East 200 North, Rio Davis 
commenced a clean up, discarding items considered not to be relevant to continued operation, 
and has indeed removed a considerable amount of property from the East side of the tract which 
portion has now been fenced and is occupied by horses. Now operated, Personal property 
remains behind the shop which houses the Davis repair business as it is now situated. 
9. On March 21, 2003 Defendant received a letter from Reed A. Elder, purporting 
to represent Hyde Park City. The letter discusses a visit in which suggested goals were to be 
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accomplished by Defendant to bring the property into compliance with the existing City 
ordinances as follows: 
1. Removal of or storage in an onsite garage, " ...all non-licensed vehicles and boats" 
2. "All miscellaneous materials that you [emphasis mine] have no useful purpose for and 
all debris must be removed from the property. This includes, but is not limited to automotive 
motor parts, brick and masonry materials, lumber or other wood items, metal barrels and all other 
items of furniture, machinery and building materials." 
3. "All material and machinery which you want to keep and store on the property must be 
stored inside a closed structure or within an additional fenced area inside the property which 
creates a visual barrier to the other properties surrounding your property. The materials to be 
used and the location of placement of such a fence would need to be approved by the City." 
4. "The property on which there is presently a trailer home located (northeast corner) 
must be separated from the balance of your property to establish its own lot and utilities. This 
will need to follow existing ordinances which the City will help you with." 
5. "This all must be accomplished within 120 days of this letter or the City may have to 
take actions to have the work done, which will result in a charge to your for the cost." 
The letter requests a signature from Defendant which was never accomplished. 
10. Defendant was charged with the crime of Maintaining a Nuisance in violation of 
Hyde Park Revised Ordinances of 10-332 with regard to the property at 187 East 200 North, 
Hyde Park, Utah alleging the occurrence on or about the 3rd day of November, 2005. 
11. Defendant was tried and convicted of an in infraction by a non- lawyer Judge and 
sentenced to pay a fine of $50.00/ day from the date of sentencing to a date to be thereafter 
determined by the Executive Department of the Municipal Government; this appeal follows. 
ISSUES 
I. Whether or not the Plaintiff City's nuisance ordinances are repugnant to and 
in conflict with the laws of the State of Utah and not in accord with the doctrine announced 
in ALLGOOD v. LARSON (infra). 
II. Whether or not the nuisance statutes of Hyde Park City and the State of 
3 
Utah are constitutional or whether said statutes should be declared void-for-vagueness 
because the statutes do not adequately define what is a nuisance nor do they provide 
adequate guidelines for the enforcement of said statutes. 
III. Whether or not the penalty ordinance No. 10-359 of the Plaintiff City is 
enforceable on its face as imposed upon Defendant. 
DISCUSSION 
I. The nuisance ordinances of the Plaintiff City are repugnant to and in conflict 
with the laws of the State of Utah and in violation of the doctrine of ALLGOOD v. 
LARSON(supra). 
12. The powers of cities and towns such as Plaintiff town are regulated by Title 10 of 
the Utah Code, U.C.A. § 10-8-60 which provides that: 
cities and town may declare what shall be a nuisance and abate the same and 
impose fines upon persons who may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist. 
13. While this section seems to give considerable flexibility to the city to fashion its 
own standards of criminality, this section must be considered in light of other provisions of law 
and the "Allgood Doctrine." c/Logan City v. Thatcher P2d (19_UT). 
14. As a limitation imposed on the Grant found in the above cited statute, 
U.C.A. § 10-8-84 provides that cities and town such as Plaintiff may: 
pass all ordinances and rules, and make all regulations, not repugnant to law, 
necessary for carrying into effect or discharging all powers and duties conferred 
by this chapter and as are necessary and proper to provide for the safety and 
preserve, the health, and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and 
good order, comfort, and convenience of the city and its inhabitants , and for the 
protection of property in the city and may enforce obedience to ordinances with 
fines or penalties as they may deem proper, but the punishment in any event shall 
be by fine not to exceed the maximum class B misdemeanor fine under Section 
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76-3-301 or by imprisonment not to exceed six months or both fine and 
imprisonment. 
15. The Utah Supreme Court in ALLGOOD v. LARSON, 545 P.2d 530, 531 (Utah 
1976) held that the provisions of Article XI, § 5 of the Utah Constitution are "not only a 
delegation of power by the people to a municipality, but is also a limitation" of such powers. The 
"constitutional provision, in conferring police power upon municipalities, limits the grant to an 
area "not in conflict with the general law,"" The Allgood Court placed a construction on the 
provision found in 10-8-84 "not repugnant to law" as being coextensive with the mandate 
emphasized above. 
16. In determining whether an ordinance is in conflict with general laws, the test is 
whether the questioned ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits, 
and likewise whether that same ordinance might eschew conduct permitted by the "General 
Law." RICHFIELD CITY v. WALKER 790 P.2d 87, 90-91 (Utah App. 1990) citing SALT 
LAKE CITY v. KUSSE, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938). Based on this test it is apparent that 
the Plaintiff City's nuisance ordinances are in conflict with the general laws of the State of Utah 
as the elements of each cannot be reconciled in several respects. 
Part 10-331 of the Plaintiff City's nuisance ordinance defines a nuisance as follows: 
For the purpose of this part the term "nuisance" is defined "to mean any condition 
of use or premises or of building exteriors which are deleterious or injurious, 
noxious or unsightly which includes, but is not limited to keeping or dispositing 
on, or scattering over the premises any of the following: 
A. Lumber, junk, trash, or debris. 
B. Abandoned, discarded, or unused objects or equipment such as furniture, 
5. 
stoves, refrigerators, freezers, cans or containers. 
17. Where in the Utah Nuisance Statutes do prohibitions such as these appear? All 
prohibitions in the Utah Code eschew "such terms as "noxious" or "unsightly" and invoke the 
requirement that any proscribed condition must be dangerous to "human life or health" or create 
an "impure or unwholesome" condition. [Defendant proposes that the latter standard "impure or 
unwholesome" is unenforceable (infra)]. 
18. The Utah Supreme Court has held that the test of whether the use of the property 
constitutes a nuisance is the reasonableness of the use complained of in the particular locality an 
in the manner and under the circumstances of the case. CANNON v. NEUBERGER, 1 Utah 2d 
396, 268 P.2d 425; DAHL v. UTAH OIL REFINING CO.. 71 Utah 1, 262 P.269. The question 
is not whether a reasonable person in the Plaintiffs or Defendant's position would regard the 
condition as unreasonable, but whether reasonable persons generally, looking at the whole 
situation impartially and objectively, would consider it unreasonable; thus should Defendant's 
use offend the "Danger to human health" standard, the inquiry must nevertheless shift to the 
reasonableness of the use in the location. (Perhaps this is the basis of the three or more persons 
requirement which basis is problematic as to whether the standard is suspect, invidious and 
arbitrary). 
19. The Courts have uniformly held that the use of property analogous to Defendants' 
use of the subject property or even for such purposes as public garages or for the business of 
wrecking automobiles and salvaging parts are not nuisances per se. HATCH v. HATCH CO., 3 
Utah 2d 295, 283 P.2d 217 (Utah 1955) citing GEORGE v. GOODVICK 288 Pa. 48, 135 A. 
719, 50A.L.R. 107; PARKERSBURG BUILDERS MATERIAL CO. v. BARRACK 118 W.Va. 
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608,191 S.E. 368, I I O A L . R . 1461. 
Utah Code Annotated, § 76-10-801, (1973 Amendment) defines "nuisance" as follows: 
(1) A nuisance is any item, thing, manner, condition whatsoever that is dangerous 
to human life or health or renders soil, air, water, or food impure or unwholesome. 
No such limitation appears in the Hyde Park Ordinance and the State statute goes on to provide: 
(2) Any person, whether as owner, agent, or occupant who creates, aids in 
creating, or contributes to a nuisance, or who supports, continues or retains a 
nuisance, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
20. The Utah Court of Appeals in TURNBAUGH v. ANDERSON, 793 P.2d 939 
(Utah App. 1990) held that Section 76-10-801 encompasses two types of nuisance developed 
under the common law: public and private nuisance. See e.g., HELMKAMP v. CLARK 
READY MIX CO., 214 N.W.2d 126, 129 (Iowa 1974) (state statutory enumerations do not 
modify the common-law doctrine of nuisance); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts 821A 
(1979). The definition of nuisance in Section 76-10-801 includes acts or conditions that are 
commonly classed as public or private nuisances. 
21. A public nuisance is defined under the provisions of U.C.A. § 76-10-803, (1992 
Amendment) as follows: 
(1) A public nuisance is a crime against the order and economy of the state and 
consists in unlawfully doing any act or omitting to perform any duty, which act or 
omission: 
(a) annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety of three or 
more persons;1 
1
 Which three (3) people. (See Solars Salt) 
(b) offends public decency2: 
(c) unlawfully interferes with, obstructs, or tends to obstruct, or renders dangerous 
for passage, any lake, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or 
highway; 
(d) is a nuisance as defined in Section 78-38-9;,(for application of which section 
Plaintiffs do not contend) or 
(e) in any way renders three or more persons insecure in life or the use of 
property. 
(2) An act which affects three or more persons in any of the ways specified in this 
section is still a nuisance regardless of the extent of annoyance or damage 
inflicted on individuals is unequal. 
22. The Utah Supreme Court had defined a public nuisance as affecting "an interest 
common to the general public, rather than peculiar to one individual, or several." SOLAR SALT 
CO. vs. SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSP. CO., 555 P.2d 286, 289 (Utah 1976) (quoting W. 
Prosser, Law of Torts 606). cf!6-10-803 SUPRA. 
23. It is more than clear that the nuisance ordinances of the Plaintiff City are 
repugnant to and in conflict with the general laws of the State of Utah in violation of the doctrine 
of ALLGOOD v. LARSON, supra. The Plaintiff City's nuisance ordinances forbid what the 
general laws of the State of Utah permit. 
24. The Plaintiff City's nuisance ordinances should therefore be declared null and void 
as being violative of Article XI, § 5 of the Utah Constitution and parallel provisions of the 
Constitution of the United States. 
II. The Plaintiff City's nuisance ordinances and the nuisance statutes are 
As is noted on page 8, Defendant contends that (a) and (b) are unenforceable as 
vague and imprecise. 
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unconstitutionally vaguk 
2^ There should he no question that (hr naliire of even civil proceedings are quasi-
criminal in character. SIMS v. TAX COMMISSION, 841 P 2d 6 (Utah 1992). 
U.C.A. § 76-10-801(2), (1973 Amendment) provide •< 
(2) Any person, whether as owner, agent, or occupant who creates, aids in 
creating, or contributes to a nuisance, or who supports, continues, or retains a 
nuisance, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
26. I he Defendants con U.IK I (hat I'uri Hi- < '»1 ml (In Plaintiff City's nuisance ordinance 
a^  1 U.C.A. § 76-10-801(1) defining nuisance and U.C.A. § 76-10-803 defining a public nuisance 
are unconstitutionally vague in violation of Article I, £ 7 of the 1 'tali l piisiitui"»n nnd the 
Fourteen!,! i \:t nendment to the I h u'ted States Constitution. 
27. The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a statute or ordinance deink. ;i« = 
offense with sufficient definiteness lliat urdm;trv people i an understand what conduct is 
prohil r anii in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
KOLENDER v. LAWSON, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909. In-'J Si I 1855(1983). 
More important than at tiuil notice r. I he requirement that a legislature establish minimal 
guidelines to govern law enforcement. KOLENDER, quoting SMITH v. GOGUEN, 415 U.S. 
566, 574, 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 94 S.Ct 1 -"4/ ( 1«» M ) '1 r .i basic pnnciple of due process that an 
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibition is not clearly defined. GRAYNED v. CITY OF 
ROCKFORD, 408 U.S. 104, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (1972). 
28. A const, * agueness challenge can proceed either as a facial challenge or 
upon its application, based upon the facts of the case. GREENWOOD v. CITY OF NORTH 
SALT LAKE, 817 P.2d 816 (I Jtah ' i .lenge is perm -. ,: when a statute or 
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ordinance has no practical application in any case or the law reaches a substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected conduct. HOFFMAN ESTATES v. FLIPSIDE, HOFFMAN 
ESTATES, INC., 455 U.S. 489, 494, 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 102 S.Ct. 1186 (1982). Where a statute or 
ordinance imposes criminal penalties, the standard of certainty is higher. WINTERS v. NEW 
YORK, 333 U.S. 507, 515, 92 L.Ed. 840, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948). This concern has led the United 
States Supreme Court to invalidate a criminal statute on its face even when it could conceivably 
have had some valid application. COLAUTTI v. FRANKLIN, 439 U.S. 379, 394-401, 58 
L.Ed.2d 596, 99 S.Ct. 675 (1979)3. 
29. The challenged ordinances and statutes in the instant case reaches a substantial 
amount of constitutionally protected conduct. 
Article I, § 1 of the Utah Constitution provides as follows: 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and 
liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the 
dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress or grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and 
opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right. 
30. The Plaintiff City must establish and prove in this case that Defendants' use of the 
subject property is a public nuisance as defined under § 76-10-803 and such use has a detrimental 
effect on public comfort, repose, health or safety, or which offends public decency. 
31. The Utah Supreme Court has held that municipal ordinances which are similar to 
U.C.A. § 76-10-801 and § 76-10-803 even when only the civil remedy is pursued, to be 
unconstitutionally vague. The Court in JONES v. LOGAN CITY CORP., 19 Utah 2d 169, 428 
3 
Utah cases such as Logan City v. Huber 786 P.2d 1372 (Ut App. 1990) and Provo City v. 
Whatcott 200 UT, (Ut. App 1986) discuss ordinances and statutes which sweep too broadly. 
10 
P.2d 160 (1967) observed as follows: 
While the statute above mentioned grants to cities the power to declare what shall 
be a nuisance, the ordinance before us does not in fact define what a nuisance is. 
Ordinance No. 120 above referred to, which grants to the Board of Condemnation 
the right to determine whether any building constitutes a menace to public health 
or public safety, does not provide standards on which the board can base its 
findings as to what is or what is not a menace to public health or public safety. It 
would appear that the ordinance imposes upon the Board of Condemnation quasi-
judicial functions without standards or guidelines to govern the Board in its 
determination. 
32. U.C.A. § 76-10-801 and § 76 10 803 do not provide sufficient ^u^. <• .»! 
giiiilcliiii ', iipoii nliim In iht ( 'unit can base its findings as to what is or what is not detrimental to 
public comfort, repose, health or safety and what is or what is not a public nuisance or even what 
public comfort or repose are. 
33. The United States Supreme Court stated in KOLENDER v. LAWSON, supra, n. 
7: societies concern for minimal guidelines finds it roots as far back as the decisioiI in UNITED 
STATES v. REESE, 92 U.S. 214, 221, 25 L.Ed. 563 (1876): 
It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to 
catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who 
could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large. This would, to some 
extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of government. 
34. U.C.A. § 76-10-801 and § 76-10-803 are unconstitutionally vague on their face 
because the statues encourage arbitrary enforcenini! by failing fo dcsaibe with sufficiency what 
conduct is proscribed by the statutes and also those statutes reach a substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected conduct. Furthermore, the statutes are unconstitutionally vague in the 
application of the statutes to the facts of this case. Assuming, the Plaintiff City's nuisance 
ordinances are applicable in this case, the ordinances are also unconstitutionally vague. 
35. Part 10-3^1 of Plaintiff City's nuisance ordinance is susceptible of many different 
meanings and consequently is unconstitutionally vague. For example, the ordinance prohibits 
lumber from being deposited or scattered on any premises. This ordinance could preclude a 
commercial lumber yard from maintaining stock on the premises and selling lumber. The 
ordinance could also prohibit the construction of buildings from lumber. Junk as defined in the 
ordinance is also susceptible of many different meanings as defined in Webster's Dictionary. 
36. The ordinance is susceptible of many different meanings and encourages arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement and should therefore be declared unconstitutionally vague. 
III. Whether or not the penalty ordinance No. 10-359 of the Plaintiff City, as 
written is enforceable upon Defendant. 
37. Hyde Park City Ordinance No. 10-359 PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY 
is as follows: 
A. Any owner, occupant or person having an interest in the property subject to 
this chapter who shall fail to comply with the notice or order given pursuant 
to this chapter shall be guilty of a class C misdemeanor for each offense and 
further sum of $50.00 for each and every day such failure to comply continues 
beyond the date fixed for compliance. 
B. Compliance by any owner, occupant or person to whom a notice has been 
given as provided in this chapter shall not be admissible in any criminal 
proceeding brought pursuant to this section. 
38. For purposes of this argument, we shall dwell only on part A. With regard to that 
portion which reads, "...further sum of $50.00 for each and every day such failure to comply 
continues beyond the date fixed for compliance." 
39. The legislature created on July 1, 1973 classes of offenses and stated in 76-1-103 
(1) the following as found in Algood v. Larson (supra): 
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"The provis ions of this code shall govern the construction of, the punishment 
for,...any offense defined in this code.... any offense defined outside this 
code ..." 76-1-104 provides that the code shall be constructed in accordance 
with these general purposes; and Subsection (3), dealing with penalties, 
states; ' Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of 
offenses..." 
40 . The cities which adopt ordinances, such as the Plaintiff City has accomplished 
here, are regulated by the State laws and by the courts, the city cannot impose a greater sentence 
than that provided by state law. See Algood v. Larson (supra), T' is :o be noted that 10-8-84, by 
its express terms, Hi i lits tl ie gi ant of powei tc i i n it licipalities to pass orcin lai ices, to tl lose """i IC t 
repugnant to law." 
4 If the ordinance penalty conflicts with that of the general law of the state covering 
the same subject, the ordinance penalty is void. The penalty prescribed by the city ordinance 
cannot exceed that set by the state law. [Allgood v. Larson(supra)] 
42. The test as to whether an i •• !-- • r"-•;.: ' \ ute law is 
not whether it deals with the same subject matter in a different manner by pioviding a different 
penalty, but it is whether the ordinance permits or licenses something which the state statute 
forbids or prohibits, or vice versa. See Algood v. Larson quoting Salt Lake city v. Kusse, supra; 
and see, e.g. city of Columbus v. Molt, 36 Ohio St. 2d 94, 304 N.E.2d 245. 
4 3 . AJX> violation of tl ie Plaii Hi!: f Cit; • 's Nuisance Ordii lance si lall be designated as a 
single crime, a misdemeanor. The Ordinance exceeds the statutory limits by providing that a fine 
of $50.00 shall be assessed "...for each and every day such failure to comply continues beyond 
the date fixed for compliance." There can only be one violation and as such there can be only 
one fine assessed. If the penalty is valid, the probable application is only to the point that $50.00 
13 
APPENDIX E 
Transcript 
otally decimated by that aort of situation. I don't think 
ou thought about that. That truck back there may be 
omething that you have a future use for, but right now you 
on't have a use for it. 
The court is going to order that the -- well, I guess, 
r.. Lauritzen, your client has the right to come back in not 
ess than two nor more than 45 days unless you want to waive 
hat time frame and proceed with sentencing today? 
MR. LAURITZEN; I'11 waive it. 
THE Very well. It will be the order of the 
Durt that the defendant pay a fine in the amount of $50 for 
aintaining that nuisance. The court-will place the 
Bfendant on probation and will review this matter on the 
5th of November at 10:00. At that point in time I'll expect 
:. Grunig in his capacity to come back and report to the 
)urt, and the defendant is to be present at that time as 
B11 with his counsel, and represent to me that the property 
is been cleaned up satisfactory to the norms of society. If 
)t, the defendant will be placed in contempt and then the 
)urt will impose a jail sentence at that point in time. Mr. 
ivis, I think you understand the court's position. 
It will be ordered that the exhibits be returned to Mr. 
'nkins. We'll be in recess. 
(Trial concluded.) 
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APPENDIX F 
Minutes, Sentence, Judgment, Commitment and Notice 
First Judicial District, State of Utah, Coi ache 
STATE OF UTAH 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
n^tJL £it^ $M*4^ 
Defendant 
Jl 'I«" .MrlN 1' & COMMITMENT 
Case No. 7>1 /1 f) PI ^ 
Plaintiff's AttornevtO^L£lM4 
Defendant's Attorned 
FEB
 0 8 2003 
Defendant (having been adjudgedfteiiteied tt^ka-of) (GUILTY 7 NO CONTEST) to the charge of 
Count No. 1 y y s f r t t C , 4( llLSMltiLA ^ a Class. 
Count No. 2 a Class. 
a Class . Count No. 3 
/ " / Misdemeanor 
Misdemeanor 
Misdemeanor 
And Defendant having agreed to proceed with sentencing and no other legal reason having been shown why judgment should not be 
pronounced, and Defendant being presented (with) (having waived) Counsel, it is the judgment and sentence of the Court as follows: 
1 Count No. 1 
and to be imprisoned for 
Count No. 2 
and to be imprisoned for 
! Count No. 3 
and to be imprisoned for 
Defendant is fined $ plus surcharge of 
less the following suspended $ 
TOTAL TO BE PAID $ S O 
days in the County Jail with days to be suspended on payment of fine/probation 
Defendant is fined $ plus surcharge of 
less the following suspended $ 
I O'l A I TO BE PAID % 
days in the County Jail with days to be suspended on payment of fine/probation 
Defendant is fined $ plus surcharge of 
less the following suspended $ 
TOTAL TO BE PAID $ 
days in the Countv Jail with davs to be suspended on payment of fine/probation 
REPORT TO JAIL. 
_to serve. _days. Community Service. 
. beginning. 
_hrs by_ 
FINE DUE by_ Fine to be paid in installments of $ per. 
Probation with Q PPS • AP&P 5(T Court • No association with known criminals, drug dealers or drug users. 
[~1 Complete alcohol counseling, pay fees, file Completion notice, • Possess/consume no alcohol or be where it is served/sold. 
f~1 Receive credit of towards cost of counseling. Q Keep Court Informed Of Current Address. 
|~] Submit to search and seizure and random testing upon request of law enforcement. Q Violate no laws. Q Obtain UA. 
• Obtain and maintain full-time employment or schooling. • Obtain GED . 
/Uivikio-^ fcir^ d7 <?ir0' #& 
Defendant may appeal this judgnu- i of Appeals In Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Dated T(W<T7 Clerk 
APPENDIX G 
Notice of Appeal 
10-
A.W. Lauritzen (1906)* 
15 East 600 North #1 
P.O.Box 171 
Logan, UT 84321 
435-753-3391 
rN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JERALD RIO DAVIS, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 071100143 MO 
Judge Clint S. Judkins 
You will please take notice that the Defendant appeals the Judgment of Conviction and 
sentence entered in the First District Court for Cache County, State of Utah, on the 28th of 
September, 2007 to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah; said Entry amounting to a final 
judgment of conviction and sentence in the above entitled action. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, NOTICE OF 
n-rtt October 
APPEAL, postage prepaid, to the following listed below on theW'^day of-SSffrombcr, 2007. 
Wifm (i\kdm>M%r± 
Jonathan E. Jenkins, Esq. 
108 North Main 
Logan, UT 84321 
2 
EXHIBIT J" 
A.W. Lauritzen(1906) 
Attorney at Law/Attorney for Defendant 
135 North Main Ste. # 104 
P.O. Box 171 
Logan, UT 84321 
435-753-3391 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
HYDE PARK CITY 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JERALD RIO DAVIS, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 071100143 MO 
Judge Clint S. Judkins 
You will please take notice thai pi n si lant to ai i Order of the District Court, made on 
January 16, 2008 (see Exhibit A), the Defendant files herewith an Amended Notice of Appeal 
taken from the Judgment of Conviction and Sentence entered in the First District Court for Cache 
County, State oi Utah, on the 28th of September, 2007; said Entry amounting to a final judgment 
of conviction and sentence in the above entitled action. 
This notice is being submitted specifically designating the constitutional issues from 
which Defendant hereby appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals as follows: 
1. Whether the Ordinance of the Plaintiff City herein # 10-332 et seq. is 
Unconstitutionally vague and violative of the protections afforded by the Due Process Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution as well as the guarantees of equal protection of the laws. 
2.Whether the Ordinances of the Plaintiffs are repugnant to and in i ecu if li ::l will i the 
laws of the State of Utah and do not thereby afford Defendant due process and/or equal 
1 
"t - a v> 
Xf 
laws of the State of Utah and do not thereby afford Defendant due process and/or equal 
protection of the laws in violation of constitutional mandates. 
3. Whether the creation and regulation of Justice Courts interferes with Judicial 
independence and thereby violates the separation of powers concept of the Utah Constitution by 
providing monetary incentives to convict and/or sanction criminal Defendants and by authorizing 
the administrative branch of municipal governments to hire and fire judges and affording 
inordinate municipal control of court operations. 
4. Whether the Sentences as imposed by the Justice Court and by the District court were 
lawful under State Law and did thereby afford Defendant due process of law. 
This Appeal is taken to the Appellate Courts of the State of Utah pursuant to Applicable 
Law. 
DATED this H day of March, 2008. 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby i >! ! tiled a true and correct copy of the foregoing, AMENDED 
NOTICE OF APPEAL, postage prepaid, to the following listed bclo the j^jnday of 
March, 2008. 
Jonathan E. Jenkins, Esq. 
108 North Main 
Logan, UT 84321 
3 
APPENDIX H 
Designation of Record on Appeal 
>,N ! ! I C T ; . ( „ V 
^
 !
r-i)5 
A.W. Lauritzen (1906; _
 f - -' •' • • / 
Attorney at Law 07 ft'OV / /, 
15 East 600 North #1 
P.O. Box 171 
Logan, UT 84321 
Phone: 435-753-3391 
Fax:435-753-8331 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JERALD RIO DAVIS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
DESIGNATION OF RECORD 
ON APPEAL 
Case No. 071100143 MO 
Judge Judkins 
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: 
COMES NOW the Defendant/Appellant, Jerald Rio Davis, and submits this Designation 
of Record on Appeal, and requests that the following items be submitted as part cTf!" Record 
with respect to this Appeal. 
1. Any and all transcripts of Hearings and Court proceedings appertaining to the 
above entitled matter be supplied to Defendant/Appellant to aid in this Appeal insofar as they are 
now in the possession of the Clerk of the Trial Court.. 
2. The entire contents of the file as it now exists in the records of 
the First District Court. 
3. All Exhibits that may have been offered and/or admitted in 
the course of proceedings had at the trial level. 
Jl 
. \ 4. Transcript of the proceedings and Oral pronouncement of Sentence had on the 
19th day of September, 2007. 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant/Appellant respectfully requires that these matters be 
contained within the Record of thisyVppeal and transmitted as required by law. 
Dated t h e 5 _ day of A H\^M&^f^2Q01. 
A. W. Lauritzen, Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, DESIGN \ ' '! " 
OF RECORD ON APPEAL, postage prepaid, to m, . ..i-. i.stcd below on the J t S i a y of 
Ciwimh/f , 2007. 
Jonathan E. Jenkins, Esq. 
108 North Main 
Logan, UT 84321 
3 
A. W. Lauritzen (1906) 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 753-3391 
' cP, 
" ' : ' • • : "•.'••• o y 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
HYDE PARK CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JERALD RIO DAVIS 
Defendant. 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
AND TO QUASH CONVICTION 
Case No. 071100143 
Judge: Clint S. Judkins 
COMES NOW A.W. LAURITZEN, Attorney for the Defendant, with this his 
Objection to Plaintiffs Order on Motion to Dismiss and to Quash Conviction and alleges: 
1. Defendant objects to the Court's Order in that the penalty prescribed by the 
ordinances exceeds the legislative grant; the sentence imposed by the convicting Court is 
thereto as immaterial. The ordinance, in its entirety, should be declared void in view of the 
express holding in Algood v. Larson 545 P.2d 530 (Utah 1976). 
DATED this J \ "day of August, 2007. 
1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I heiebv n."iiif\ iii.ii I faxed and mailed a true and correct copy of die foregoing, 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO QUASH 
CONVICTION, Postage prepaid, to the following listed below * ^••.••\1,- ; 1 August, 
2007. 
2z S4 iC- ./<s. 
Jonathan Jenkins, Esq. 
108 North Main 
Logan, UT 84321 
2 
APPENDIX J 
Objection to the Order on Motion to Dismiss and to Quash Conviction 
APPENDIX K 
Objection to Oral Verdict, Judgment and Sentence 
A.W. Lauritzen (1906) 
15 East 600 North #1 
P.O.Box 171 
Logan, UT 84321 
435-753-3391 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JERALD RIO DAVIS, 
Defendant. 
OBJECTION TO ORAL VERDICT, 
JUDGEMENT AND SENTENCE 
Case No. 071100143 MO 
Judge Clint S. Judkins 
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through is Attorney of record, with this his 
Objection to the ruling from the bench, Judgment and Sentence as entered on the 19th day of 
September, 2007 in that the Judge's Order imposed the maximum sentence and in that, the 
Defendant was convicted of an infraction with the ordinance prescribing the maximum fine of 
Fifty Dollars ($50.00). No jail time may be imposed upon conviction of the infraction under 
either municipal or state law and in that Defendant has suffered the maximum penalty, no 
probation or further sanction may be imposed should the fine be paid as required by the Court in 
its written Judgement. 
—in* 
Dated the g^ay~of October, 2007. 
. Lauritzen 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, OBJECTION TO 
ORAL VERDICT, JUDGEMENT AND SENTENCE, postage prepaid, to the following listed 
below on the M-flay of Slpg?8&er, 2007. 
IfYl-PaKaj^  ^udwuu^cvt 
Jonathan E. Jenkins, Esq. 
108 North Main 
Logan, UT 84321 
2 
APPENDIX L 
Letter from Mark E. Daines 
113 East Hyde Park Lane, P.O. Box 489 
Hyde Park, Utah 84318 
563-6507 
November 9, 1998 
Mr. Ira B. Davis 
187 East 200 North 
Hyde Park, Utah 84318 
Dear Ira: 
I will try to respond to your written request for information concerning the business at your home. 
It has taken some time to locate and research the old ordinances and Council minutes. 
A. Regarding the date of your first business license, we will accept your date of late 50's or early 
60fs. We have no records dating back that far for business licenses, and can find no record in the 
Council minutes. 
B. We have reviewed the earliest zoning ordinances that we can locate of the City and are 
enclosing a copy of the portion that relates to you and your business. Your business has always 
been a non-conforming use in a residential zone. It was grandfathered in and today would not be 
allowed. Even in the earliest ordinances there is provision that such a non-conforming use may 
NOT be expanded. This, of course, is a serious concern for the City. It appears that you have 
added many, many vehicles and other materials to your property. 
C. The original right that you have is a non-conforming use in a residential zone, grandfathered in 
by the existence of your business prior to zoning regulations in the City. 
D. Enclosed is a copy of the minutes of September 8, 1998 as requested. 
We hope to work amicably with you to allow you to keep your repair business, but to remove all 
articles added onto your property which did not exist at the time you got your business license in 
the late 50's or early 60fs. 
We have noticed the removal of some vehicles and very much appreciate your willingness to 
comply with the ordinance and at the same time not jeopardize your repair business. 
Sincerely, 
Mark E. Daines / \ ^ 
Mayor 
MED/jyh \i 
APPENDIX M 
Business License 

APPENDIX N 
Letter from Reed A. Elder 
March 21, 2003 
Rio Davis 
808 East Canyon Rd. 
Hyde Park, UT 84318 
Re: Property clean up at 187 East 200 North 
Dear Rio: 
This letter is a follow-up on my visit with you on Thursday the 20th of March 2003, where we discussed 
the clean-up of your property at 187 East 200 North in Hyde Park City. The following is a list of items 
we agreed needed to be done to bring your property into compliance with City ordinances: 
1. All non-licensed vehicles and boats must be removed from the property or stored in a garage on 
site. 
2. All miscellaneous materials that you have no useful purpose for and all debris must be removed 
from the property. This includes, but is not limited to automotive motor parts, brick and masonry 
materials, lumber or other wood items, metal barrels and all other items of furniture, machinery and 
building materials. 
3. All material and machinery which you want to keep and store on the property must be stored 
inside a closed structure or within an additional fenced area inside the property which creates a visual 
barrier to the other properties surrounding your property. The materials to be used and the location of 
placement of such a fence would need to be approved by the City. 
4. The property on which there is presently a trailer home located (northeast corner) must be 
separated from the balance of your property to establish its own lot and utilities. This will need to follow 
existing ordinances which the City will help you with. 
5. This all must be accomplished within 120 days of this letter or the City may have to take 
actions to have the work done, which will result in a charge to you for the cost. 
Rio, we are very interested in helping you accomplish this task. Let us work together to get this done. 
Please sign the enclosed letters as your agreement to perform. Return one in the self-addressed stamped 
envelope and keep the other as your copy. 
Sincerely, 
Rio Davis 
Reed A. Elder 
Hyde Park City 
cc: David Kooyman, Mayor 
Hyde Park City Council 
APPENDIX P 
Information 
Scott L Wyatt # 5829 
HYDE PARK CITY ATTORNEY 
108 North Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
(435) 753-4000 
IN THE JUSTICE COURT IN AND FOR HYDE PARK CITY 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
HYDE PARK CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JERALD RIO DAVIS, 
808 Canyon Road 
Hyde Park, Utah 84318 
DOB 11/11/58 
Defendant. 
INFORMATION 
Case No. HP05- CSC-^> 
Judge: David C. Marx 
The City of Hyde Park, upon information and belief, charges the above-named defendant 
with the commission of the following crime: 
COUNT 1: 
IN VIOLATION OF: 
CLASSIFICATION: 
LOCATION: 
ON OR ABOUT: 
Maintaining a Nuisance 
Revised Ordinances of Hyde Park §10-332 
A Class "B" Misdemeanor 
187 East 200 North, Hyde Park, Utah 
November 3, 2005 
The acts of the defendant constituting the crime are: That the defendant, owning, leasing, 
occupying or having charge of the premises located at 187 East 200 North. Hyde Park, 
Utah, did maintain or keep any nuisance thereon. "Nuisance" is defined to mean: (1) any 
condition of use of premises or of building exteriors which are deleterious or injurious, 
noxious or unsightly which includes, but not limited to keeping or depositing on, or 
scattering over the premises any of the following: (a) Lumber, junk, trash, or debris; or 
(b) abandoned, discarded or unused objects or equipment such as furniture, stoves, 
refrigerators, freezers, cans or containers. "Nuisance" is also defined to mean: (2) 
unsheltered storage or old, unused, stripped and junked machinery, implements, 
equipment or personal property of any kind which is no longer safely usable for the 
purposes for which i^was manufactured, for a period of 30 days or more 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witness: R. Karren, 
M. Grunig. 
DATED November 3, 2005 
Scott tWyat t 
Hyde Park City Attorney 
Scott L Wyatt # 5829 
HYDE PARK CITY ATTORNEY 
108 North Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
(435) 753-4000 
IN THE JUSTICE COURT IN AND FOR HYDE PARK CITY 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
HYDE PARK CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CHRISTINE H. DAVIS, 
808 Canyon Road 
Hyde Park, Utah 84318 
DOB 11/11/58 
Defendant. 
AMENDED 
INFORMATION 
Case No. HP05-0504 
Judge: David C. Marx 
The City of Hyde Park, upon information and belief, charges the above-named defendant 
with the commission of the following offense: 
COUNT 1: 
IN VIOLATION OF: 
CLASSIFICATION: 
LOCATION: 
ON OR ABOUT: 
Maintaining a Nuisance 
Revised Ordinances of Hyde Park §10-332 
An Infraction 
808 East Canyon Road, Hyde Park, Utah 
November 3, 2005 
The acts of the defendant constituting the offense are: That the defendant, owning, 
leasing, occupying or having charge of the premises located at 808 East Canyon Road, 
Hyde Park. Utah, did maintain or keep any nuisance thereon. "Nuisance" is defined to 
mean: (1) any condition of use of premises or of building exteriors which are deleterious 
or injurious, noxious or unsightly which includes, but not limited to keeping or depositing 
on, or scattering over the premises any of the following: (a) Lumber, junk, trash, or 
debris; or (b) abandoned, discarded or unused objects or equipment such as furniture, 
stoves, refrigerators, freezers, cans or containers. "Nuisance" is also defined to mean: (2) 
unsheltered storage or old, unused, stripped and junked machinery, implements, 
equipment or personal property of any kind which is no longer safely usable for the 
purposes for which it was manufactured, for a period of 30 days or more 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witness: R. Karren, 
M. Grunig. 
DATED March 23, 2006 
A 
Scott L Wyatt 
Hyde Park City Attorney 
APPENDIX Q 
Allgood vs. Larson 545 P.2d 530, 531 (Utah 1976) 
VersusLaw Research uataoasc 
01/12/76 VIVIAN ALLGOOD v. DELMAR LARSON 
[ 1 ] SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
[2] No. 14094 
[3] 1976.UT.4 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 545 P.2d 530 
[4] January 12, 1976 
[5] VIVIAN ALLGOOD, PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT, 
v. 
DELMAR LARSON, SHERIFF OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, AND SALT 
LAKE CITY, UTAH, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS 
[6] Roger F. Cutler, Salt Lake City Atty., Paul G. Maughan, Deputy Salt Lake City Atty., Salt 
Lake City, for defendants and appellant. 
[7] Stephen R. McCaughey of Salt Lake Legal Defenders Assn., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
and respondent. 
[8] Maughan, Justice, wrote the opinion. 
[9] Tuckett, J., concurs. 
[10] Henriod, C.j., concurs in the result. 
[11] Crockett, Justice (dissenting). 
[12] Ellett, J., concurs in the views expressed in the Dissenting opinion of Crockett, J. 
[13] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Maughan 
[14] MAUGHAN, Justice: 
[15] Plaintiff was arrested, charged, and convicted of trespassing; under a Salt Lake City 
APPENDIX R 
Richfield City vs. Walker 790 P.2d 87,90-91 (Utah App. 1990) 
VersusLaw Kesearcn wdiaua^ 
03/26/90 RICHFIELD CITY v. JAMES M. WALKER 
[ 1 ] COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
[2] No. 890156-CA 
[3] 1990.UT.73 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 790 P.2d 87, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 37 
[4] March 26,1990 
[5] RICHFIELD CITY, PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT, 
v. 
JAMES M. WALKER, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
[6] Sixth Circuit, Sevier County, The Honorable David L. Mower. 
[7] Sheldon R. Carter, Provo, for Appellant. 
[8] Richard K. Chamberlain, Richfield, for Respondent. 
[9] Regnal W. Garff, Judge, Russell W. Bench, Judge, John Fair Larson, *fhl Judge, concur. 
[10] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Garff 
[11] FACTS. - Walker was found drunk in his truck, engine off, headlights on, and keys in the 
ignition. He was asleep, lying with his head toward the passenger door. 
[12] PROCEEDINGS. - Walker was convicted of being in actual physical control of the vehicle 
and appealed. 
[13] RESULT. - Affirmed. Per Garff; Bench & Larson concur. 
[14] HELD. - The Richfield ordinance was not inconsistent with the controlling statute. Walker 
was in actual physical control of the vehicle under the circumstances. 
[15] REGNAL W. GARFF, Judge: 
APPENDIX S 
Cannon v. Neuberger, 1 Utah 2d 396, 268 P.2d 425 
/ersusLaw Research Database 
03/22/54 CANNON v. NEUBERGER ET UX. 
[ 1 ] SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
[2] No. 8083 
[3] 1954.UT.31 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 268 P.2d 425, 1 Utah 2d 396 
[4] March 22, 1954 
[5] CANNON 
v. 
NEUBERGER ET UX. 
[6] George C. Heinrich, Logan, for appellant. 
[7] George D. Preston, Logan, for respondents. 
[8] McDONOUGH, Crockett, Henriod, and Wade, JJ., concur. 
[9] Wolfe, C. J., being disqualified does not participate herein. 
[10] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Dunford 
[11] DUNFORD, District Judge. Plaintiff brought this action to abate a claimed nuisance in the 
form of three Carolina Poplar trees and two Siberian Elm trees which defendants have upon 
their property. The trial court ordered the Carolina Poplar trees 'topped' by cutting twenty 
feet from the tops thereof, ordered removed the dead wood and sufficient of the branches to 
overcome a danger of the trees being blown over onto plaintiffs property. Plaintiff appealed 
claiming under three assignments of error, that the court should have ordered defendants to 
remove the offending trees from their property or require them to so control their growth as 
to keep their branches from overspreading, or the roots from permeating, or the leaves, 
twigs and branches from falling or being blown upon plaintiffs lot and buildings. We affirm 
the judgment of the lower court with costs to the respondents. 
[12] This action being in equity, the court will review the evidence and determine its weight. 
However, much consideration must be given to the trial court's findings, inasmuch as the 
presiding Judge saw and heard the witnesses, had a better opportunity to determine their 
knowledge of the facts testified to, to observe their demeanor indicating interest, prejudice, 
r '^A/onnc 
APPENDIX T 
Dahl v. Utah Oil Refining Co. 71 Utah 1, 262 P.2 69 
APPENDIX U 
Hatch v. Hatch Co., 3 Utah 2d 295, 283 P.2d 217 (Utah 1955) 
VerSUS.UaW IVCSCcil^ll Lsaiauao^ 
05/05/55 GLEN A. HATCH AND EDITH E. HATCH v. W. S. 
[ 1 ] SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
[2] No. 8215 
[3] 1955.UT.42 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 283 P.2d 217, 3 Utah 2d 295 
[4] May 5, 1955 
[5] GLEN A. HATCH AND EDITH E. HATCH, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, 
v. 
W. S. HATCH COMPANY, A CORPORATION, AND WILLARD S. HATCH, 
DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS 
[6] Oscar W. Moyle, Jr., Moyle & Moyle, Salt Lake City, for appellants. 
[7] Marr, Wilkins & Cannon, Mark K. Boyle, Salt Lake City, for respondents. 
[8] Crockett, Wade and Worthen, JJ., and Lewis, District Judge, concurred. 
[9] Henriod, J., having disqualified himself did not participate herein. 
[10] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Mcdonough 
[11] McDONOUGH, Chief Justice. Plaintiffs appeal from a dismissal of their cause after a trial 
on the merits by the court sitting without a jury, contending that the trial court erred in 
finding that no actionable nuisance is maintained by the defendants on property adjoining 
plaintiffs' residential property. 
[12] Plaintiff Glen A. Hatch and defendant W. S. Hatch are brothers, who inherited contiguous 
pieces of property, with a house on each lot, situated in Woods Cross, Davis County, Utah. 
Plaintiffs moved into their home in 1917, but did not obtain title until 1935, doing 
substantial remodelling in 1935 and again in 1951; they occupy the property primarily as a 
residence, doing some farming thereon and maintaining a filling pump and storage garage 
in the rear of their house for trucks belonging to Hatch Brothers Company, a livestock 
corporation in which both brothers hold stock. Defendant moved into his residence, 
immediately north of plaintiff s property, about 1935 and utilized the area behind the house 
to establish a business of transporting road tars and oils. The company, here also made 
APPENDIX V 
Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 118 W.Va. 608,191 S.E. 368,110 
A.L.R. 1461 
APPENDIX W 
Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 793 P.2d 939 (Utah App. 1990) 
05/31/90 SHIRLEY TURNBAUGH v. EVAN ANDERSON AND RED 
[ 1 ] COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
[2] No. 880501-CA 
[3] 1990.UT.133 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 793 P.2d 939, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 72 
[4] May 31,1990 
[5] SHIRLEY TURNBAUGH, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE 
OF LE ROY TURNBAUGH, FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE HEIRS OF LE ROY 
TURNBAUGH, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, 
v. 
EVAN ANDERSON AND RED DOME, INC., A UTAH CORPORATION, 
DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES 
[6] Fourth District, Millard County, The Honorable Ray M. Harding. 
[7] D.m. Amoss (Argued), Roger T. Nuttall, Attorneys at Law, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
[8] Dexter L. Anderson (Argued), Attorney, Fillmore, Utah. 
[9] Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge. Norman H. Jackson, Judge, Gregory K. Orme, Judge, concur. 
[10] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Greenwood 
[11] FACTS. - Turnbaugh was killed when the heavy equipment he was operating ran out of 
fuel, thereby lost power, brakes, and steering, and overturned into an open pit mine owned 
by Red Dome. Anderson owned the heavy equipment. 
[12] PROCEEDINGS. - Tumbaugh's personal representative sued Anderson and Red Dome for 
wrongful death. From a judgment for the defendants, Turnbaugh appeals. 
[13] RESULT. - Affirmed. Per Greenwood; Jackson & Orme concur. 
[14] HELD. - Lacking a showing of unreasonable interference with a right common to the 
APPENDIX X 
Helmkamp v. Clark Ready Mix Co, 214 N.W.2d 126,129 (Iowa 1974) 
HELMKAMP v. CLARK READY MIX COMPANY, 214 N.W.2d 126 (Iowa 01/16/1974) 
[ 1 ] Supreme Court of Iowa. 
[2] No. 56112 
[3] 214 N.W.2d 126, 1974.IA.0042344< http://www.versuslaw.com> 
[4] January 16, 1974 
[5] CLARK HELMKAMP ET AL., APPELLANTS, 
V. 
CLARK READY MIX COMPANY, APPELLEE. 
[6] APPEAL FROM CARROLL DISTRICT COURT, PAUL E. HELLWEGE, J. [214 NW2d 
Page 127] 
[7] Edward S. White, Carroll, for appellants. 
[8] Minnich & Neu, Carroll, for appellee. 
[9] Heard before Moore, C.J., and Mason, Rees, Uhlenhopp and Harris, JJ. 
[10] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Uhlenhopp, Justice. 
[11] The question in this appeal is whether we should enjoin as a nuisance the operation of the 
cement ready-mix plant of defendant Clark Ready Mix Company in Carroll County, Iowa. 
We hear [214 NW2d Page 128] 
[12] the appeal de novo. We give weight to the trial court's fact findings but are not bound by 
them. Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers' Supply Co., 252 Iowa 1102, 109 N.W.2d 695. 
[13] United States Highway 71, which carries substantial traffic, runs north and south along the 
west side of Carroll, Iowa. In 1959, owners of land in the northwest part of Carroll platted 
Thomas Addition on the east side of the highway. Residential restrictions apply in the 
addition, except for two lots adjoining the highway which are zoned commercial. At time of 
trial in October 1972, the respective plaintiffs had owned and lived in homes in the addition 
for periods ranging from three to nine years. The homes vary in value for tax purposes from 
APPENDIX Y 
Restatement (Second) of Torts 821A (1979) 
APPENDIX Z 
Solar Salt Co. vs. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 555 P.2d 286, 289 (Utah 1976) 
V l U v n , 
09/10/76 SOLAR SALT COMPANY v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC 
[ 1 ] SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
[2] No. 14427 
[3] 1976.UT.187 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 555 P.2d 286 
[4] September 10, 1976 
[5] SOLAR SALT COMPANY, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, 
v. 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, A CORPORATION, 
DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT 
[6] Frank J. Allen, of Clyde & Pratt, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant. 
[7] Haldor T. Benson and James R. Amschler, of VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and respondent. 
[8] Ellett, Justice, wrote the opinion. 
[9] Henriod, C.j., concurs. 
[ 10] Crockett, Justice (concurring). 
[11] Maughan, Justice (dissenting). 
[12] Tuckett, J., concurs in the views expressed in the Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice 
Maughan. 
[13] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Ellett 
[14] ELLETT, Justice: 
[15] The plaintiff has a lease from the State of Utah on land bordering the shore of the Great Salt 
5/20/2008 
APPENDIX AA 
Sims v. Tax Commission, 841 P.2d 6 (Utah 1992) 
10/22/92 LOUIE E. SIMS v. COLLECTION DIVISION UTAH 
[ 1 ] SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
[2] No. 900324 
[3] 1992.UT.218 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 841 P.2d 6, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 
[4] October 22, 1992 
[5] LOUIE E. SIMS, PETITIONER, 
v. 
COLLECTION DIVISION OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
RESPONDENT 
[6] Original Proceeding in this Court 
[7] R. Paul Van Dam, Leon A. Dever, John C. McCarrey, Salt Lake City, for Tax Commission. 
[8] G. Fred Metos, Salt Lake City, for Sims. 
[9] Durham, Zimmerman, Stewart, Howe, Hall 
[10] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Durham 
[11] DURHAM, Justice: 
[12] Petitioner Louie E. Sims seeks review of a formal order of the Utah State Tax Commission 
("the Commission") affirming a tax and penalty assessment under the Illegal Drug Stamp 
Tax Act ("the Act"). Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-19-101 to -107. We reverse the decision of the 
Commission and vacate the tax and penalty assessed. 
[13] On July 27, 1988, the Utah Highway Patrol and the Juab County Sheriffs Department set 
up a roadblock on Interstate Highway 15 approximately two miles outside of Nephi, Utah. 
When Sims' car was stopped at the roadblock, the officers observed an open container of 
alcohol in the back seat area. Sims was asked to exit the car, at which time he consented to 
a search of the interior. There, the officers discovered the remnants of one or two marijuana 
cigarettes. Sims then consented to a search of the trunk. When the latter search revealed two 
/ ^T^s^r* o c n Y 5/20/2008 
APPENDIX BB 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909,103 S.Ct. 1855 (1983) 
KOLENDER v. LAWSON, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 461 U.S. 352 (U.S. 05/02/1983) 
[ 1 ] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
[2] No. 81-1320 
[3] 103 S. Ct. 1855, 461 U.S. 352, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903, 51 U.S.L.W. 4532, 1983.SCT.41818 
<http://www.versuslaw.com> 
[4] decided: May 2, 1983. 
[5] KOLENDER, CHIEF OF POLICE OF SAN DIEGO, ET AL 
v. 
LAWSON 
[6] APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT. 
[7] A. Wells Petersen, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellants. 
With him on the briefs were George Deukmejian, Attorney General, Robert H. Philibosian, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Daniel J. Kremer, Assistant Attorney General, and Jay 
M. Bloom, Deputy Attorney General. 
[8] Mark D. Rosenbaum, by invitation of the Court, 459 U.S. 964, argued the cause as amicus 
curiae in support of the judgment below. With him on the brief were Dennis M. Perluss, 
Fred Okrand, Mary Ellen Gale, Robert H. Lynn, and Charles S. S i m s . - ^ 
[9] O'connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, 
Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a concurring 
opinion, post, p. 362. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, J., joined, 
post, p. 369. 
[10] Author: O'connor 
[ 461 U.S. Page 353] 
[11] JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
APPENDIX CC 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (1972) 
GRAYNED v. CITY ROCKFORD, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 408 U.S. 104 (U.S. 06/26/1972) 
[1] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
[2] No. 70-5106 
[3] 92 S. Ct. 2294, 408 U.S. 104, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 1972.SCT.42411 
<http://www.versuslaw.com> 
[4] decided: June 26, 1972. 
[5] GRAYNED 
v. 
CITY OF ROCKFORD 
[6] APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. 
[7] Sophia H. Hall argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs were William R. 
Ming, Jr., and Aldus S. Mitchell. 
[8] William E. Collins argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were A. Curtis 
Washburn and Charles F. Thomas. 
[9] Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, 
Stewart, White, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a statement joining 
in the judgment and in Part I of the Court's opinion and concurring in the result as to Part 
II of the opinion, post, p. 121. Douglas, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part and joining in 
Part I of the Court's opinion, post, p. 121. 
[10] Author: Marshall 
[408 U.S. Page 105] 
[11] MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
[12] Appellant Richard Grayned was convicted for his part in a demonstration in front of West 
Senior High School in Rockford, Illinois. Negro students at the school had first presented 
their grievances to school administrators. When the principal took no action on crucial 
APPENDIX DD 
Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816 (Utah 1991) 
09/10/91 KATE GREENWOOD AND ANDREW GREENWOOD v. 
[ 1 ] SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
[2] No. 890355 
[3] 1991.UT.216 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 817 P.2d 816, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 
[4] September 10, 1991 
[5] KATE GREENWOOD AND ANDREW GREENWOOD, PERSONALLY, AND 
RALPH GREENWOOD, BOTH PERSONALLY AND AS PRESIDENT AND 
MEMBERS OF AMERICAN DOG BREEDERS' ASSOCIATION, INC., 
PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, 
v. 
CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, AN INCORPORATED MUNICIPALITY, 
DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE 
[6] Second District, Davis County; The Honorable Rodney S. Page. 
[7] David Paul White, Salt Lake City, for appellants. 
[8] Kent Christiansen, Salt Lake City, for appellee. 
[9] Stewart, Justice. Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice, Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief Justice, 
Christine M. Durham, Justice, Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice, concur. 
[10] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Stewart 
[11] FACTS. - North Salt Lake enacted an ordinance regulating dogs classified as "fierce, 
dangerous, or vicious," including pit bulls. Greenwoods own and breed pit bulls. 
[12] PROCEEDINGS. - Greenwoods sued to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance. 
The district court upheld the ordinance for the most part, and Greenwoods appealed. 
[13] RESULT. - Affirmed. Per Stewart; all concur. 
APPENDIX EE 
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,494, 71 L.Ed.2d 
362,102 S.Ct. 1186(1982) 
ILLAGE HOFFMAN ESTATES ET AL. v. FLIP-SIDE, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 455 U.S. 489 (U.S. 
3/03/1982) 
[1 ] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
[2] No. 80-1681 
[3] 102 S. Ct. 1186,455 U.S. 489, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 50U.S.L.W. 4267, 1982.SCT.40974 
<http://www.versuslaw.com> 
[4] decided: March 3, 1982. 
[5] VILLAGE OF HOFFMAN ESTATES ET AL 
v. 
THE FLIP-SIDE, HOFFMAN ESTATES, INC. 
[6] APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH 
CIRCUIT. 
[7] Richard N. Williams argued the cause and filed briefs for appellants. 
[8] Michael L. Pritzker argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. 
[9] Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, 
Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'connor, JJ., joined. White, J., filed an opinion 
concurring in the judgment, post, p. 507. Stevens, J., took no part in the consideration or 
decision of the case. 
[10] Author: Marshall 
[455 U.S. Page 491] 
[11] JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
[12] This case presents a pre-enforcement facial challenge to a drug paraphernalia ordinance on 
the ground that it is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The ordinance in question 
requires a business to obtain a license if it sells any items that are "designed or marketed 
^/On/9008 
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Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515, 92 L.Ed 840, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948) 
WINTERS v. NEW YORK, 68 S. Ct. 665, 333 U.S. 507 (U.S. 03/29/1948) 
[ 1 ] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
[2] No. 3 
[3] 68 S. Ct. 665, 333 U.S. 507, 92 L. Ed. 840,1948.SCT.40361 
<http://www.versuslaw.com> 
[4] decided: March 29,1948. 
[5] WINTERS 
v. 
NEW YORK 
[6] APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF SPECIAL SESSIONS OF NEW YORK CITY. 
[7] Arthur N. Seiff argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant. With him on the 
original argument and the first reargument was Emanuel Redfield. 
[8] Whitman Knapp argued the cause for appellee. With him on the briefs was Frank S. 
Hogan. 
[9] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Sidney R. Fleisher for the Authors' 
League of America, Inc.; and Emanuel Redfield, Osmond K. Fraenkel and Morris L. Ernst 
for the American Civil Liberties Union. 
[10] Vinson, Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, Jackson, Rutledge, Burton 
[11] Author: Reed 
[ 333 U.S. Page 508] 
[12] MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court. 
[13] Appellant is a New York City bookdealer, convicted, on information,^^- of a 
APPENDIX GG 
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379,394-401, 58 L.Ed.2d 596, 99 S.Ct. 675 (1979) 
COLAUTTI v. FRANKLIN ET AL., 99 S. Ct. 675, 439 U.S. 379 (U.S. 01/09/1979) 
[ 1 ] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
[2] No. 77-891 
[3] 99 S. Ct. 675, 439 U.S. 379, 58 L. Ed. 2d 596,1979.SCT.40246 
<http://www.versuslaw.com> 
[4] decided: January 9, 1979. 
[5] COLAUTTI, SECRETARY OF WELFARE OF PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL 
v. 
FRANKLIN ET AL. 
[6] APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN 
DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA. 
[7] Carol Los Mansmann, Special Assistant Attorney General of Pennsylvania, argued the 
cause for appellants. With her on the brief was J. Jerome Mansmann, Special Assistant 
Attorney General. 
[8] Roland Morris argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees. 
[9] Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, 
Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. 
J., and Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 401. 
[10] Author: Blackmun 
[ 439 U.S. Page 380] 
[11] MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
[12] 
At issue here is the constitutionality of subsection (a) of? 5 * ^ of the Pennsylvania 
Abortion Control Act, 1974 Pa. Laws, 
APPENDIX HH 
Logan City v. Huber 786 P.2d 1372 (Ut App. 1990) 
01/17/90 LOGAN CITY v. RALPH LOWELL HUBER 
[ 1 ] COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
[2] No. 890093-CA 
[3] 1990.UT.15 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 786 P.2d 1372, 126 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 
[4] January 17, 1990 
[5] LOGAN CITY, PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT, 
v. 
RALPH LOWELL HUBER, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
[6] First Circuit, Cache County, The Honorable Burton H. Harris. 
[7] A.w. Lauritzen, Attorney for Appellant, Logan, Utah. 
[8] Cheryl A. Russell, Logan City Attorney, Logan, Utah. 
[9] Norman H. Jackson, Judge, Richard C. Davidson, Judge, Regnal W. Garff, Judge, concur. 
[10] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Jackson 
[11] FACTS. - Huber had an angry verbal interchange with police and was arrested. 
[12] NORMAN H. JACKSON, Judge: 
[13] Ralph Lowell Huber was convicted by a jury of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor, in 
violation of a Logan City ordinance. On appeal, he challenges the constitutionality of the 
ordinance on its face and as applied. We reverse. 
[14] In the early morning hours of December 11, 1988, Officers Russell Roper and Greg Monroe 
were on alcohol enforcement detail. They were parked off the road in their unmarked patrol 
car when they heard and saw a small car approaching them. The car made a wide turn at the 
corner and started to slide on the pea gravel in the road. The car accelerated and went past 
the police vehicle, at a speed estimated by the officers at 35-38 m.p.h. in a 25 m.p.h. zone, 
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Provo City v. Whatcott 200 UT, (Utah App. 1986) 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Provo City, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Scott A. Whatcott, 
Defendant and Appellant 
OPINION 
(For Official Publicat 
Case No. 981642-C 
F I L E D 
(March 23, 2000) 
2000 UT App 86 
Fourth District, Provo Department 
The Honorable Gary D. Stott 
Attorneys: Margaret P. Lindsay and Thomas H. Means, Provo, for 
Appellant 
Vernon F. Romney, Provo, for Appellee 
Before Judges Jackson, Billings, and Orme. 
JACKSON, Associate Presiding Judge: 
T[l Scott A. Whatcott challenges his conviction for telephone harassment, a Class B misdemeanor in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 (1999). Because subsections (a) and (d) of the telephone 
harassment statute are unconstitutionally overbroad, we reverse Whatcott's conviction. 
BACKGROUND 
JL U £ V s £* U l ^ 
[^2 "When iCMcvviiig iiiiiu; IIIL J^  Mil- and all reasonable inferences in a .u: .. 
most favorable to the verdict, reciting the facts accordingly. We present conflicting evidence onh when 
necessary to understand issues raised on appeal." State v. Heaps; 2000 UT 5, f2, 386 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 
(citations omitted). 
f3 Whatcoti admitted IO placing a telephone call to the home of Anne lv • * <\.>. i.u iUuti.^ii-e, 
Kathryn Convey. Nieison and Whatcott were friends, and Convey was * • • • * i nic/\i with WhaicuU. 
Whatcott left !'••. fHkm ing message on their answering machine: 
I \ e g^i uu^ I^J.. w., ..,_, iCoiii.iL liiaiju . jiL consistently and 
constantly and it's painful and it's red - .at or a third testicle. And I 
was wondering if like Kath\ or Ann[ej. w Hie of; ou could help me out here, if 
either one of you could like grab my crotch and just like fondle that third 
testicle of mine. It's just oozing all over the place, to get their hands kind of 
greasy. If you have any advice, please, give me a call. You know the mimhn 
Thanks. Bye, 
]\4 / u i. iai, >v iiaicou testified that Convey nuu um-n laiked about ner mice . i nan,
 t. IK1^ on 
her breast, and other health problems. He said that his intent in making the . . . . . . . ' \y a prank" on 
Convey and to "parody" what he had heard her saying about her physical ailmenU cribed tin. 
phone call as a "sick kind of joke." Convey testified that the message shocked and otlended ner, d\\c >hc 
referred to the message as obscene, lewd, and lascivious. Whatcott was convicted by a jury of one count 
of telephone harassment in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-0-901 i 'oooi ^ jpcMt-p'^tfvi K^ P T V O , 
Ctah Code < h <4o.o; >viOO<M. 
ISSUES AND S I AN HARD OF K V \ i I' W 
[^5 Whatcott argues there was niM.ifiincn; evidence to show that Liu: telephone message was lewd, 
lascivious, or profane, further K- nntends the telephone harassment statute is unconstitutionally 
overbroad, both on its face and as applied, and is void for vagueness. A challenge to the constitutionality 
of a statute presents a question of law, which we review for correctness, according no deference to the 
trial court's ruling. See Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989) 
1|6 Because we conclude the telephone harassment statute is unconstitutionally overbroad, we need ilot 
reach Whatcott's c^dlr*1*^ *•* lU-> suPV :o"rv -r&, - - ; }crrc — M- vagueness argument. 
ANAI ,YSIS 
\J Whai :;; J.S mai seeuon O-V-JM is unci . road, both on its face and as applied 
to him,;. ,ti u is void for vagueness. I We ilis. ,. ^ . .. ..aicott's overbreadth challenge. We need 
consider his vagueness challenge onh' il we conclude the statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad. See 
Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372 J ?"\S (UfahO, App. 1990). 
1|8 A statute will De niwnidatcd lor overbreadth only il n uue> I M <mn specifically at evils within the 
allowable area of state control but, on the contrary, sweeps within its ambit other activities that in 
ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or the press.1" Logan City, 786 P.2d 
at 1375 (citation omitted). "[Particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved . , . the 
overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well. . . ." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 
U.S. 601, 615, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 2918 (1973); see State v. Haig, 578 P.2d 837, 841 (Utah 1978). Further, a 
"'statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing 
construction."' Haig, 578 P.2d at 841 (Maughan, J., concurring in result) (quoting Erznoznik v. City of 
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 2276 (1975)). As an overarching principle, we will 
construe a statute as constitutional whenever possible. See State v. Mohi. 901 P.2d 991, 1009 (Utah 
1995). 
Tf9 The telephone harassment statute, section 76-9-201, provides: 
(1) A person is guilty of telephone harassment and subject to prosecution in the 
jurisdiction where the telephone call originated or was received if with intent to 
annoy, alarm another, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten, harass, or frighten 
any person at the called number or recklessly creating a risk thereof, the person: 
(a) makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues; 
(b) makes repeated telephone calls, whether or not a conversation 
ensues, or after having been told not to call back, causes the 
telephone of another to ring repeatedly or continuously; 
(c) makes a telephone call and insults, taunts, or challenges the 
recipient of the telephone call or any person at the called number in 
a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response; 
(d) makes a telephone call and uses any lewd or profane language 
or suggests any lewd or lascivious act; or 
(e) makes a telephone call and threatens to inflict injury, physical 
harm, or damage to any person or the property of any person. 
(2) Telephone harassment is a class B misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 (1999). 2 
flO We acknowledge at the outset that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting the public from 
certain unreasonable telephone calls. Presumably, the Legislature intended to prohibit threatening and 
menacing calls, and calls that would provoke a breach of the peace. This is certainly within the 
Legislature's power, and does not offend the First Amendment. 
TJ11 But section 76-9-201 sweeps even more broadly. Under subsection (a), the statute prohibits any 
"telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues," where the caller has "recklessly creat[ed] a risk" 
of "annoy[ing], alarm[ing] . . ., intimidating], offend[ing], abus[ing], threatening], harassing], or 
frightening]" the recipient. kL Read thus, the statute would prohibit a potentially huge universe of 
otherwise legitimate telephone calls. 
1J12 For example, unwanted telephone solicitations made to a private home during the dinner hour would 
be prohibited, as those calls surely risk annoying, offending, or harassing the recipients. Or, imagine a 
young adult who has recently moved out of the family home. To his exasperation (frequently and 
vocally expressed), his mother calls often to make sure he is alright. Under this statute, the worried 
mother's telephone calls-whether or not she actually conversed with or in fact annoyed him—could 
subject her to prosecution. Her conscious disregard of the substantial likelihood that the call would 
annoy her son would bring the call within the statute's ambit. 
J Clf^V T U l J 
|^13 Subsection (d) is aLo pioblenialit boi example, one could call n liiend in i |iii il oi good Jun, 
intending to play a joke on the friend. 3 At the very same time, one could also has e the specific intent to 
annoy or offend the friend by using "lewd or piofane language" or even by "suggesting] a[] lewd or 
lascivious act." Id. § 76-9-201(d). This lewd language, in fact, could be part and parcel of the joke. The 
specific intent to annoy or offend while telling a joke would bring the telephone call under the statute 
One could also call a friend, intending to tell a lewd joke and assuming that the friend would not be 
offended—but nonetheless violate the statute because telling the joke created the reckless risk that the 
friend would take offense. 
*]! 14 The potential ovei breadth of the statute is not, oi course, lunik d to the scenarios posed abuu i ither 
legitimate telephone calls, made with a specific intent to annoy or offend the recipient, could im hide "a 
consumer calling the seller or producer of a product to express dissatisfaction of product perfoniiance, a 
businessman calling another to protest failure to perform a contractual obligation, a constituent calling 
his legislator to protest the legislator's stand on an issue, etc." State v. Dronso, 279 N.W.2d 710, 714 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1979). These few examples show that the overbreadth of subsections (a) and (d) is real 
and substantial, as they m"sweep[] within [their] ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances 
constitute an exercise of freedom of speech.'"" Logan City, 786 P.2d at 1375 (quoting Waters v. 
McGuriman, 656 F. Supp. 923, 925 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (citation omitted)). Thus, we hold that subsections 
(a) and (d) of section 76-9-201 are unconstitutionally overbroad. See State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, ^ [18. 
20, 980 P.2d 191 (stating "if a portion of fa] statute might be saved by severing the part that is 
unconstitutional, such should be donef,]" so long as severance does not "destroy the purpose of the 
statute"), 
|^ 15 Our holding here should "not suggest that the first amendment gives one the unlimited right to 
annoy another, by speech or otherwise." People v. Klick, 362 N.E.2d 329, 331 (111. 1977). However, the 
First Amendment does not prohibit the kind of essentially harmless communications described above. 
Simply put, "[t]he First Amendment is made of sterner stuff." Bolles v. People, *"] 1 P 'M 80 83 (Colo. 
1975) 
I OIN< I UNION 
[^10 Subsections (a) and (d) of the telephone harassment statute, section 76-9-201 of the Utah Code, are 
unconstitutionally overbroad both facially and as applied. We thus icverse Whatcott's conviction 
Because of our disposition, we do not reach Whatcott's arguments thai insufficient evidence supported 
his conviction and that the statute is also unconstitutionally vaimr 
1f 17 Reversed. 
Noinii in 11 I.iii k'.nii, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
1J18WF CONCUR: 
Judith M Hillings, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
FOOTNOTES 
1 "[W]e assume, arguendo, the applicability of federal first amendment standing principles in Utah 
courts." Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372, 1375 n.10 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Because Whatcott is 
mounting a First Amendment challenge to the telephone harassment statute, he has standing to challenge 
it "on behalf of others not before the court even if the law could be constitutionally applied to" him, Salt 
Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1263 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), unless we are able to construe the 
statute in a manner that "will apply only to unprotected activity." Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 
455, 458 (Utah 1989). Because we cannot impose a limiting construction in this case, Whatcott has 
standing to challenge the statute both on its face and as applied to him. 
2 The information charging Whatcott did not indicate under which subsection Whatcott was charged. 
Similarly, the jury was instructed to evaluate whether Whatcott's conduct satisfied any of the 
subsections, without specifying a particular one. Both Whatcott and the City contend that Whatcott's 
actions could fall only under subsections (a) or (d). We agree that the call would most logically fall 
under one of these subsections. Thus, we interpret Whatcott's appeal as a challenge to subsections (a) 
and (d) only, and we do not address the constitutionality of subsections (b), (c), or (e). 
3 In fact, Whatcott's defense in this case is that he intended only to "play a prank, to have fun, give a 
joke." Puerile and offensive as the call may have been, it is nonetheless protected expression under the 
First Amendment. 
APPENDIX KK 
Jones v. Logan City Corp., 19 Utah 2d 169, 428 P.2d 160 (1067) 
05/24/67 EVAN P. JONES v. LOGAN CITY CORPORATION 
[1] SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
[2] No. 10622 
[3] 1967.UT.74 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 428 P.2d 160, 19 Utah 2d 169 
[4] May 24, 1967 
[5] EVAN P. JONES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, 
v. 
LOGAN CITY CORPORATION, DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT 
[6] Theodore S. Perry, Logan, for appellant. 
[7] H. Preston Thomas, Logan, for respondent. 
[8] Tuckett, Justice, wrote the opinion. 
[9] Henriod, J., concurs. 
[10] Callister, Justice (concurring in result). 
[11] Ellett, Justice (concurring and Dissenting). 
[ 12] Crockett, Chief Justice (dissenting). 
[13] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Tuckett 
[14] TUCKETT, Justice: 
[15] This is an action brought by the plaintiff wherein he seeks to restrain Logan City from 
destroying a home owned by him. The City's Board of Condemnation, after a hearing and 
inspection of the building in question, made findings that the building owned by the 
plaintiff constituted a menace to public safety and further found that the building should be 
APPENDIX LL 
United States -• " se, 92 U.S. 214, 221, 25 L.Ed. 563 (1876) 
U.S. Supreme Court 
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875) 
United States v. Reese 
92 U.S. 214 
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
Syllabus 
1. Rights and immunities created by or dependent upon the Constitution of the United States can be protected 
by Congress. The form and manner of that protection may be such as Congress, in the legitimate exercise of its 
legislative discretion, shall provide, and may be varied to meet the necessities of a particular right. 
2. The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution does not confer the right of suffrage, but it invests citizens of 
the United States with the right of 
Page 92 U.S. 215 
exemption from discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on account of their race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude, and empowers Congress to enforce that right by "appropriate legislation." 
3. The power of Congress to legislate at all upon the subject of voting at state elections rests upon this 
amendment, and can be exercised by providing a punishment only when the wrongful refusal to receive the 
vote of a qualified elector at such elections is because of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
4. The third and fourth sections of the Act of May 31, 1570, 16 Stat. 140, not being confined in their operation to 
unlawful discrimination on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, are beyond the limit of the 
Fifteenth Amendment and unauthorized. 
5. As these sections are in general language broad enough to cover wrongful acts without as well as within the 
constitutional jurisdiction, and cannot be limited by judicial construction so as to make them operate only on that 
which Congress may rightfully prohibit and punish, held that Congress has not provided by "appropriate 
legislation" for the punishment of an inspector of a municipal election for refusing to receive and count at such 
election the vote of a citizen of the United States of African descent. 
6. Since the passage of the act which gives the presiding judge the casting vote in cases of division and 
authorizes a judgment in accordance with his opinion, Rev.Stat., sec. 650, this Court, if it finds that the 
judgment as rendered is correct, need do no more than affirm it. If, however, that judgment is reversed, all 
questions certified, which are considered in the final determination of the case here, should be answered. 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case comes hare by reason of a division of opinion between the judges of the Circuit Court in the District of 
Kentucky. It presents an indictment containing four counts, under sees. 3 and 4 of the Act of May 31, 1870, 16 
Stat. 140, against two of the inspectors of a municipal election in the State of Kentucky for refusing to receive 
and count at such election the vote of William Garner, a citizen of the United States of African descent. All the 
questions presented by the certificate of divisior i arose upon general demurrers to the several counts of the 
indictment. 
APPENDIX MM 
State of Utah v. Hemmert, No 15725 1978 
IN 1 H.E S U P R E M E C O l I K T OJ: T H E S T A T E O F UTAH: 
-ooOoo- • •• 
S t a t e of U t a h , 
P l a i n t i f f ;HK1 f;e«jpuTHlC"iita 
v . 
K;i i I i M e m m e r t , 
D e f e n d a n t a n d A p p e l l a n t . 
N o . 15725 
F I L E D 
D e c e m b e r 
G e o f f r e y J . / B x f f t e r , CI e r f e ^ 
MA U GI IA N
 a J u s t i c e ; 
D e f e n d a n t - w a s c h a r g e d in A j u s t i c e s n m n ' , w i t h a v i o l a t i o n of a . S a l t L a k e 
C o u n t y z o n i n g o r d i n a n c e . Spec i f i ca l l y , , d e f e n d a n t w a s a c c u s e d of m a i n t a i n i n g a 
d w e l l i n g w i t h a n a t t a c h e d c a r p o r t on h i s p r o p e r t y w i t h l e s s t h a n t h e r e q u i s i t e s i d e 
y a r d * T h e s i d e y a r d o r d i n a n c e i s n o t i n i s s u e h e r e . T h e d e f e n s e s t i p u l a t e d a s t o 
t h e f a c t s , -ir,-' dei«.-ndaiit v.-.- s* found g u i l t y . D e f e n d a n t a p p e a l e d t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , 
b e f o r e w h o m t h e c a s e w a s s u b m i t t e d b a s e d o n s t i p u l a t e d f a c t s . W e d e c l a r e t h e 
s e lit e n ^ n p o ^  r: * n <"•> r r • * - :- T * * * f : - ' 1 a i t J-J i i, s t
 (<i,? i J th e j u d g m cut of fh e c o u r f. 
U H o ; t ' ;*-* -'"." . • ' « o u r t d e f e n d a n t u r g e d t h e r e w a s d i s c r i m i n a t o r y e n f o r c e -
m e n t of t h e z o n i n g o r d i n a n c e , , T o s u s t a i n h i s c l a i m d e f e n d a n t c i t e d n i n e v i o l a t i o n s 
of z o n i n g o r d i n a n c e s i n a n o t h e r s u b d i v i s i o n , a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h r e e m i l e s f r o m h i s 
r e s i d e n c e , w h i c h t h e c o u n t y h a d n o t p r o s e c u t e d , 
"The t r i a l c o u r t r u l e d i n t e n t i o n a l d i s c r i m i n a t o r y e n f o r c e m e n t \would be in 
v i o l a t i o n of t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n g u a r a n t e e d b y t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s 
a n d t h e S t a t e of U tah* In c o n t r a s t , m e r e l a x i t y of e n f o r c e m e n t , e v e n t h o u g h i t m a y 
r e s u l t in. u n e q u a l a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e l aw t o t h o s e e n t i t l e d t o b e t r e a t e d a l i k e # d o e s 
n o t c o n s t i t u t e a d e n i a l of e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n , ^ T h e t r i ^ l c o u r t found t h e r e w a s n o 
e v i d e n c e of i n t e n t i o n a l d* P<~ H n ^ h i ^ t i o n ; a n d , t h e r e i n .re, fonnd d e f e n d a n t w a s g u i l t y 
a s c h a r g e d . 
T h e coi iii ty h a s u r g e d t h e d u u ^ . Q t i of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ;> f inal , 
A r t i c l e V I I I , S e c t i o n 9» C o n s t i t u t i o n o( Utah* p r o v i d e s "two e x c e p t i o n s to t h e 
f i n a l i t y of t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t o:-, a p p e a l s f r o m a j u s t i c e of t h e p e a c e , 
t h e y a r e 3 ' i n c a s e s i n v o l v i n g t h e v a l i d i t y 07- c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of a s t a t u t e „ l l 
A t 1 h e t i m e of s e n t e n c i n g d e f e n s e c o u n s e l m o v e d t h e s e n t e n c e no t b e i m p o s e d 
a n d t h e c o n v i c t i o n v a c a t e d on t h e g r o u n d s t h e o r d i n a n c e s e t t i n g f o r t h the pena I ty w a s 
b o t h u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d i n v a l i d b y r e a s o n t h a t t h e C o u n t y C o m m i s s i o n e x c e e d e d i t s 
s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y . S p e c i f i c a l l y , d e f e n d a n t u r g e d t h e o r d i n a n c e w a s d i s c r i m i n a t o r y 
a n d d e n i e d e q u a 1 p r o t e c t i o n of t h e l a w s i n c e b y f a i l u r e to p r o s e c u t e a v i o l a t o r f o r a 
I . P e o p l e y:# U t i e a Dav?s D r u g C o m p a n y , I n c . , 16 Ap„ Div„ 2d 12, 225 N . Y . S . 2d 
1 2 8 , 4 A . L . -R. 3d 393 ( 1 9 6 2 ) . 
p e r i o d of five y e a r s , the v io la t ion b e c o m e s a nonconforming u se . Secondly, the 
Coun ty C o m m i s s i o n e x c e e d e d i t s s t a t u to ry a u t h o r i t y "by confer r ing on the Planning 
C o m m i s s i o n the p o ^ e r to e s t a b l i s h a. n o n c o n f o r m i n g u s e , which in effect, p e r m i t s 
t h e l a t t e r to a m e n d the zoning ord inance* T h i r d l y , defendant a s s e r t e d the o r d i -
n a n c e w a s app l ied in a d i s c r i m i n a t o r y m a n n e r by r e a s o n that long t e r m v i o l a t o r s 
w e r e not p r o s e c u t e d a l though they had fa i led to follow the p r o c e d u r e se t fo r th in 
t h e o r d i n a n c e to e s t a b l i s h t he nonconforming u s e a s p rov ided t h e r e i n . 
T h e cha l l enged o r d i n a n c e , Sec t ion 2 2 - 1 - 1 1 , p r o v i d e s : 
2 2 - 1 - 1 1 . P e n a l t i e s . Any p e r s o n , f i r m or co rpo ra t ion , 
w h e t h e r a s p r i n c i p a l , agent e m p l o y e e or o t h e r w i s e , v iola t ing or 
caus ing or p e r m i t t i n g the v io la t ion of the p r o v i s i o n of this T i t l e 
sha l l be gui l ty of a m i s d e m e a n o r and pun i shab le a s provided by law. 
Such p e r s o n , f i r m o r c o r p o r a t i o n who in t en t iona l ly v io la tes t h i s 
T i t l e s h a l l b e d e e m e d to b e gui l ty of a s e p a r a t e offense fox e a c h 
and every day d u r i n g which any v io l a t i on of th i s T i t l e i s c o m m i t t e d , 
cont inued; or p e r m i t t e d by such p e r s o n , or c o r p o r a t i o n and s h a l l 
b e pun i shab l e a s h e r e i n s t a t ed , p rov ided , h o w e v e r , that when any 
s t r u c t u r e o r u s e is in cont inuous v i o l a t i o n of t h i s Ord inance for a 
p e r i o d e x c e e d i n g five (5) y e a r s , and upon p r o p e r affidavits be ing 
submi t t ed to the Sal t L a k e County p l a n n i n g C o m m i s s i o n to the 
effect t h a t no a c t i o n ha s b e e n i n s t i g a t e d o r compla in t r e c e i v e d 
du r ing sa id p e r i o d with r e s p e c t to the v io la t ion , and when sa id 
C o m m i s s i o n f inds tha t in the i n t e r e s t of j u s t i c e and the g e n e r a l 
pub l ic good and w e l f a r e such s t r u c t u r e o r u s e should be a l lowed 
to con t inue , t h e n and in t ha t event sa id C o m m i s s i o n may d e c l a r e 
such s t r u c t u r e or u s e n o n - c o n f o r m i n g . However , the pe r iod of 
l i m i t a t i o n of f ive (5) y e a r s p r e s c r i b e d h e r e i n sha l l not c o m m e n c e 
to r u n un t i l the effect ive da te of t h i s O r d i n a n c e and in no w a y 
s h a l l be i n t e r p r e t e d to p e r m i t t h e cont inua t ion of any vio la t ion which 
wh ich e x i s t s on t he effect ive da te hereof« 
It c l e a r l y e x c e e d s p o w e r s de ta i l ed in four- l e g i s l a t i v e e n a c t m e n t s * The pow 
c o n f e r r e d on the b o a r d s of county c o m m i s s i o n e r s to p rov ide for zoning and plant 
a r e s e t fo r th in C h a p t e r 27 , T i t l e 17, U . C . A . 1953 . 
Sect ion 17-27-1B p r o v i d e s s t a t u t o r y r e g u l a t i o n for a nonconforming u s e . 
i t s e x p r e s s t e r m s a nonconfo rming u s e i s , i n effect , defined as a n ex i s t ing and la^ 
u s e a t t h e t i m e of adop t ion of a zoning r e s o l u t i o n or i t s a m e n d m e n t . Such a nonca: 
f o r m i n g u s e m a y b e cont inued, excep t a s p rov ided in the s ta tu te . A l l the provision 
in t h e s t a tu t e c o n c e r n i n g nonconforming u s e s r e q u i r e the t e r m s and condi t ions to t 
s e t f o r t h in a zoning reso lu t ion* 
17 -27 -15 c o n f e r s on the B o a r d of County C o m m i s s i o n e r s power t o au tho r i z 
t h e b o a r d of a d j u s t m e n t {by zoning r e s o l u t i o n ) , to m a k e spec ia l excep t ions , whe 
s u c h wi l l be in h a r m o n e y with the g e n e r a l p u r p o s e and intent of t h e r e g u l a t i o n s . T' 
p o w e r to m a k e e x c e p t i o n s i s 1 Jsubject to a p p r o p r i a t e p r i n c i p l e s , s t a n d a r d s , r u l e s , 
c o n d i t i o n s , and s a f e g u a r d s set fo r th i n the zoning r e g u l a t i o n . t ! 
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17-27 23 p rov ides that any person,... v io la t ing any regu lation or any p rov i s ion 
of a zoning re.sol.iition .shall he gui l ty of a m i s d e m e a n o r , 
I he effect of the o rd inance i± lo c s U L J i ^ ; « ^uiiditional five year s t a tu te of 
l i m i t a t i o n s for v io la t ion of a zoning o rd inance . The ord inance fu r the r v io la tes the 
s t a tu to ry s t a n d a r d which e s t a b l i s h e s a nonconforming e*e a s an exis t ing and lawful 
u s e at t he t i m e of the adoption of a zoning resolut ion, or amendment* The o rd inance 
a t t e m p t s to e s t a b l i s h a p r o c e d u r e to conver t a n exis t ing, 'unlawful use into a non-
conforming u s e in con t raven t ion of the s t a t u t e . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e is no s t a tu to ry 
p r o v i s i o n c o n f e r r i n g on the Board, of County C o m m i s s i o n e r s the au thor i ty to d e l e -
ga te to the P lann ing C o m m i s s i o n the power t o g r a n t a nonconforming use s t a t u s , on 
a c a s e by c a s e b a s i s . The e s t a b l i s h e d s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r e to c r e a t e an except ion 
to a zoning r e s o l u t i o n i s se t f o r t h in Sect ion 1 7 - 2 7 - 1 5 . F ina l ly the ord inance exceeds 
the power g r a n t e d the Board! of County C o m m i s s i o n e r s by c rea t ing a five yea r l i m i -
ta t ion p e i i n d -:M1 providing each day of v io la t ion cons t i tu t e s a s e p a r a t e offense. 
_ - . : • - . * - • : - * * • - e s : 
It sha l l be 'unlawful to e r e c t
 a , « any « «, ,. s t r u c t u r e . , 
in v io l a t ion of
 m „ » any zoning reso lu t ion* or any a m e n d m e n t 
thereof , enacted or adopted by any b o a r d of county c o m m i s -
s i o n e r s unde r the au tho r i t y of the ac t . Any" per son , 
viola.ting „ . . any zoning r e s o l u t i o n , or any amendmen t of 
th i s a c t , sha l l be guilt v of a m i s d e m e a n o r [Emphas i s 
s u p p l i e d . ] • 
ri iii* s t a tu te de s igna t e s a v io la t ion of a zoning reso lu t ion a s a. s ingle c r i m e , 
"v i z # , ^ m i s d e m e a n o r . The o r d i n a n c e e x c e e d s the s t a tu to ry l imi t s by providing 
each day :/. v iolat ion cons t i t u t e s a s e p a r a t e of fense . The five year l imi ta t ion pe r iod 
c o n t r a v e n e s Sect ion 76-1 -302(b ) , which p r o v i d e s a, p rosecu t ion for a m i s d e m e a n o r 
mu st 1"-* -ommcr . ced within two y e a r s af ter i t is c o m m i t t e d . 
The p r o v i s i o n s of (he cha l lenged o r d i n a n c e a r e c l e a r l y inval id by rea son of 
the Board of C o m m i s s i o n e r s exceed ing the s t a t u t o r y au thor i ty confe r red "upon t h e m 
unde r C h a p t e r 27, T i t l e 17, The inval id i ty of the o rd inance does not p rec lude the 
impos i t i on of s e n t e n c e on defendant , s ince the s t a tu t e , Section 17 -27 -23 , p r o v i d e s 
*he p E*na It y. However , in vie v. of the s ta te s t a t u t e ' s p rov i s ion for one offense r a t h e r 
tli*n ;i s e r i e s of offense*;, the t r i a l cour t may want to modify th is s e n t e n c e . 
CROCKET T5 J u s t i c e ; (Concurr i in ; , u-j.ri: r e s e r v a t i o n ) 
1 vo;)cui in a f f i rming the convict ion and the impos i t ion of s e n t e n c e . But 
i n a s m u c h a s that i s done, I s ee n e i t h e r r e a s o n nor n e c e s s i t y for c r i t i c i z ing the 
o rd inance r e f e r r e d to , nor for d e c l a r i n g tha t it exceeds the powers g ran ted to the 
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Coun ty C o m m i s s i o n e r s . 1 It i m p r e s s e s m e a s w i th in the zoning, and planning 
a u t h o r i t y c o n f e r r e d upon the C o m m i s s i o n "by the s t a t u t e s r e f e r r e d to , and that i s 
w e l l des igned to a c c o m p l i s h i t s p r o p e r object ives , , T h i s inc ludes the p rov i s ion 
t h a t w h e n any s t r u c t u r e ha s e x i s t e d con t inuous ly fo r a pe r iod of five y e a r s , with 
no c o m p l a i n t and no a c t i o n t h e r e o n , the C o m m i s s i o n t h e n has d i s c r e t i o n to d e t e r -
m i n e w h e t h e r " in the i n t e r e s t of j u s t i c e and t h e g e n e r a l publ ic good and we l fa re 
s u c h s t r u c t u r e or u s e should b e a l lowed to continue*1 1 
T h a t p r o v i s i o n i s in h a r m o n y wi th what should, be the g e n e r a l pu rpose of 
a l l l a w s and r e g u l a t i o n s , tha t of a l lowing a n owner t h e h ighes t p o s s i b l e d e g r e e of 
f r e e d o m of u s e of h i s p r o p e r t y so long a s i t i s "not a n i n f r i ngemen t upon r e c o g n i -
t i o n of s i m i l a r r i g h t s in o t h e r s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i th t h e g e n e r a l w e l f a r e , The 
f a c t t h a t a s t r u c t u r e h a s ex i s t ed for a p e r i o d of five y e a r s with no one mak ing any 
c o m p l a i n t about it s e e m s a t l e a s t a p r i m a fac ie b a s i s for a s s u m i n g tha t i t i s not 
"bothering or a d v e r s e l y affect ing o t h e r i nd iv idua l s o r t h e publ ic*welfare . Allowing 
t h e C o m m i s s i o n to t hen m a k e s u c h a d e t e r m i n a t i o n , and g ran t ing or denying v*hat 
•is s o m e t i m e s a l s o r e f e r r e d t o a s 1ra v a r i a n c e , 1 1 r e c o g n i z e s tha t t h e r e m a y be 
m a r g i n a l s i t ua t ions a n d / o r c i r c u m s t a n c e s of p r a c t i c a l ex igency which jus t i fy the 
C o m m i s s i o n in u s i n g s o m e j u d g m e n t and d i s c r e t i o n in c a r r y i n g out i t s zoning and 
p l a n n i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , 
E l l e t t , Chief J u s t i c e , c o n c u r s in t h e v i e w s e x p r e s s e d in t h e c o n c u r r i n g 
op in ion of M r . J u s t i c e C r o c k e t t . 
1* T h a t t h e c o u r t should avoid i n t r u d i n g into the l e g i s l a t i v e p r e r o g a t i v e unlesf 
n e c e s s a r y to r e s o l v e a c o n t r o v e r s y b e f o r e i t , s e e 3 Am* Jux» 383 and c a s e s t h e r e i 
c i t ed ; c i t ed in H e a t h m a n v* G i l e s , 13 Utah 2d 368 , 374 F , 2 d S39; and tha t a l e g i s h 
f ive e n a c t m e n t should b e p r e s u m e d v a l i d and not d e c l a r e d o t h e r w i s e u n l e s s i t 
a p p e a r s so beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt , s ee New c o m b v . Ogden City, e t c . , l2lUtcL 
5 0 3 , 243 P # 2 d 9 4 1 . 
H A L L , J u s t i c e : ( C o n c u r r i n g , w i th r e s e r v a t i o n ) 
I c o n c u r in a f f i rming t h e j u d g m e n t of t he t r i a l c o u r t . Howeve r , t h e r e i s nc 
n e c e s s i t y to d i s c u s s the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l m e r i t s of the o r d i n a n c e wh ich s u p p o r t s the 
c o n v i c t i o n a s t ha t m a t t e r w a s not r a i s e d below and h e n c e i s not b e f o r e u s on th i s 
a p p e a l , •* 
"Wilkins, J u s t i c e , does not p a r t i c i p a t e h e r e i n . 
1, A r t i c l e VHI, Sec t ion 9, C o n s t i t u t i o n of Utah* 
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Marbury vs. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed, 60 
WILLIAM MARBURY v. JAMES MADISON, SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
5 U.S. 137 
FEBRUARY, 1803 Term 
Is Marfaury 
entitled to his 
commission? 
Does Section 13 
of the Judiciary 
Act authorize 
the Court to 
issue a writ of 
mandamus? 
Is Section 13 of 
the Judiciary 
Act 
constitutional? 
If Section 13 of 
the Judiciary Act 
is 
unconstitutional, 
does the 
Supreme Court 
have the power 
to declare it 
void? 
Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the court. 
In the order in which the court has viewed this subject, the following questions 
have been considered and decided: 
1st. Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands? 
2dly. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his 
country afford him a remedy? 
3dly. If they do afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from this court? 
The first object of enquiry is: Has the applicant a right to the commission he 
demands? 
|His right originates in an act of congress passed in February, 1801, 
(concerning the district of Columbia. This law enacts, "that there shall be 
appointed in and for each of the said counties, such number of discreet persons to be justices of the peace 
as the president of the United States shall, from time to time, think expedient, to continue in office for five 
years." 
It appears, from the affidavits, that in compliance with this law, a commission for William Marbury as a 
justice of peace for the county of Washington, was signed by John Adams, then president of the United 
States; after which the seal of the United States was affixed to it; but the commission has never reached 
the person for whom it was made out. 
In order to determine whether he is entitled to this commission, it becomes necessary to enquire whether 
he has been appointed to the office. For if he has been appointed, the law continues him in office for five 
years, and he is entitled to the possession of those evidences of office, which, being completed, became 
his property. 
The 2d section of the 2d article of the constitution, declares, that "the president shall nominate, and, by and 
with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, 
and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not otherwise provided for." The third 
section declares, that "he shall commission all the officers of the United States." An act of congress directs 
the secretary of state to keep the seal of the United States, "to make out and record, and affix the said seal 
to all civil commissions to officers of the United States, to be appointed by the President, by and with the 
consent of the senate, or by the President alone; provided that the said seal shall not be affixed to any 
l& 
commission before the same shall have been signed by the President of the United States." 
These are the clauses of the constitution and laws of the United States, which affect this part of the case. 
They seem to contemplate three distinct operations: 
1st, The nomination. This is the sole act of the President, and is completely voluntary. 
2d. The appointment. This is also the act of the President, and is also a voluntary act, though it can only be 
performed by and with the advice and consent of the senate. 
3d. The commission. To grant a commission to a person appointed, might perhaps be deemed a duty 
enjoined by the constitution. "He shall," says that instrument, "commission all the officers of the United 
States." 
This is an appointment by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, and is 
evidenced by no act but the commission itself.... The last act to be done by the President, is the signature 
of the commission. He has then acted on the advice and consent of the senate to his own nomination. The 
time for deliberations has then passed. He has decided. His judgment, on the advice and consent of the 
senate concurring with his nomination, has been made, and the officer is appointed. This appointment is 
evidenced by an open, unequivocal act; and being the last act required from the person making it, 
necessarily excludes the idea of its being, so far as respects the appointment, an inchoate and incomplete 
transaction. 
The signature is a warrant for affixing the great seal to the commission; and the great seal is only to be 
affixed to an instrument which is complete. It asserts, by an act supposed to be of public notoriety, the 
verity of the Presidential signature. 
It is never to be affixed till the commission is signed, because the signature, which gives force and effect to 
the commission, is conclusive evidence that the appointment is made. 
The commission being signed, the subsequent duty of the secretary of state is prescribed by law, and not 
to be guided by the will of the President. He is to affix the seal of the United States to the commission, and 
is to record it. 
This is not a proceeding which may be varied, if the judgment of the executive shall suggest one more 
eligible; but is a precise course accurately marked out by law, and is to be strictly pursued. It is the duty of 
the secretary of state to conform to the law, and in this he is an officer of the United States, bound to obey 
the laws. He acts, in this regard, as has been very properly stated at the bar, under the authority of law, 
and not by the instructions of the President. It is a ministerial act which the law enjoins on a particular 
officer for a particular purpose.... 
The discretion of the executive is to be exercised until the appointment has been made. But having once 
made the appointment, his power over the office is terminated in all cases, where, by law, the officer is not 
removable by him. The right to the office is then in the person appointed, and he has the absolute, 
unconditional, power of accepting or rejecting it. 
Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the President, and sealed by the 
secretary of state, was appointed; and as the law creating the office, gave the officer a 
right to hold for five years, independent of the executive, the appointment was not 
revocable; but vested in the officer legal rights, which are protected by the laws of his 
country. 
To withhold his commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by 
law, but violative of a vested legal right. 
This brings us to the second enquiry; which is, 2dly. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do 
the laws of his country afford him a remedy? 
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of 
the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. 
The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. 
It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a 
vested legal right. 
By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain important political powers, in 
the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political 
character, and to his own conscience. To aid him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to 
appoint certain officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with his orders. 
In such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which 
executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion. The 
subjects are political. They respect the nation, not individual rights, and being entrusted to the executive, 
the decision of the executive is conclusive. The application of this remark will be perceived by adverting to 
the act of congress for establishing the department of foreign affairs. This office, as his duties were 
prescribed by that act, is to conform precisely to the will of the President. He is the mere organ by whom 
that will is communicated. The acts of such an officer, as an officer, can never be examinable by the 
courts. 
But when the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other duties; when he is directed peremptorily 
to perform certain acts; when the rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those acts; he 
is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport 
away the vested rights of others. 
The conclusion from this reasoning is, that where the heads of departments are the political or confidential 
agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the President, or rather to act in cases in which the 
executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their 
acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights 
depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself 
injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy. 
If this be the rule, let us enquire how it applies to the case under the consideration of the court. 
The power of nominating to the senate, and the power of appointing the person nominated, are political 
powers, to be exercised by the President according to his own discretion. When he has made an 
appointment, he has exercised his whole power, and his discretion has been completely applied to the 
case. 
The question whether a right has vested or not, is, in its nature, judicial, and must be tried by the judicial 
authority. If, for example, Mr. Marbury had taken the oaths of a magistrate, and proceeded to act as one; in 
consequence of which a suit had been instituted against him, in which his defence had depended on his 
being a magistrate; the validity of his appointment must have been determined by judicial authority. 
So, if he conceives that, by virtue of his appointment, he has a legal right, either to the commission which 
has been made out for him, or to a copy of that commission, it is equally a question examinable in a court, 
and the decision of the court upon it must depend on the opinion entertained of his appointment. 
That question has been discussed, and the opinion is, that the latest point of time which can be taken as 
that at which the appointment was complete, and evidenced, was when, after the signature of the 
president, the seal of the United States was affixed to the commission. 
It is then the opinion of the court: 1st. That by signing the commission of Mr. Marbury, the president of the 
United States appointed him a justice of peace, for the county of Washington in the district of Columbia; 
and that the seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the secretary of state, is conclusive testimony of 
the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment; and that the appointment conferred 
on him a legal right to the office for the space of five years. 2dly. That, having this legal title to the office, he 
has a consequent right to the commission; a refusal to deliver which, is a plain violation of that right, for 
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which the laws of his country afford him a remedy. 
It remains to be enquired whether, 3dly. He is entitled to the remedy for which he applies. This depends on, 
1st. The nature of the writ applied for, and, 2dly. The power of this court. 
1 st. The nature of the writ. 
If one of the heads of departments commits any illegal act, under the color of his office, by which an 
individual sustains an injury, it cannot be pretended that his office alone exempts him from being sued in 
the ordinary mode of proceeding, and being compelled to obey the judgment of the law. How then can his 
office exempt him from this particular mode of deciding on the legality of his conduct, if the case be such a 
case as would, were any other individual the party complained of, authorize the process? 
It is not by the office of the person to whom the writ is directed, but the nature of the thing to be done that 
the propriety or impropriety of issuing a mandamus, is to be determined. Where the head of a department 
acts in a case, in which executive discretion is to be exercised; in which he is the mere organ of executive 
will; it is again repeated, that any application to a court to control, in any respect, his conduct, would be 
rejected without hesitation. 
But where he is directed by law to do a certain act affecting the absolute rights of individuals, in the 
performance of which he is not placed under the particular direction of the President, and the performance 
of which, the President cannot lawfully forbid, and therefore is never presumed to have forbidden; as for 
example, to record a commission which has received all the legal solemnities, it is not perceived on what 
ground the courts of the country are further excused from the duty of giving judgment, that right be done to 
an injured individual, than if the same services were to be performed by a person not the head of a 
department.... 
It was at first doubted whether the action of detinue was not a specified legal remedy for the commission 
which has been withheld from Mr. Marbury; in which case a mandamus would be improper. But this doubt 
has yielded to the consideration that the judgment in detinue is for the thing itself, or its value. The value of 
a public office not to be sold, is incapable of being ascertained; and the applicant has a right to the office 
itself, or to nothing. He will obtain the office by obtaining the commission, or a copy of it from the record. 
This, then, is a plain case for a mandamus, either to deliver the commission, or a copy of it from the record; 
and it only remains to be enquired, Whether it can issue from this court. 
The act to establish the judicial courts of the United States authorizes the supreme court "to issue writs of 
mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons 
holding office, under the authority of the United States." 
The secretary of state, being a person holding an office under the authority of the United States, is 
precisely within the letter of the description; and if this court is not authorized to issue a writ of mandamus 
to such an officer, it must be because the law is unconstitutional, and therefore absolutely incapable of 
conferring the authority, and assigning the duties which its words purport to confer and assign. 
The constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one supreme court, and such inferior 
courts as congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. This power is expressly extended to all 
cases arising under the laws of the United States; and consequently, in some form, may be exercised over 
the present case; because the right claimed is given by a law of the United States. 
In the distribution of this power it is declared that "the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in all 
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a 
party. In all other cases, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction." 
It has been insisted, at the bar, that as the original grant of jurisdiction, to the supreme and inferior courts, 
is general, and the clause, assigning original jurisdiction to the supreme court, contains no negative or 
restrictive words; the power remains to the legislature, to assign original jurisdiction to that court in other 
cases than those specified in the article which has been recited; provided those cases belong to the judicial 
power of the United States. 
If it had been intended to leave it to the discretion of the legislature to apportion the judicial power between 
the supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been useless to 
have proceeded further than to have defined the judicial powers, and the tribunals in which it should be 
vested. The subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage, is entirely without meaning, if such is to be 
the construction. If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the 
constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction where the constitution 
has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without 
substance. 
Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed; and in this 
case, a negative or exclusive sense must be given to them or they have no operation at all. 
It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore 
such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it. 
When an instrument organizing fundamentally a judicial system, divides it into one supreme, and so many 
inferior courts as the legislature may ordain and establish; then enumerates its powers, and proceeds so 
far to distribute them, as to define the jurisdiction of the supreme court by declaring the cases in which it 
shall take original jurisdiction, and that in others it shall take appellate jurisdiction; the plain import of the 
words seems to be, that in one class of cases its jurisdiction is original, and not appellate; in the other it is 
appellate, and not original. If any other construction would render the clause inoperative, that is an 
additional reason for rejecting such other construction, and for adhering to their obvious meaning. 
To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate 
jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction. 
It has been stated at the bar that the appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of forms, and that 
if it be the will of the legislature that a mandamus should be used for that purpose, that will must be 
obeyed. This is true, yet the jurisdiction must be appellate, not original. 
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause 
already instituted, and does not create that cause. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to 
courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper, is in effect the same as to sustain an 
original action for that paper, and therefore seems not to belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction. 
Neither is it necessary in such a case as this, to enable the court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction. 
The authority, therefore, given to the supreme court, by the act establishing the judicial courts of the United 
States, to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution; and 
it becomes necessary to enquire whether a jurisdiction, so conferred, can be exercised. 
The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can become the law of the land, is a question 
deeply interesting to the United States; but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest. It seems 
only necessary to recognize certain principles, supposed to have been long and well established, to decide 
it. 
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their 
opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole American fabric has 
been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it to be 
frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental. And as the 
authority, from which they proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent. 
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns, to different departments, their 
respective powers. It may either stop here; or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those 
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departments. 
The government of the United States is of the latter description. The powers of the legislature are defined, 
and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what 
purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, 
at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction, between a government with 
limited and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are 
imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be 
contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter 
the constitution by an ordinary act. 
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is either a superior, paramount law, 
unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is 
alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it. 
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law: if the 
latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power, 
in its own nature illimitable. 
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental 
and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an 
act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void. 
If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind 
the courts, and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a 
rule as operative as if it was a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory; and 
would seem, at first view, an absurdity too gross to be insisted on. It shall, however, receive a more 
attentive consideration. 
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply 
the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each 
other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. 
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, 
so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or 
conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting 
rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. 
If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the 
legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply. 
Those then who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be considered, in court, as a paramount 
law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the constitution, and 
see only the law. 
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions. It would declare that an act, 
which, according to the principles and theory of our government, is entirely void; is yet, in practice, 
completely obligatory. It would declare, that if the legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act, 
notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It would be giving to the legislature a practical 
and real omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits. It 
is prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure. 
That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement on political institutions - a 
written constitution - would of itself be sufficient, in America, where written constitutions have been viewed 
with so much reverence, for rejecting the construction. But the peculiar expressions of the constitution of 
the United States furnish additional arguments in favor of its rejection. 
I V I U I U U I Y TO J.TXV*X*xw»va.i 
The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the constitution. Could it be 
the intention of those who gave this power, to say that, in using it, the constitution should not be looked 
into? That a case arising under the constitution should be decided without examining the instrument under 
which it arises? This is too extravagant to be maintained. 
In some cases then, the constitution must be looked into by the judges. And if they can open it at all, what 
part of it are they forbidden to read, or to obey? There are many other parts of the constitution which serve 
to illustrate this subject. It is declared that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state." 
Suppose a duty on the export of cotton, of tobacco, or of flour; and a suit instituted to recover it. Ought 
judgment to be rendered in such a case? ought the judges to close their eyes on the constitution, and only 
see the law. The constitution declares that "no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed." 
If, however, such a bill should be passed and a person should be prosecuted under it; must the court 
condemn to death those victims whom the constitution endeavors to preserve? 
Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to support it? This oath certainly applies, in an 
especial manner, to their conduct in their official character. How immoral to impose it on them, if they were 
to be used as the instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating what they swear to support! 
The oath of office, too, imposed by the legislature, is completely demonstrative of the legislative opinion on 
the subject. It is in these words, "I do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to 
persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich; and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge all 
the duties incumbent on me as according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the 
constitution, and laws of the United States." 
Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the constitution of the United States, if that 
constitution forms no rule for his government? if it is closed upon him, and cannot be inspected by him? 
If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn mockery. To prescribe, or to take this oath, 
becomes equally a crime. 
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the 
principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is 
void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument. 
Note: Top image: Chief Justice John Marshall; bottom image: Wil l iam Marbury 
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YOUNGSTOWN SHEET & TUBE CO. ET AL. v. SAWYER, 72 S. Ct. 863, 343 U.S. 579 (U.S. 
06/02/1952) 
[1] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
[2] No. 744 
[3] 72 S. Ct. 863, 343 U.S. 579, 96 L. Ed. 1153, 1952.SCT.40707 
<http://www.versuslaw.com> 
[4] decided: June 2, 1952. 
[5] YOUNGSTOWN SHEET & TUBE CO. ET AL 
v. 
SAWYER 
[6] CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.^ 
[7] John W. Davis argued the cause for petitioners in No. 744 and respondents in No. 745. On 
the brief were Mr. Davis, Nathan L. Miller, John Lord O'Brian, Roger M. Blough, 
Theodore Kiendl, Porter R. Chandler and Howard C. Westwood for the United States Steel 
Co.; Bruce Bromley, E. Fontaine Broun and John H. Pickering for the Bethlehem Steel 
Co.; Luther Day, T. F. Patton, Edmund L. Jones, Howard Boyd and John C. Gall for the 
Republic Steel Corp.; John C. Bane, Jr., H. Parker Sharp and Sturgis Warner for the Jones 
& Laughlin Steel Corp.; Mr. Gall, John J. Wilson and J. E. Bennett for the Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. et al.; Charles H. Tuttle, Winfred K. Petigrue and Joseph P. Tumulty, Jr. 
(who also filed an additional brief) for the Armco Steel Corp. et al.; and Randolph W. 
Childs, Edgar S. McKaig and James Craig Peacock (who also filed an additional brief) for 
E. J. Lavino & Co., petitioners in No. 744 and respondents in No. 745. 
[8] Solicitor General Perlman argued the cause for respondent in No. 744 and petitioner in No. 
745. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Baldridge, James L. 
Morrisson, Samuel D. Slade, Oscar H. Davis, Robert W. Ginnane, Marvin E. Frankel, 
Benjamin Forman and Herman Marcuse. 
[9] By special leave of Court, Clifford D. O'Brien and Harold C. Heiss argued the cause for 
the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers et al., as amici curiae, supporting petitioners in 
No. 744 and respondents in No. 745. With them on the brief were Ruth Weyand and V. C. 
Shuttleworth. 
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In re Young 
1999 UT 6 
976 P.2d 581 
Case Number: 970032 
Decided: 01/22/1999 
Utah Supreme Court 
In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, the Honorable David S Young, District Judge 
From the Judicial Conduct Commission 
Attorneys: 
Steven H Stewart, Francis M Wikstrom, Salt Lake City, for Judicial Conduct Commission 
Dame! L Berman, Peggy A Tomsic, D Frank Wilkins, Salt Lake City, for Judge Young 
Brent M Johnson, Richard H Schwermer, Margaret K Gentles, Salt Lake City, for amici Utah 
Judicial Council and Administrative Office of the Courts 
M Gay Taylor, Robert H Rees, Salt Lake City, for amici legislative members of Judicial Conduct 
Commission 
Jan Graham, Att'y Gen , Annina M Mitchell, Asst Att'y Gen , Salt Lake City, for amici Governor 
Leavitt and Attorney General Graham 
On Petition for Rehearing 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice 
fl1 This matter is before us on a petition for rehearing The original decision in this case was handed down on July 
10. 1998, and was published as In re Youruj, 961 P 2d 918 (Utah 1998) (hereinafter referred to as original 
opinion) 1 In that decision, we held that sections 78-7-27(1 )(a) and (b) of the Code were violative of article V, 
section 1 of the Utah Constitution Those Code subsections provide that two members of the Senate, appointed 
by the President, and two members of the House, appointed by the Speaker, shall serve on the ten-member 
Judicial Conduct Commission As a consequence, we held void proceedings of the commission that led it to 
recommend that this court enter a public sanction against Judge David S Young 
Tf2 The Judicial Conduct Commission moved for permission to file a petition for rehearing This court granted the 
motion, as well as the motions of various parties for permission to file briefs as amici curiae in support of the 
petition for rehearing 2 The respondent, Judge Young, filed an opposition to the petition for rehearing Oral 
argument was held on December 21, 1998 We now grant the petition and issue this opinion on rehearing 
TI3 The petition for rehearing and the briefs of the various amici have raised several issues of substantial import 
First and foremost, the amicus brief of the legislative members of the Judicial Conduct Commission has brought 
to our attention much new material about the origins of the present judicial article of the Utah Constitution, article 
VIM, which was rewritten in its entirety and passed by the voters in 1984 Section 13 of that article elevated the 
Judicial Conduct Commission to constitutional status The legislator amici contend that this new matenai 
demonstrates that the drafters of the amended article, the judges who participated in the hearings preceding its 
being finalized, the legislators who then passed the proposed amendment and put it on the ballot, and the voters 
who approved it at a general election all understood that the amended article contemplated legislative 
participation on the Judicial Conduct Commission Therefore, they argue, our original decision holding such 
participation unconstitutional was in error 
114 The objective importance of this historical material cannot be overstated The petition of the Judicial Conduct ' 
Commission for rehearing had narrowly asked only that we declare whether the commission can continue to 
function without the legislative members But at oral argument, the chair of the commission, who previously had 
been unaware of the historical materials provided us by the amici, apologized for failing to bring this critical 
material to our attention in the original proceeding He also announced in open court that he was now convinced 
that our original decision was wrong and should be reversed 
.• . _ _ / tA~u.,^A^m»„t Qcn?r,-tpiH=?47n78&PrintOnlv. . 7/21/200 
Cite as 1999 UT 6, 976 P 2d 581 
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Salt Lake City vs. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 849 (Utah 1994) 
08/05/94 SALT LAKE CITY v. MASON A. OHMS 
[ 1 ] SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
[2] No. 930580 
[3] 1994.UT.16295 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 881 P.2d 844, 245 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 
[4] August 5,1994 
[5] SALT LAKE CITY, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, 
v. 
MASON A. OHMS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
[6] Third Circuit, Salt Lake County. Commissioner Sandra N. Peuler 
[7] Cheryl D. Luke, Salt Lake City, for Salt Lake City. 
[8] David L. Sanders, Salt Lake City, for Ohms. 
[9] Russon, Stewart, Howe, Durham, Zimmerman 
[10] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Russon 
[11] AMENDED OPINION 
[12] RUSSON, Justice: 
[13] Mason A. Ohms appeals his conviction of giving false or misleading information to a 
police officer, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance § 
11.04.100. We reverse and remand. 
[14] I. FACTS 
[15] At approximately 9:30 p.m. on August 25, 1992, a disturbance involving the distribution of 
beer erupted in the third-level plaza area of the Delta Center. Sergeant Foster Mayo of the 
APPENDIX SS 
State vs. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683, 688 (Utah 1977) 
11/17/77 STATE UTAH v. DEBRA KAY GALLION 
[1 ] SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
[2] No. 14966 
[3] 1977.UT.262 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 572 P.2d 683 
[4] November 17,1977 
[5] STATE OF UTAH, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, 
v. 
DEBRA KAY GALLION, DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT. 
[6] Robert B. Hansen, William W. Barrett, Noall T. Wootton for plaintiff and appellant. 
[7] Michael D. Esplin for defendant and respondent. 
[8] Maughan, Justice, wrote the opinion. WE Concur: D. Frank Wilkins, Justice, Gordon R. 
Hall, Justice. Crockett, Justice: [Concurring Separately]. Ellett, Chief Justice: . 
[9] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Maughan 
[10] MAUGHAN, Justice The state appeals from an order of the district court quashing an 
information filed against defendant. Defendant was charged with a violation of Section 58-
37-8(4) D (a)(iii), U.C.A. 1953, as enacted in 1972, that she altered a forged prescription for 
a Schedule II controlled substance, demerol. Conviction under this section provides the 
penalty for a felony in the third degree. We affirm. 
[11] In Section 58-37-4(3)(b), the substances which were determined by the legislature to be 
included in Schedule II were set forth. The substance, demerol, does not appear therein. The 
state asserted in a memorandum to the trial court that the attorney general had added 
demerol to Schedule II in accordance with the Utah Controlled Substances Act, Title 58, 
Chapter 37. Specifically the state claimed: 
[12] ... Since the adoption of the Controlled Substance Act, Demerol has been added to the 
controlled substance list, a true list being in the possession of Dr. Wesley Parish, a chemist, 
located at 815 West Columbia Lane, Provo, Utah. *fhl 
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Timpanogos Planning and Water Management Agency v. Central Utah Water 
Conservancy Dist. 690 P.2d 562, 564-565 (Utah 1984) 
10/10/84 TIMPANOGOS PLANNING AND WATER MANAGEMENT 
[1] SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
[2] No. 19482 
[3] 1984.UT.198 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 690 P.2d 562 
[4] October 10, 1984 
[5] TIMPANOGOS PLANNING AND WATER MANAGEMENT AGENCY, A UTAH 
INTERLOCAL CO-OPERATION ACT ENTITY, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND 
APPELLANTS, 
v. 
CENTRAL UTAH WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, A UTAH WATER 
DISTRICT, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS. 
[6] James S. Jardine, Salt Lake City; Kent H. Murdock, Salt Lake City; John A. Adams, Salt 
Lake City, for Plaintiff. 
[7] Edward W. Clyde, Salt Lake City; Merlin K. Jensen (Weber Basin), Ogden; Douglas A. 
Taggart (Weber Basin), Ogden; Hugh W. Colton (Uintah), Vernal; Therold N. Jensen 
(Carbon), Price, for Defendant. 
[8] Howe, Justice, wrote the opinion. WE Concur: Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice, Christine M. 
Durham, Justice, J. Dennis Frederick, District Judge. Stewart, Justice, does not participate 
herein; Frederick, District Judge, sat. Zimmerman, Justice, does not participate herein. 
[9] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Howe 
[10] HOWE, Justice: Plaintiff Timpanogos Planning and Water Management Agency and others 
brought this suit to have U.C.A., 1953, § 73-9-9, as constituted prior to its amendment in 
1983, declared unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the separation of powers 
mandated by Utah Constitution article V, section 1. The statute provided for the 
appointment of boards of directors of water conservancy districts to be made by the district 
court. By its 1983 amendment, L. 1983, ch. 350, § 1, the legislature provided for the 
appointment to be made by the board of county commissioners of a single county district 
and by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate in multi-county districts. 
[11] Inasmuch as six of the court-appointed directors of defendant Central Utah Water 
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In re Hammermaster, 139 Wash.2d 211, 985 P.2d 924 (Wash. 10/07/1999) 
[1] Washington Supreme Court 
[2] No.JD#15 
[3] 139 Wash.2d 211, 985 P.2d 924, 1999.WA.0043634 <http://www.versuslaw.com> 
[4] October 07, 1999 
[5] IN REl HONORABLE A. EUGENE HAMMERMASTER, RESPONDENT JUDGE. 
[6] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Madsen, J. 
[7] EN BANC 
[8] Municipal Court Judge A. Eugene Hammermaster appeals a determination by the 
Commission on Judicial Conduct (the Commission) ordering censure, and recommending 
suspension for 30 days without pay. The Commission found that Judge Hammermaster 
violated the Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC) Canons 2(A), 3(A)(1) and 3(A)(3) by making 
improper threats of life imprisonment and indefinite jail sentences, improperly accepting 
guilty pleas, holding trials in absentia, and engaging in a pattern of undignified and 
disrespectful conduct toward defendants. Judge Hammermaster admits that he engaged in the 
alleged conduct, but maintains that his conduct was a reasonable exercise of judicial 
independence which did not violate the Canons. We affirm the Commission's findings of 
misconduct, but also find that Judge Hammermaster's practice of ordering defendants to 
leave the country constitutes a violation of Canon 3(A)(3). We substantially agree with the 
Commission's order of censure but find that a six-month suspension without pay is more 
appropriate than the sanction recommended by the Commission. 
[9] Facts 
[10] Judge Hammermaster is an appointed part-time municipal court Judge for the Sumner, 
Orting, and South Prairie courts of Pierce County, Washington. He has been a Judge for one 
or more of these courts for 30 years. Report of Commission Proceedings (RP) at 322. On 
June 25, 1996, the Commission on Judicial Conduct received a letter of complaint about 
Judge Hammermaster from an inmate at the Sumner City Jail who was serving jail time 
because he had not paid a fine imposed by the Judge. In the letter the inmate stated that 
"Judge Hammermaster has told me before that if I didn't pay my 300$(sic) fine he would 
throw me in jail for life. I've sat out the time in jail to pay off the fine but thats (sic) not 
exaptbl (sic) to him." CJC, Finding of Probable Cause (May 13, 1998). The letter goes on to 
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Steve Harmsen, Chair 
Criminal Justice System Assessment Report 
The Institute of Law & Policy Plonning wos engoged by Moyor Workmon on 
beholf of the Criminol Justice Advisory Council to conduct a comprehensive 
Criminol Justice System ossessment. The impetus for the study wos crowding 
of the Adult Detention Center, a facility that opened in January 2000 and 
shortly thereafter reached near capacity. Crowding occurred despite a 
decrease in the overall crime rate and the existence of various jail 
population control mechanisms. The system assessment's goals were: 1) find 
ways to reduce current and future jail population, 2) provide 
recommendations for alternatives to incarceration, and 3) provide a 
planned process for implementation of the study's recommendations. 
Mr. Alan Kalmanoff, The Institute for Law & Policy Planning (ILPP), presented a 
summary of the final report. He stated ILPP performed two major statistical analyses to 
determine the primary causes of the growing inmate populat ion: an inmate tracking 
analysis to look for delays in the case flow and a profile analysis to analyze the seriousness 
of the current inmate population. The analyses clearly showed that the growth in jail 
population was due to a dramatic increase in the average length of stay for inmates, not 
due to increase in crime or population. Since 1977, the average length of stay has more 
than doubled to 29 days. Doubling the average length of stay and then multiplying it by 
the thousands of offenders that enter the jail has led to a rapid increase in the jail 
population. 
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He reviewed "leverage points" in the justice system that are attributable to 
deficiencies in the justice system, such as: no uniform arrest policy; pretrial release options 
are not broad; municipalities and their Ji jstice Courts overly rely on the jail; Justice Courts' 
sentences to 
jail vary considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; the Sheriff's Office's authority is 
circumvented; continuances and delays in the District Court; two-tiered court system is 
problematic (district court and justice courts) because it is neither coordinated nor 
managed as a cohesive system; case priorities are not set; drug courts have inappropriate 
participants; waiting lists for substnce abuse treatment are too long; the County has not 
developed a plan for reduced resources; and the Criminal Justice Advisory Council has 
developed into a briefing forum rather than a management forum that can provide 
leadership. 
He stated that tf \e analysis yielded over 60 recommendations to enhance the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal justice system. He reviewed the primary 
recommendations to help alleviate congestion and jail overcrowding: 
1. Adopt a Goutvtywide field citation release policy that includes 
circumstances and offenses suitable for citation releases and supervisory review 
requirements on discretionary arrests. 
2. Create a pre-processing intake center at the Jail. 
3. Develop sentencing guidelines and a continuum of sanctions at the 
Justice Court level that favor community-based sanctions rather than incarceration at the 
jail. 
4. Discontinue accept ing Class B misdemeanants at the Jail with the 
exception of certain offenses such as DUI and violation of protection from abuse orders. 
5. Establish through legislation that pre-trial and sentenced inmates for all 
courts are ultimately in the "custody of the Sheriff," whereby the Sheriff can move offenders 
between the jail and various alternative programs based on custody factors and behavior. 
6. Assist the municipalities in developing a strategic plan for a minimum-
security detention facility that can be implemented if other avenues of controlling the jail 
population do not prevail. 
7. Encourage appeals of justice court convictions that result in excessive or 
disproportionate sentences, especially when the sentence is in lieu of payment of a fine, so 
long as the interest of ftle individual client in each case is served. 
8. Create a new case mnnan^nv ?nt syst* i n < il tin.' Pistrid Courl II u il supports 
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cases time standards. 
9. Develop consolidated or regional mental health and drug courts at the 
Justice Court level. 
10. Institute municipal-level community service programs that provide a 
method for defendants to work off fines and costs. 
11. Develop a 48-hour DUI intervention program (in lieu of jail). 
12. Expand the community custody program to include additional lower risk 
inmates especially those who have been incarcerated for failure to pay fines/costs. 
13. Work toward the goal of conducting a substance abuse assessment prior 
to placing offenders in programs to ensure that treatment resources are appropriately 
utilized. 
14. Restructure the Criminal Justice Advisory Council (CJAC) so that it 
becomes an engine or coordination, collaboration, and change. 
15. Hire a criminal justice coordinator to facilitate CJAC and implement 
recommendations of this report and previous studies. 
In conclusion, Mr. Kalmanoff emphasized the need for CJAC to take the lead 
in implementing the recommendations and becoming the management group of the 
criminal justice system. This will require some restructuring of CJAC. Presently, CJAC consists 
of over 25 members representing all of the criminal justice players, such as treatment 
organizations, the legal community, the business community, and government agencies. 
There are so many people representing so many stakes, CJAC has become quite 
cumbersome. Its size needs to be reduced to an executive group of no more than 10 
people, who can grab the reins and make things happen. This executive group should 
include the Mayor, District Attorney, Sheriff, a key judge, and a few others. Other people 
can be assigned to task forces to work on issues such as pre-trial release, a county wide jail 
policy, court delays, etc. He felt it would also be helpful to have an outside coordinator or 
facilitator for CJAC to help push things along. 
Council Member Jensen stated he would be helpful for CJAC to look at the 
study recommendations and suggest what the Council can do to help implement some of 
the recommendations. 
Mr. Gary Dalton, Director, Criminal Justice Services Division and a member of 
CJAC, stated CJAC will hold an executive meeting on May 13, 2004, to lift some of the 
issues out of the report and discuss them. He would appreciate the Council making a 
gesture of support, in concert with the Mayor, to direct CJAC to analyze and prioritize the 
recommendations in the assessment report. 
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Council Memer Horiuchi, seconded by Council Member Jensen, moved to 
support the assessment report and to join with the Mayor in directing CJAC to analyze and 
prioritize the recommendations in the report. The motion passed unanimously 
Discussion Regarding Contract with Contract Cities for Sheriff's Law Enforcement Services 
On April 23, 2004, Council Member Ashton, Jensen, and Hatch met with the 
cities that contract with the Sheriff's Office for law enforcement services, 
Sheriff's Office representatives, Auditor's Office representatives, and 
Attorney's Office representatives regarding the law enforcement contract 
for the upcoming year. 
Council Member Harmsen stated that there is a misconception circulating 
that the County does not have a firm contract price and the price could exceed the 5 
percent cap . (Under the term of the three-year contract, it is anticipated that the cost per 
deputy as well as the aggregate cost of pooled services will increase from the base level 
price by 5 percent each year for the three-year period.) 
Council Member Jensen stated it was also discussed at the meeting that 
there is a potential for unforseen, nondiscretionary increases that could raise the contract 
price by more than 5 percent. This could happen if the price of gasoline rose to $4 per 
gallon, or the State increased retirement fund contributions. An agreement was reached 
that if an outside external force necessitated a price increase, everyone would pay the 
increase, but before a greater expenditure is allowed that would exceed the budget, the 
County 11H ist inform the cities and give them an opportunity to provide input. The cities 
discussed making lists of nondiscretionary and discretionary expenditures, but the decision 
whether or not to create such lists was left in the hands of the cities 
Mr. Darrin Casper, Fiscal Analyst, Council Office, stated the plan was for the 
contract prices to increase by 5 percent each year for three years, and hold the 
expenditure growth to 3.6 percent per year for three years to ca tch the revenues up with 
the expenditures. It was discussed at the meeting that unavoidable increases could go 
beyond the 3.6 percent growth expenditure cap and whether or not the budget could be 
amended for discretionary versus nondiscretionary reasons. If the 3.6 percent expenditure 
growth per year is circumvented, even due to circumstances beyond the County's control, 
it will nlanifest itself in a liability that is created at the end of the year. 
Council Member Russ Wall, Taylorsville City, stated the biggest issue is that the 
budget cap seems to be a moving target. Last year the cities were hit with a $1.5 million 
error, which the cities had to pick up; then they were hit with the liability issue; and then 
they were hit with the reconciliation issue. Taylorsville City has a $13-million budget and 
law enforcement is one-third of that budget. Taylorsville City cannot afford any more 
surprises. Eventually, they have to set a price c a p and say that is as far as they will go. 
1 ft Irrnhor 1 Inrr h siaien I tl ie figures tt ie County gave the cities for the coming 
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contract should be totally in li ne with the 5 percent per year cap. 
Council Member Jensen stated John Brems, the attorney for the contract Cities, 
and Dick Nixon, Deputy District Attorney, are negotiating the contract. A draft should be completed 
within one to two weeks. 
Gifts to Clark Planetarium 
Mr. Alan Dayton, Deputy Mayor, explained the following gifts were auctioned 
at the Clark Planetarium VIP fund raising gala on April 15, 2004, to benefit the planetarium. 
Formal accep tance of the gifts has been p laced on the Council agenda. 
Lorry H. Miller 
Mike & Mary Beth Clark 
Terry Diehl 
Gateway Basket 
Girl Scout Cookies 
Clark Star Party 
Kennedy Space Center 
Flight with Winston Scott 
Clark Star Party 
Flight with Sen. Jake Garn 
Car Detailing 
Jazz Basketball 
$ 600 
400 
10,000 
8,500 
10,500 
$ 6,500 
5,000 
$ 300 
1,000 
Mark Hansen Autographed AK-47 Shoes $ 600 
Mayor Nancy Workman Autographed Arroyo Shoes $ 500 
Charles Brown Flight with Terry Fregly $ 6,200 
Richard James Fishing with Sterling Poulson $ 2,600 
Council Member Jensen, seconded by Council Member Horiuchi, moved to 
forward acceptance of the gifts to the 4:00 p.m. Council meeting. The motion passed 
unanimously. 
Resolution Regarding Reconstruction and Realignment of 11400 South 
At the April 20, 2004, Committee of the Whole meeting, the Utah 
Department of Transportation reviewed the 11400 South Environmental 
Impact Statement listing five alternatives for the reconstruction and 
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realignment ot I1400 South. Ihe Council instructed flic I )islncf AMomey's 
Office to draft a resolution supporting Alternative 4. 
Mr. Karl Hendrickson, Deputy District Attorney, stated a resolution has been 
drafted endorsing Alternative 4 of the Utah Department of Transportation's Environmental 
Impact Study regarding the reconstruction and realignment of 11400 South. The resolution 
has been placed on the Council agenda for final approval and execution. 
Council Member Jensen, seconded by Council Member Honuchi, moved to 
forward the resolution to the 4:00 p.m Council meeting for formal consideration. The motion 
passed unanimously. 
Resolution and Interlocal Agreement 
Mr. Alan Dayton, Deputy Mayor, explained the following interlocal 
agreement. The resolution authorizing the execution of this agreement has been placed 
on the Council aqenda for final approval and execulion: 
1) Utah Department ot Public Safety regarding campaign to increase safety 
restraint use. 
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Council Member Jensen, seconded by Council Member Horiuchi, moved to 
forward the agreement to the 4:00 p.m. Council meeting for formal consideration. The 
motion passed unanimously. 
Review of Property Tax Committee Recommendations 
Ms. JodiAnn Martin, Chair, Property Tax Committee, reviewed the 
recommendations of the Property Tax Committee regarding requests of taxpayers for 
consideration of tax-related matters. These recommendations have been placed on the 
Council agenda for final approval. 
Council Member Jensen, seconded by Council Member Horiuchi, moved to 
forward the recommendations to the 4:00 p.m. Council agenda for formal consideration. 
The motion passed unanimously. 
Mr. Alan Dayton, Deputy Mayor, explained that the Zoo, Arts & Parks Tier I 
Advisory Board has recommended that the following organizations receive funding under 
the Tier I Zoo, Arts & Parks Program for 2004. The recommendations have been p laced on 
the Council agenda for final approval. (The agreements with these organizations will be 
signed and executed by the Mayor): 
Ballet West 
Children's Dance Theater 
Friends of Tracy Aviary 
Gina Bachauer 
Grand Theater 
Red Butte Garden 
Ririe-Woodbury Dance 
Salt Lake Acting Company 
Salt Lake Art Center 
Salt Lake City Arts Council 
Sundance Institute 
Tree Utah 
Utah Humanities Council 
Utah Museum of Fine Arts 
Utah Museum of Nat His 
Utah Symphony & Opera 
The Advisory Board has also recommended that the following organizations 
receive funding under the Tier I Zoo, Arts & Parks Program for 2004, subject to a financial 
health plan being submitted and accep ted by the staff and Advisory Board. 
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Children's Mubt 
First Night 
Hale Center Theater 
Pianeer Theater 
Repertory Dance Theater 
This is the Place Foundation 
Utah Arts Festival 
Odyssey Dance 
Utah Heritage Foundation 
Council Member Jensen, seconded by Council Member Horiuchi, moved to 
forward the recommendations to the 4:00 p.m. Council meeting for formal consideration. 
The motion passed unanimously. 
Other Business 
Acceptance of Minutes 
Council Member Jensen, seconded by Council Member Horiuchi, moved to 
accept the April 20, 2004, minutes. The motion passed unanimously. 
The meeting was adjourned at 2:30 p .m. 
Chair, Committee of the Whole 
Deputy Clerk 
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Blankenship vs. Minton Chevrolet, Inc., 266 S.E.2d 902,903 (W.V. 1979) 
V U O U O U U 
11/06/79 MERRILL BLANKENSHIP v. MINTON CHEVROLET 
[ 1 ] SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA 
[2] Nos. 14559, 14435, 14394 
[3] 1979.WV.33 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 266 S.E.2d 902, 164 W.Va. 446 
[4] November 6, 1979 
[5] MERRILL BLANKENSHIP 
v. 
MINTON CHEVROLET, INC., ET AL.; THOMAS L. ANDERSON, AND JAMES A. 
LIOTTA, ADIVTR., ETC V. M. C. MORAN; DONALD SHAFFER, ETC. V. J. O. 
MARKO, ETC., ET AL. AND RICHARD S. STEPHENSON 
[6] Appeals from decisions of the Circuit Court, Logan County, Harvey Oakley, Judge, the 
Circuit Court, Marion County, Fred L. Fox, II, Judge, and a writ of error from Circuit 
Court, Monongalia County, Frank J. DePond, Judge, were consolidated for decision. 
[7] Charles R. Garten, Jr., Daniel F. Hedges, for Blankenship. 
[8] Eric H. O'Briant, Valentine, Wilson & Partain, for Minton Chevrolet, et al. 
[9] J. Scott Tharp, James A. Liotta, for Anderson, et al. 
[10] Rose, Southern & Padden, Herschel Rose, Duane Southern, Philip C. Petty, for Moran. 
[11] Richard S. Stephenson, pro se. 
[12] No appearance by Shaffer. 
[13] Neely, Justice. 
[14] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Neely 
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Town of South Carthage vs. Barrett, 840 S.W.2d 895 (Tenn. 1992) 
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09/28/92 STATE TENNESSEE v. CI IES7 ER B AR R El T 
[1] SUPREME COURT OF 1 ENNESSEE, \I N ^  SI l\ 'II I ,E 
[ 2 ] I J<i fill S-IH l)«)0J4/V -(JI)U^ 
[3] 1992.TN.1728 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 840 S.W.2d 895 
[4] September 28, 1992 
[5] STATE Of TENNESSEE, BY AND THROUGH THE TOV 
CARTHAGE, TENNESSEE, PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, 
Y 
CHESTER
 B A R R E T T , DEFENDANT/APPELLEE. 
[6] CIRCUIT COURT. SMITH COUNTY. HON. BOBBY CAPERS, JUDGE. 
[7] For Appellant:'David Bass, Bass And Bass, Carthage, Tennessee 
X| Foi Appellee : Jacky 0 Bellai , Cai tl lage, I ennessee. 
[9] Anderson, Reid, Drowota, OfBrien, Daughtrey. 
[10] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Anderson 
ANDERSON, J. 
[12] The sole issue raised in this direct appeal is whether municipal or "corporation" courts may 
constitutionally exercise concurrent jurisdiction over state criminal offenses committed 
within the municipality's boundaries. The Smith County Circuit Court held that the 
legislation (Term. Code Ann. § 6-2-403) granting such concurrent jurisdiction to the 
Municipal Court of the Town of South Carthage violates the separation of powers 
provisions of the Tennessee Constitution. We agree and affirm, 
[13] BACKGROUND 
114] The parties have stipulated the following factual and procedural background: 
APPENDIX ZZ 
Summers vs. Thompson, 764 S.W.2d 182,183 (Tenn. 1988) 
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05/23/88 JERRY H. SUMMERS v. MAYOR ROBERT L. 
[1] SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE 
[2] No. 229 
[3] 1988.TN.772 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 764 S.W.2d 182 
[4] May 23, 1988 
[5] JERRY H. SUMMERS, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, 
v. 
MAYOR ROBERT L. THOMPSON, ET AL., RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS 
[6] HAMILTON CHANCERY, Hon. R. Vann Owens, Chancellor. 
[7] Petition for Rehearing Overruled July 18,1988 
[8] Jacqueline E. Schulten, Soddy-Daisy City Attorney, Chattanooga, Tennessee, W. J. Michael 
Cody, Attorney General and Reporter, Kevin Steiling, Assistant Attorney General, 
Nashville, Tennessee for Appellants. 
[9] Jerry H. Summers, Chattanooga, Tennessee, Jack R. Brown, Chattanooga, Tennessee for 
Appellee. 
[10] Deborah S. Swettenam, Tennessee Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Dickson, 
Tennessee, J. Anthony Farmer, Tennessee Trial Lawyers' Association, Knoxville, 
Tennessee for Amicus Curiae. 
[11] Frank F. Drowota, III, Justice, Harbison, C.j., Fones, Cooper and O'Brien, JJ., Concur. 
[12] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Drowota 
[13] FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, Justice. 
[14] This direct appeal raises a significant issue of Tennessee constitutional law, that is, whether 
certain statutes permitting a municipal Judge to be terminated at will are valid. The 
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Calligy v. Mayor and Council of City of Hoboken, 284 N.J.Super. 365, 665 A.2d 408(N.J.Super.Law 
Div. 06/23/1995) 
[1] New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division 
[2] DOCKET NO. HUD-L-2005-95 
[3] 284 N.J.Super. 365, 665 A.2d 408, 1995.NJ.4 <http://www.versuslaw.com> 
[4] June 23, 1995 
[5] THOMAS P. CALLIGY, PLAINTIFF, 
v. 
THE MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF HOBOKEN, DEFENDANT. 
[6] Thomas P. Calligy, Attorney, Pro Se. 
[7] David F. Corrigan for defendant (Murray, Murray & Corrigan, attorneys). 
[8] Dfitalia,A.j.s.c. 
[9] The opinion of the court was delivered by: D'italia 
[10] D'ITALIA, AJ.S.C. 
[11] This is a taxpayer action challenging an ordinance of the City of Hoboken that creates the 
offices of municipal court Judge and additional municipal court Judge "in the Department 
of Administration" of City government. Plaintiff argues that the assignment of the 
municipal court to a department of municipal government, a practice which has existed in 
Hoboken under various ordinances since at least 1959, violates the separation of powers 
doctrine. This matter is before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment. 
[12] The amended sections of the Hoboken Code about which complaint is made provide in 
pertinent part: *fnl 
[13] Sec.4-22. Municipal Court Judge. 
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Bernat v. Allphin, 106 P.3d 707,2005 UT 1 (Utah 01/07/2005) 
[1] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
[2] No. 20030567 
[3] 106 P.3d 707,2005 UT 1, 516 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 2005.UT.0000009< 
http://www.versuslaw.com> 
[4] January 7, 2005 
[5] SEAN BERNAT, LESA BEUCHERT, JEREMY KEE, BRANDON KVENVOLD, 
DONALD LANG, DARRIN MANN, MATTHEW PHILLIPS, JOSEPH SCOVELL, 
DYLAN T. SERRE, MARK WAHLSTROM, AND HENRY T. ZAHKARIAN, 
PLAINTIFFS AND PETITIONERS, 
v. 
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL G. ALLPHIN, THE HONORABLE ANN BOYDEN, 
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL K. BURTON, THE HONORABLE GLEN R. 
DAWSON, THE HONORABLE DONALD J. EYRE, THE HONORABLE DENISE P. 
LINDBERG, THE HONORABLE BRUCE C. LUBECK, DEFENDANTS AND 
RESPONDENTS. 
[6] Attorneys: 
[7] Benjamin A. Hamilton, Salt Lake City, for petitioners. 
[8] Brent M. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for respondents. 
[9] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Durrant, Justice 
[10] Original Proceeding in the Utah Court of Appeals 
[11] On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
[12] [^1 Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Utah's two-tier justice court system, arguing 
that this system violates the prohibition against double jeopardy and denies defendants due 
process and equal protection under the law. They assert that, in light of these alleged 
violations, the court of appeals abused its discretion when it refused to issue writs of 
mandamus directing various district courts to dismiss the charges against Petitioners. We 
APPENDIX CCC 
Blanton vs. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989) 
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BLANTON ET AL. v. CITY NORTH LAS VEGAS, 109 S. Ct. 1289,489 U.S. 538 (U.S. 03/06/1989) 
[ 1 ] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
[2] No. 87-1437 
[3] 109 S. Ct. 1289, 489 U.S. 538,103 L. Ed. 2d 550, 57 U.S.L.W. 4314, 1989.SCT.41329 
<http://www.versuslaw.com> 
[4] decided: March 6, 1989. 
[5] BLANTON ET AL 
v. 
CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 
[6] CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA. 
[7] John J. Graves, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was John G. 
Watkins. 
[8] Mark L. Zalaoras argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Roy A. 
Woofter.^" 
[9] Marshall, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
[10] Author: Marshall 
[ 489 U.S. Page 539] 
[11] JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
[12] The issue in this case is whether there is a constitutional right to a trial by jury for persons 
charged under Nevada law with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Nev. Rev. 
Stat. ? 484.379(1) (1987). We hold that there is not. 
[13] DUI is punishable by a minimum term of two days' imprisonment and a maximum term of 
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Justice Court Appeals: The Good, the Bad, and the Unintended 
by Sam Newton 
Your client has been charged with a criminal misdemeanor which is being heard in a justice court. 
What a lucky draw, right? The client gets two bites at the apple. He can run motions, and then he 
can try the case. If he wins, then he is done. But if he loses, then he has the option to appeal the case 
to District Court, wipe the slate clean, and start everything from scratch. What could be better? The 
Utah Court of Appeals agrees. In Lucero v. Kennard, 2004 UT App 94, the defendant wanted 
review of a justice court decision, and he did it by filing an extraordinary writ.l The Court of 
Appeals disagreed with defendant's decision to pursue a writ: "A trial de novo would have remedied 
any constitutional violations Petitioner may have suffered in the Justice Court." Lucero, 2004 UT 
App 94, 113. But is this statement true? Is the trial de novo the complete "fix-all"? Is it possible that 
pursuing a trial de novo may actually create problems for a defendant? 
Everything is Not So Rosy 
In Shakespeare's Measure for Measure one character laments: "O, what may man within him hide. 
Though angel on the outward side!"2 The trial de novo process seems to be a perfect fix to most any 
problems which would occur injustice court. What could be better than a fresh start? But we may 
not consider (or realize) that pursuing a trial de novo may be unintentionally complicated or may 
bring unintended consequences. 
I. No or Limited Review of Justice Court Judges1 Legal Rulings 
Supreme Court Justice William Brennan once said, "there are few, if any situations in our system of 
justice in which a single judge is given unreviewable discretion over matters concerning a 
personOOs liberty or property . . . ."3 Because de novo review results in a case simply starting over 
as though it was never heard, the justice court judges are almost completely insulated from true 
appellate review. They have the power to make legal conclusions and to impose criminal sanctions 
which impact defendants1 most fundamental constitutional rights. Yet the trial de novo remains the 
only procedure in place in Utah law to remedy any justice court problem. While the trial de novo 
gives our clients a fresh start, the justice court judge's legal rulings or sentence remain unchecked. 
Outside of the United States Supreme Court, the justice courts are the only other body in this 
jurisdiction to have virtually no appellate review. Of course the trial de novo most often fixes or 
eliminates a poor justice court decision. But what is alarming is that in a system which thrives on 
the ability of higher courts to check the abuses of lower courts, the decisions of justice court judges 
cannot be checked or called into question. Sure, justice court sentences and convictions no longer 
stand when one successfully pursues a trial de novo, but the higher court is not able to tell a lower 
court that a particular process or practice is unconstitutional. The procedure lacks a mechanism to 
review a judicial officer's exercise of discretion. This essentially gives justice court judges free rein -
they know that their specific rulings cannot be reviewed or their abuses of discretion called into 
question. 
Interestingly, the Utah Code gives the prosecution an opportunity to have the district court review a 
justice court decision. If the justice court dismisses a case, invalidates a statute or ordinance, 
excludes evidence, or grants a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, then the prosecution is entitled to a 
hearing de novo in district court on that issue.4 No such provision exists for the defendant. This is 
arguably because she has a better right: she can start the whole proceeding over and run all of her 
motions or arguments again in the district court. But the problem remains: a defendant lacks a 
procedural mechanism to ask a higher court to review a justice court decision. 
Let's assume the worst. What if a justice court decided to illegally detain a defendant? Or what if 
that court refused to afford people their constitutional trial rights? What are defendants' remedies? 
They must plead guilty and appeal. Or they must go to trial and then appeal. Neither of these options 
fixes the problem that occurred below, and neither option slaps the justice court on the wrist. That 
court may engage in repetitively unconstitutional practices, yet Utah law lacks a mechanism which 
tells that court that it is in the wrong. 
Some may assume that the extraordinary writ may keep a justice court in check. The writ may be 
used when a court "has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion."5 Yet before one may 
pursue the extraordinary writ there must be "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy" 
available.6 But in the current state of the law, it appears that the availability of the writ may be 
questionable. The Court of Appeals in Lucero v. Kennard. 2004 UT App 94, held that a defendant 
who pursued an extraordinary writ should have pursued the trial de novo, even though that 
defendant was not represented by counsel in the justice court. 
The problem is fundamental. The extraordinary writ may be the only way a defendant has to check a 
justice court judge's abuse of discretion. And while the appellate courts have reviewed justice court 
writs in the past,7 Lucero illustrates that the appellate courts have become more reticent about using 
the writ as a method of review. They seem to prefer use of the trial de novo. The writ still seems to 
be an option that is out there, but there are no guarantees that the appellate courts will accept one. 
Interestingly, the vast majority of persons encounter the criminal justice system through the justice 
courts. People think that because the justice courts only handle class B and C misdemeanors, they 
can only do limited damage to peoples' liberties. But recently the justice court sentencing practices 
have been coming under fire. That is, even though the justice courts lack the ability to punish 
severely, they make up for it in their more-frequent use of punitive measures. 8 This issue has 
become increasingly political with the release of a study commissioned by the Criminal Justice 
Advisory Counsel (CJAC) this last May. Because of massive overcrowding at the Salt Lake County 
Jail, the CJAC study made some rather drastic recommendations regarding the justice courts. 
Among others, the study recommended that the jail should discontinue accepting class B and C 
misdemeanants, that justice court judges should be given a limited number of beds at the jail based 
on their jurisdiction's population, and that defense attorneys should "adopt a policy of routinely 
appealing all justice court convictions that result in excessive or disproportionate sentences, 
especially when the sentence is in lieu of payment of a fine . . ."9 Alan Kalmanoff, of the Institute 
for Law and Policy Planning, and the consultant on the study, said that justice courts have been 
overusing jail as a sanction: they have been incarcerating "those we're angry at," rather than "those 
we're scared of." 10 
Of course the majority of justice court judges act within their discretion and act to protect 
defendants. But it is not necessarily the justice court judges as a whole who are the problem. The 
problem is created by a system which allows judges to overstep the bounds of propriety. The 
concern is not that these judges should lack the authority to incarcerate defendants. The concern is 
that the current state of the law lacks a mechanism to check a justice court judge's abuse of that 
power. 
If our clients plan on pursuing a trial de novo, and if we wish to allege some sort of unconstitutional 
error or practice in the justice court, we must realize that it may be extremely difficult to even get 
the appellate courts to take a look at the issue. 
II. Custody Status Pending Appeal 
Not only does a defendant lack the means to get a justice court decision reviewed, but he may suffer 
other collateral consequences by entering a plea or going to trial and then asking for a trial de novo. 
Let's say that a person is arrested for simple assault on Friday. Under the law, he must be arraigned, 
his bail must be set, and he must be given a court date within a few days. Now let's take an identical 
defendant, but this time he enters a plea to simple assault in the justice court on Friday - and let's say 
that he is taken into custody. He files his appeal that day. This same defendant may not get his case 
heard in the district court, nor may he get his bail set for periods of up to twenty days or more. How 
can this defendant make sure that the justice court sentence is stayed or that the district court hears 
his case within a reasonably prompt period of time? 
According to Rule 38 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, once a defendant has filed a notice of 
appeal and the justice court has issued a certificate of probable cause, the judgment of the justice 
court is stayed. 11 Yet interestingly, the rule states that once a defendant has filed a notice, then the 
district court must issue all further orders governing the case (with the exception of the certificate of 
probable cause) and must "conduct anew the proceedings." 12 But what happens with these 
defendants who are either in custody, or who are taken into custody, when the justice court enters its 
sentence? Are they instantly released from jail upon counsel's filing for the trial de novo? Is the 
justice court sentence automatically stayed? 
These are unanswered questions. 13 According to Rule 38, in order to obtain a stay of the justice 
court sentence, two requirements must be met: 1) the defendant must file a notice of appeal, and 2) 
the justice court judge must issue a certificate of probable cause. 14 This matter starts to get 
complicated when one looks at the standard for obtaining a certificate of probable cause, which is 
found in Rule 27. According to Rule 27, in order to obtain the certificate, the judge must make two 
findings: 1) the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay; and 2) the appeal "raises substantial issues 
of law or fact reasonably likely to result in reversal.. ."15 Add one more rule to the sticky pot: if 
the defendant is in custody or sentenced to jail, the judge must determine by clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant is not likely to flee and that he does not pose a danger to the community 
if he were to be released. 16 
Now here's where it really gets messy. Utah Code Ann, an 78-5-120 contains the trial de novo 
standard, and is completely clear: "In a criminal case, a defendant is entitled to a trial de novo in the 
district court" when a notice of appeal is filed within thirty days of either 1) sentencing after a trial 
or a plea of guilty, or 2) after a plea held in abeyance. 17 Here is the problem: a defendant has an 
automatic right to a trial de novo. She doesn't have to make a showing. She doesn't have a burden. 
She files her notice on time and the statute automatically gives her a new trial. 
But what is the justice court judge supposed to do with the issuance of the certificate of probable 
cause? The rules clearly require one to issue. Additionally, they require the justice court judge to 
make findings regarding whether the defendant raises a good question of law or whether the appeal 
is just a delay tactic. But she gets her new trial automatically, so arguably, the certificate should also 
issue as a matter of course. 
Not all justice court judges agree. Some will automatically stay a sentence once a notice of appeal is 
received. Others want to go through the formalities of the certificate of probable cause - and it is not 
uncommon for a justice court judge to deny a stay based on some of the prongs traditionally 
required for issuing a certificate. 18 
The Court of Appeals seems to have agreed with justice courts who have automatically issued the 
stay. In a series of memorandum decisions, the Court held that defendants would not have to show a 
likelihood that they will prevail on appeal: "A defendant appealing a justice court judgment is 
entitled to a trial de novo without any demonstration of error in the justice court. In this context, we 
agree it appears unnecessary to require a defendant to demonstrate that the 'appeal... raises 
substantial issues of law or fact reasonably likely to result in a reversal. . . .'"19 
Despite this pronouncement from the Court of Appeals, the rules still appear to be contradictory -
and it appears that these questions remain unresolved in the minds of many district and justice court 
judges. When a defendant appeals, is her justice court sentence automatically stayed? Or does the 
justice court retain the power to hold the defendant? At what point may the district court step in and 
order a defendant's release or set an appropriate bail? As one can see, the questions are not answered 
by the rules and as a result, some defendants may get caught in the middle. 
Counsel must realize that if a client is sentenced to jail in the justice court and is taken into custody 
(or the client is already in custody) that he or she may not get out of jail, nor may the justice court 
sentence be stayed, until counsel can get a district court judge to act on the matter. 
The problem is further complicated because the district courts may not generate a file until they 
have received the file from the justice courts. In the event that the defendant is only being held on 
the justice court sentence, it may leave counsel with the only option of filing an extraordinary writ in 
order to have the district court hear the issue in the meantime. Some justice court judges think that 
because the Rule gives them twenty days to transfer the file to the district court,20 that they can hold 
a defendant in custody for the full twenty days before transferring the file. This attitude only 
prolongs the amount of time our clients may sit in custody while we attempt to secure their release. 
Securing our clients' release may be further complicated because different district court judges have 
different procedural approaches. Some will sign an order which stays the justice court sentence as a 
matter of course. Others want defense counsel to file a motion. Others want to wait until the district 
court clerks have generated a file. Some want stipulations from both counsel. Some want a formal 
denial from the justice court and an appeal of that denial. Others want counsel to use the 
extraordinary writ. But what if the justice court sentences a defendant to twenty days jail and waits 
the full twenty to transfer the file? Or what if that court refuses to transfer the file at all? Then 
defense counsel must spend time at the district court to try to get a judge to act. We, as counsel 
should not judge-shop. In the Third District Court in downtown Salt Lake City, there has been an 
attempt to solve this problem. The District Court will generate a file upon defense counselOOs 
promise that an appeal is "on its way." The file is created then assigned to the judge on rotation for 
accepting new cases. Counsel can then file a motion with the newly-assigned judge and raise the 
issue. Then that judge has a case, and can begin making rulings on the matter. 
It can be extraordinarily complicated to try to secure a defendant's release from custody, or to get a 
stay of the justice court sentence, pending one's appeal. Hopefully the rule can be clarified in the 
future to make appropriate resolution of some of these procedural problems. 
III. Remand Without Notice 
Another problem arises when our clients fail to appear at the initial stage of the trial de novo appeal. 
According to Rule 38, the district court may dismiss the appeal and remand the case back to the 
justice court if the defendant fails to appear or "fails to take steps necessary to prosecute the 
appeal."21 While this may be helpful in practice, it may not be entirely fair to a defendant. 
When counsel asks for a trial de novo, the justice court has the responsibility to transfer the file to 
the district court. The district court, in turn, will generate its own file and set a new court date. The 
problem is that defendants may not get notice of the new court date. This may be because the district 
court does not look for the defendant's address in the justice court file, or perhaps it is because the 
justice court does not put the defendant's address in its file. Of course, it can always be that the 
defendant has chosen, for whatever reason, not to appear. Whatever the problem may be, the fact 
remains that defendants often do not receive notice from the district court of their new date. As a 
result, they may not appear. Because of their failure to appear the district court dismisses the appeal 
and remands the case. 
If we as counsel are planning to pursue a trial de novo, we must take great care to inform our clients 
of new court dates. Perhaps to avoid this problem, we should also advise our clients to call the 
district court and/or our offices periodically to find out the new date. That way we avoid the 
potential problem of losing our appeal for something that is not our client's fault. 
IV. Loss of Privileges 
The last complication of a justice court appeal is that a plea of guilty or a finding of guilt at trial 
followed by an appeal may subject a defendant to a number of collateral consequences. First, on 
drug, DUI, and reckless driving cases, the Driver License Division will most likely pull a 
defendantOOs license upon receipt of the conviction.22 It does not matter to the Division that the 
defendant's conviction is actually wiped clean and that the process starts over with the filing of a 
notice of appeal injustice court. The Division treats the justice court plea or finding of guilt as a 
conviction and pulls the license. The problem is that the Driver License Division does not get notice 
of the trial de novo from the justice court. It's a classic situation of the left hand not knowing what 
the right hand is doing. 
There are additional collateral consequences: defendants may lose their funding for student loans.23 
They may be subject to deportation or suffer other immigration consequences.24 If the defendant is 
in the military, it is likely that he or she will not be able to bear arms because of the conviction.25 
Counsel may not have considered that by entering a plea, her client may lose a significant number of 
privileges. Other independent agencies and/or government entities may take actions against the 
defendant, merely because he has entered a plea and a "conviction" has been entered. As of yet, 
there is no solution. The statute requires that there be a finding or verdict of guilt before a defendant 
may pursue the appeal.26 What other agencies will do with that finding of guilt is slightly up in the 
air. Practically speaking, they may do nothing. But the risk is there, and the fact remains that these 
agencies have been known to act following a guilty plea or such a finding. 
Conclusion 
There is no question that the justice courts serve a wonderful purpose. They alleviate the rather 
stressful burden of the district courts by taking jurisdiction over the class B and class C 
misdemeanors. Additionally, clients who are charged injustice court usually get two chances to 
have their cases heard. The benefits to these defendants are outstanding and crucial. But we must be 
aware that several complications may arise from trying to move the case from justice court to the 
district court. Outside of the extraordinary writ, justice court judges remain insulated from any sort 
of judicial review of the legal conclusions made in favor of the prosecution. Defendants may have 
great difficulty securing a stay of a justice court sentence pending the trial de novo. Defendants may 
not obtain notice of their new court dates. Finally, criminal defendants may lose a significant 
number of privileges merely because they have entered a plea or because they have been found 
guilty. 
If we are aware of these consequences, then we can adequately advise our clients in pursuing their 
appeals in district court. 
1. Arguably because Lucero could not take the trial de novo option. 
2. Measure for Measure. Act iii, Sc. 2. 
3. Jones v. Barnes. 463 U.S. 745, 757 (1983) (emphasis added). 
4. Utah Code Ann, an 78-5-120(4). 
5. Utah R. Civ. Pro. 65B(d)(2). 
6. Utah R. Civ. Pro 65B(a). 
7 See e.g.. Dean v. Henriod. 1999 UT App 50 
8 A Salt Lake County study done by the Institute for Law and Policy Planning found that nearly 
two-thirds of jail bookings were from misdemeanor offenses, with the justice courts accounting for 
43 % of the jail population. The study also noted another problem: "Justice court judges recognize 
that they are key contributors to the jail's population. . .. [J]udges feel frustrated by the ability of the 
Sheriff/Jail Director to let inmates out before sentences are completed through early release and 
award of good time. This frustration has resulted in the use of consecutive sentences, resulting in 
inmates being in jail over one year and blocking early release while exacerbating crowding." 
9. Salt Lake County Criminal Justice System Assessment, prepared for the Salt Lake County 
Criminal Justice Advisory Council, April 28, 2004, by the Institute for Law and Policy Planning. 
The study found that every sentence of "jail or pay a fine" originated from a justice court. This is 
arguably an unconstitutional practice. The Utah Constitution prohibits " . . . imprisonment for debt 
except in cases of absconding debtors." Utah Const. Art. I an 16. 
10. Report Says County Jail Need Not Be So Packed, The Salt Lake Tribune, May 1, 2004; 
Cooperation Called Solution to Jail Crowding, The Salt Lake Tribune, May 6, 2004; S.L. County 
Justice Qyerhaul Urged, Deseret Morning News, April 29, 2004. 
11. Utah R. Crim. Pro. R. 38(d). 
12. Utah R. Crim. Pro. R. 38(e) and (f). 
13. These questions may or may not be answered in the near future. The Utah Supreme Court has 
heard arguments on a case, Bernat v. Allphin, Case Number 20030567, which is awaiting a decision. 
In that case, defendant alleges that the current trial de novo scheme violates the double jeopardy 
clause. Unless a justice court sentence is automatically vacated upon filing the notice of appeal, he 
argues, then defendants are forced to keep vestiges of their justice court conviction throughout the 
trial de novo. It is unclear what the Supreme Court will do with the case, though it is possible they 
may address some of the stay questions brought up in this article. This will definitely be a case to 
keep an eye on. 
14. Utah R. Crim. Pro. R. 38(d) and (e). 
15. Utah R. Crim. Pro. R. 27(f). 
16. Utah R. Crim. Pro. R. 27(b). 
17. Utah Code Ann, nu 78-5-120 (emphasis added). 
18. This issue was interestingly discussed in 2001 in an article in the Utah Law Review. Bates. 
Benjamin. Exploring Justice Courts in Utah and Three Problems Inherent in the Justice Court 
System, 2001 Utah L. Rev. 731. In that note, the author recommends that the district court, and not 
the justice court, should make the determination regarding the certificate of probable cause. 
19. Ulmer v. Lubeck. 2003 UT App 110; Zakharian v. Burton. 2003 UT App 111, though note 17, 
infra, refers to the possibility that the Supreme Court may take a look at this matter. 
20. Utah R. Crim Pro. R. 38(c). 
21. Utah R. Crim. Pro. R. 38(g). Another potential problem is Rule 38(g)(2). Exactly what does it 
mean to fail "to take steps necessary to prosecute the appeal"? Potentially any delay (i.e. 
continuances) subjects a defendant to dismissal for not moving the case on promptly. 
22. Utah Code Ann, na 53-3-220(1) requires an automatic suspension of the driver license for 
several misdemeanors: DUIs, drug- and reckless-driving cases are among several offenses for which 
suspension is required. 
23. 20 USCS na 1091(r). The 1998 Drug Free Student Loans Act denies federal grants, federally 
subsidized loans, and work-study funds to college students who have been convicted of any drug 
offense. This can be a felony or a misdemeanor, and includes sale or possession. If the conviction is 
for the purchase of a controlled substance, a person is ineligible for one year for the first offense, 
two years for the second, and indefinitely for the third. If the conviction is for the sale of a 
controlled substance, then the offender is ineligible for two years on the first offense and indefinitely 
for the second. 
24. Most criminal convictions may subject a non-citizen defendant to immigration consequences. 
The Immigration & Naturalization Service (INS) defines a "conviction" as a formal judgment of 
guilt, or if a judgment is withheld, where there is some type of plea, and/or admission of facts 
warranting guilt and the imposition of some type of penalty. 8 USCS an 1101(a)(48); INA QQ 
101(a)(48). Certain kinds of convictions may be deportable offenses and others may make a person 
ineligible for admission to the country. But the mere fact that a defendant enters a plea in order to 
pursue an appeal may be grounds for the INS to take administrative action. The following article in 
the Michigan Bar Journal has an excellent summary of immigration consequences. Ronald 
Kaplovitz. Criminal Immigration: the Consequences of Criminal Convictions on Non-U.S. Citizens, 
82 MI Bar Jul. 30 (Feb. 2003) (available online at 
http://www.michbar.org/journal/article.cfm?articleID=544& volumeID=41#fn5ref). 
25. This is because of the Lautenberg Amendment, 18 USCS an 922(g)(9), which prohibits a person 
convicted of a misdemeanor from possessing a firearm or ammunition. The Utah Court of Appeals 
has agreed to hear this issue. In Salt Lake City v. Gary Newman, 20040452-CA, defendant has 
alleged that he had to file an extraordinary writ in order to obtain review of a justice court legal 
conclusion. His basis was that he could lose his military status by entering a guilty plea and pursuing 
the trial de novo. 
26. Utah Code Ann, na 78-5-120(1). 
Posted by at May 3, 2005 12:21 PM 
The Utah State Bar presents this web site as a service to our members and to the public. Information presented in this site is NOT legal 
advice. Please review the Terms of Use for more policy, disclaimer & liability information - ©©Utah State Bar 
email: webmaster@utahbar.org 
APPENDIX EEE 
Court's Minutes 
FIRST DISTRICT - CACHE 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JERALD RIO DAVIS, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
RULING ON MOTION 
NOTICE 
Case No: 071100143 MO 
Judge: CLINT S. JUDKINS 
Date: July 30, 2007 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lindac 
Prosecutor: BAIRD, TONY C 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LAURITZEN, ARDEN W 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 11, 1958 
Video 
CHARGES 
1. PUBLIC NUISANCE - Infraction 
HEARING 
The Court denies both of defendant's motions 
prepare an Order. Trial date set. 
BENCH TRIAL is scheduled. 
Date: 09/19/2007 
Time: 10:30 a.m. 
Location: COURTROOM 1 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
13 5 NORTH 100 WEST 
LOGAN, UT 84321 
before Judge CLINT S. JUDKINS 
The State will 
Page 1 (last) 
APPENDIX FFF 
Objection to the Oral Order of the Court and to the Judgement of Conviction 
A.W.Lauritzen(1906J 
15 East 600 North #1 
P.O.Box 171 
Logan, UT 84321 
435-753-3391 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JERALD RIO DAVIS, 
Defendant. 
OBJECTION TO ORAL VERDICT, 
JUDGEMENT AND SENTENCE 
Case No. 071100143 MO 
Judge Clint S. Judkins 
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through is Attorney of record, with this his 
Objection to the ruling from the bench, Judgment and Sentence as entered on the 19th day of 
September, 2007 in that the Judge's Order imposed the maximum sentence and in that, the 
Defendant was convicted of an infraction with the ordinance prescribing the maximum fine of 
Fifty Dollars ($50.00). No jail time may be imposed upon conviction of the infraction under 
either municipal or state law and in that Defendant has suffered the maximum penalty, no 
probation or further sanction may be imposed should the fine be paid as required by the Court in 
its written Judgement. 
Dated the g>7Iay~of October, 2007. 
^ .w . Lauritzen 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, OBJECTION TO 
ORAL VERDICT, JUDGEMENT AND SENTENCE, postage prepaid, to the following listed 
below on the i""3ay of Sgpgff&er, 2007. 
jfYLoaKcxj^  (hudJ^UAj/i^cy^ 
Jonathan E. Jenkins, Esq. 
108 North Main 
Logan, UT 84321 
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United States Constitution 
14th Amendment 
* 
Amendment 14 - Citizenship Rights. Ratified 7/9/1868. Note History 
1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, 
counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to 
vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the 
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, 
and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such 
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-
President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having 
previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member 
of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of 
the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or 
comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for 
payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be 
questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or 
emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. 
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Article I, Section 1 
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Article I, Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; 
to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the dictates of their 
consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of 
grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse 
of that right. 
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Article I, Section 24 
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Article I, Section 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
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Article V, Section 1 
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Article V, Section 1. [Three departments of government] 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the 
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any 
functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or 
permitted. 
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Article VIII, Section 1. [Judicial powers -- Courts.] 
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in a trial court of general 
jurisdiction known as the district court, and in such other courts as the Legislature by statute 
may establish. The Supreme Court, the district court, and such other courts designated by 
statute shall be courts of record. Courts not of record shall also be established by statute. 
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Article VIII, Section 4. [Rulemaking power of Supreme Court -- Judges pro tempore -
- Regulation of practice of law.] 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the courts of 
the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of 
all members of both houses of the Legislature. Except as otherwise provided by this 
constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and judges 
pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United 
States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. The Supreme Court by rule shall 
govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline 
of persons admitted to practice law. 
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Article XI, Section 5. [Cities and towns not to be created by special laws -
Legislature to provide for the incorporation, organization, dissolution, and classification 
of cities and towns -- Charter cities.] 
The Legislature may not create cities or towns by special laws. 
The Legislature by statute shall provide for the incorporation, organization, and dissolution 
of cities and towns and for their classification in proportion to population. Any incorporated city 
or town may frame and adopt a charter for its own government in the following manner: 
The legislative authority of the city may, by two-thirds vote of its members, and upon 
petition of qualified electors to the number of fifteen per cent of all votes cast at the next 
preceding election for the office of the mayor, shall forthwith provide by ordinance for the 
submission to the electors of the question: "Shall a commission be chosen to frame a charter?" 
The ordinance shall require that the question be submitted to the electors at the next regular 
municipal election. The ballot containing such question shall also contain the names of 
candidates for members of the proposed commission, but without party designation. Such 
candidates shall be nominated in the same manner as required by law for nomination of city 
officers. If a majority of the electors voting on the question of choosing a commission shall vote 
in the affirmative, then the fifteen candidates receiving a majority of the votes cast at such 
election, shall constitute the charter commission, and shall proceed to frame a charter. 
Any charter so framed shall be submitted to the qualified electors of the city at an election 
to be held at a time to be determined by the charter commission, which shall be not less than 
sixty days subsequent to its completion and distribution among the electors and not more than 
one year from such date. Alternative provisions may also be submitted to be voted upon 
separately. The commission shall make provisions for the distribution of copies of the 
proposed charter and of any alternative provisions to the qualified electors of the city, not less 
than sixty days before the election at which it is voted upon. Such proposed charter and such 
alternative provisions as are approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon, shall 
become an organic law of such city at such time as may be fixed therein, and shall supersede 
any existing charter and all laws affecting the organization and government of such city which 
are now in conflict therewith. Within thirty days after its approval a copy of such charter as 
adopted, certified by the mayor and city recorder and authenticated by the seal of such city, 
shall be made in duplicate and deposited, one in the office of the secretary of State and the 
other in the office of the city recorder, and thereafter all courts shall take judicial notice of such 
charter. 
Amendments to any such charter may be framed and submitted by a charter commission in 
the same manner as provided for making of charters, or may be proposed by the legislative 
authority of the city upon a two-thirds vote thereof, or by petition of qualified electors to a 
number equal to fifteen per cent of the total votes cast for mayor on the next preceding 
election, and any such amendment may be submitted at the next regular municipal election, 
and having been approved by the majority of the electors voting thereon, shall become part of 
the charter at the time fixed in such amendment and shall be certified and filed as provided in 
case of charters. 
Each city forming its charter under this section shall have, and is hereby granted, the 
authority to exercise all powers relating to municipal affairs, and to adopt and enforce within its 
limits, local police, sanitary and similar regulations not in conflict with the general law, and no 
enumeration of powers in this constitution or any law shall be deemed to limit or restrict the 
general grant of authority hereby conferred; but this grant of authority shall not include the 
power 
to regulate public utilities, not municipally owned, if any such regulation of public utilities is 
provided for by general law, nor be deemed to limit or restrict the power of the Legislature in 
matters relating to State affairs, to enact general laws applicable alike to all cities of the State. 
The power to be conferred upon the cities by this section shall include the following: 
(a) To levy, assess and collect taxes and borrow money, within the limits prescribed by 
general law, and to levy and collect special assessments for benefits conferred. 
(b) To furnish all local public services, to purchase, hire, construct, own, maintain and 
operate, or lease, public utilities local in extent and use; to acquire by condemnation, or 
otherwise, within or without the corporate limits, property necessary for any such purposes, 
subject to restrictions imposed by general law for the protection of other communities; and to 
grant local public utility franchises and within its powers regulate the exercise thereof. 
(c) To make local public improvements and to acquire by condemnation, or otherwise, 
property within its corporate limits necessary for such improvements; and also to acquire an 
excess over than [that] needed for any such improvement and to sell or lease such excess 
property with restrictions, in order to protect and preserve the improvement. 
(d) To issue and sell bonds on the security of any such excess property, or of any public 
utility owned by the city, or of the revenues thereof, or both, including, in the case of public 
utility, a franchise stating the terms upon which, in case of foreclosure, the purchaser may 
operate such utility. 
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this state shall extend to any other land and territory now acquired, or that may 
hereafter be acquired, by compact or agreement with other states, or otherwise, 
although such land and territory are not included within the boundaries herein 
before designated. 
Sect ion 32. That the erection of safe prisons, the inspection of prisons, and 
the humane treatment of prisoners, shall be provided for. 
Sect ion 33. That slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment 
for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, are forever prohibited 
in this state. 
Sect ion 34. The General Assembly shall make no law recognizing the right 
of property in man. 
Sect ion 35. To preserve and protect the rights of victims of crime to justice 
and due process, victims shall be entitled to the following basic rights: 
Sect ion 35a. The right to confer with the prosecution. 
Sect ion 35b. The right to be free from intimidation, harassment and abuse 
throughout the criminal justice system. 
Sect ion 35c The right to be present at all proceedings where the defendant 
has the right to be present. 
Sect ion 35d. The right to be heard, when relevant, at all critical stages 
of the criminal justice process as defined by the General Assembly. 
Sect ion 35e. The right to be informed of all proceedings, and of the release, 
transfer or escape of the accused or convicted person. 
Sect ion 35f. The right to a speedy trial or disposition and a prompt and 
final conclusion of the case after the conviction or sentence. 
Sect ion 35g. The right to restitution from the offender. 
Sect ion 35h. The right to be informed of each of the rights established 
for victims. 
The General Assembly has the authority to enact substantive and procedural 
laws to define, implement, preserve and protect the rights guaranteed to victims 
by this section. 
ARTICLE II . 
Distribution of Powers. 
Sect ion 1. The powers of the government shall be divided into three distinct 
departments: legislative, executive, and judicial. 
Sect ion 2. No person or persons belonging to one of these departments shall 
exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except in 
the cases herein directed or permitted. 
Legislative Department. 
Sect ion 3. The legislative authority of this state shall be vested in a General 
Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives, both 
dependent on the people. Representatives shall hold office for two years and sena-
tors for four years from the day of the general election, except tha t the speaker 
of the Senate and the speaker of the House of Representatives each shall hold 
his office as speaker for two years or until his successor is elected and qualified 
provided however, that in the first general election after adoption of this amend-
ment senators elected in districts designated by even numbers shall be elected 
for four years and those elected in districts designated by odd numbers shall be 
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and the items or parts of items disapproved or reduced shall be void to the ex-
tent that they have been disapproved or reduced unless repassed as hereinafter 
provided. The governor, within ten calendar days (Sundays excepted) after the 
bill shall have been presented to him, shall report the items or parts of items 
disapproved or reduced with his objections in writing to the House in which the 
bill originated, or if the General Assembly shall have adjourned, to the office of 
the secretary of state. Any such items or parts of items so disapproved or reduced 
shall be restored to the bill in the original amount and become law if repassed by 
the General Assembly according to the rules and limitations prescribed for the 
passage of other bills over the executive veto. 
ARTICLE IV. 
Elections. 
Section 1. Every person, being eighteen years of age, being a citizen of the 
United States, being a resident of the state for a period of time as prescribed by 
the General Assembly, and being duly registered in the county of residence for 
a period of time prior to the day of any election as prescribed by the General As-
sembly, shall be entitled to vote in all federal, state, and local elections held in 
the county or district in which such person resides. All such requirements shall 
be equal and uniform across the state, and there shall be no other qualification 
attached to the right of suffrage. 
The General Assembly shall have power to enact laws requiring voters to vote 
in the election precincts in which they may reside, and laws to secure the freedom 
of elections and the purity of the ballot box. 
All male citizens of this state shall be subject to the performance of military 
duty, as may be prescribed by law. 
Sect ion 2. Laws may be passed excluding from the right of suffrage persons 
who may be convicted of infamous crimes. 
Section 3. Electors shall, in all cases, except treason, felony, or breach of the 
peace, be privileged from arrest or summons, during their attendance at elections 
and in going to and returning from them. 
Sect ion 4. In all elections to be made by the General Assembly, the members 
thereof shall vote viva voce, and their votes shall be entered on the journal. All 
other elections shall be by ballot. 
ARTICLE V. 
Impeachments. 
Section 1. The House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeach-
ment. 
Sect ion 2. All impeachments shall be tried by the Senate. When sitting for 
that purpose the senators shall be upon oath or affirmation, and the chief justice 
of the Supreme Court, or if he be on trial, the senior associate judge, shall preside 
over them. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of 
the senators sworn to try the officer impeached. 
Section 3. The House of Representatives shall elect from their own body three 
members, whose duty it shall be to prosecute impeachments. No impeachment 
shall be tried until the Legislature shall have adjourned sine die, when the Sen-
ate shall proceed to try such impeachment. 
Sec t ion 4. The governor, judges of the Supreme Court, judges of the inferior 
courts, chancellors, attorneys for the state, treasurer, comptroller, and secretary 
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of state, shall be liable to impeachment, whenever they may, in the opinion of the 
House of Representatives, commit any crime in their official capacity which may 
require disqualification but judgment shall only extend to removal from office, 
and disqualification to fill any office thereafter. The party shall, nevertheless, be 
liable to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment according to law. The Leg-
islature now has, and shall continue to have, power to relieve from the penalties 
imposed, any person disqualified from holding office by the judgment of a Court of 
Impeachment. 
Section 5. Justices of the peace, and other civil officers not herein before 
mentioned, for crimes or misdemeanors in office, shall be liable to indictment in 
such courts as the Legislature may direct; and upon conviction, shall be removed 
from office by said court, as if found guilty on impeachment; and shall be subject 
to such other punishment as may be prescribed by law. 
ARTICLE VI. 
Judicial Department. 
Section 1. The judicial power of this state shall be vested in one Supreme Court 
and in such Circuit, Chancery and other Inferior Courts as the Legislature shall 
from time to time, ordain and establish; in the judges thereof, and in justices of 
the peace. The Legislature may also vest such jurisdiction in Corporation Courts 
as may be deemed necessary. Courts to be holden by justices of the peace may 
also be established. 
Section 2. The Supreme Court shall consist of five judges, of whom not more 
than two shall reside in any one of the grand divisions of the state. The judges 
shall designate one of their own number who shall preside as chief justice. The 
concurrence of three of the judges shall in every case be necessary to a decision. 
The jurisdiction of this court shall be appellate only, under such restrictions and 
regulations as may from time to time be prescribed by law; but it may possess 
such other jurisdiction as is now conferred by law on the present Supreme Court. 
Said court shall be held at Knoxville, Nashville and Jackson. 
Section 3. The judges of the Supreme Court shall be elected by the qualified 
voters of the state. The Legislature shall have power to prescribe such rules as 
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of section two of this article. Every 
judge of the Supreme Court shall be thirty-five years of age, and shall before his 
election have been a resident of the state for five years. His term of service shall 
be eight years. 
Section 4. The Judges of the Circuit and Chancery Courts, and of other In-
ferior Courts, shall be elected by the qualified voters of the district or circuit to 
which they are to be assigned. Every judge of such courts shall be thirty years of 
age, and shall before his election, have been a resident of the state for five years, 
and of the circuit or district one year. His term of service shall be eight years. 
Section 5. An attorney general and reporter for the state, shall be appointed 
by the judges of the Supreme Court and shall hold his office for a term of eight 
years. An attorney for the state for any circuit or district, for which a judge hav-
ing criminal jurisdiction shall be provided by law, shall be elected by the quali-
fied voters of such circuit or district, and shall hold his office for a term of eight 
years, and shall have been a resident of the state five years, and of the circuit or 
district one year. In all cases where the attorney for any district fails or refuses 
to attend and prosecute according to law, the court shall have power to appoint 
an attorney pro tempore. 
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10-3-703. Criminal penalties for violation of ordinance -- Civil penalties prohibited -
Exceptions. 
(1) The governing body of each municipality may impose a minimum criminal penalty for the 
violation of any municipal ordinance by a fine not to exceed the maximum class B 
misdemeanor fine under Section 76-3-301 or by a term of imprisonment up to six months, or 
by both the fine and term of imprisonment. 
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), the governing body may prescribe a 
minimum civil penalty for the violation of any municipal ordinance by a fine not to exceed the 
maximum class B misdemeanor fine under Section 76-3-301. 
(b) A municipality may not impose a civil penalty and adjudication for the violation of a 
municipal moving traffic ordinance. 
Amended by Chapter 156, 2003 General Session 
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10-8-6. Borrowing power -- Warrants and bonds. 
They may borrow money on the credit of the corporation for corporate purposes in the 
manner and to the extent allowed by the Constitution and the laws, and issue warrants and 
bonds therefor in such amounts and forms and on such conditions as they shall determine. 
No Change Since 1953 
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10-8-60. Nuisances. 
They may declare what shall be a nuisance, and abate the same, and impose fines upon 
persons who may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist. 
No Change Since 1953 
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10-8-84. Ordinances, rules, and regulations -- Passage -- Penalties. 
(1) The municipal legislative body may pass all ordinances and rules, and make all 
regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into effect or discharging all powers 
and duties conferred by this chapter, and as are necessary and proper to provide for the safety 
and preserve the health, and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good 
order, comfort, and convenience of the city and its inhabitants, and for the protection of 
property in the city. 
(2) The municipal legislative body may enforce obedience to the ordinances with fines or 
penalties in accordance with Section 10-3-703. 
Amended by Chapter 323, 2000 General Session 
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76-1-103. Application of code -- Offense prior to effective date. 
(1) The provisions of this code shall govern the construction of, the punishment for, and 
defenses against any offense defined in this code or, except where otherwise specifically 
provided or the context otherwise requires, any offense defined outside this code; provided 
such offense was committed after the effective date of this code. 
(2) Any offense committed prior to the effective date of this code shall be governed by the 
law, statutory and non-statutory, existing at the time of commission thereof, except that a 
defense or limitation on punishment available under this code shall be available to any 
defendant tried or retried after the effective date. An offense under the laws of this state shall 
be deemed to have been committed prior to the effective date of this act if any of the elements 
of the offense occurred prior thereto. 
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session 
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76-1-104. Purposes and principles of construction. 
The provisions of this code shall be construed in accordance with these general purposes. 
(1) Forbid and prevent the commission of offenses. 
(2) Define adequately the conduct and mental state which constitute each offense and 
safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal. 
(3) Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of offenses and which 
permit recognition or differences in rehabilitation possibilities among individual offenders. 
(4) Prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused or convicted of offenses. 
Enacted by Chapter 196,1973 General Session 
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76-3-301. Fines of persons. 
(1) A person convicted of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine, not exceeding: 
(a) $10,000 for a felony conviction of the first degree or second degree; 
(b) $5,000 for a felony conviction of the third degree; 
(c) $2,500 for a class A misdemeanor conviction; 
(d) $1,000 for a class B misdemeanor conviction; 
(e) $750 for a class C misdemeanor conviction or infraction conviction; and 
(f) any greater amounts specifically authorized by statute. 
(2) This section does not apply to a corporation, association, partnership, government, or 
governmental instrumentality. 
Amended by Chapter 291, 1995 General Session 
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76-10-801. "Nuisance" defined - Violation -- Classification of offense. 
(1) A nuisance is any item, thing, manner, condition whatsoever that is dangerous to human 
life or health or renders soil, air, water, or food impure or unwholesome. 
(2) Any person, whether as owner, agent, or occupant who creates, aids in creating, or 
contributes to a nuisance, or who supports, continues, or retains a nuisance, is guilty of a class 
B misdemeanor. 
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session 
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76-10-801. "Nuisance" defined -- Violation - Classification of offense. 
(1) A nuisance is any item, thing, manner, condition whatsoever that is dangerous to human 
life or health or renders soil, air, water, or food impure or unwholesome. 
(2) Any person, whether as owner, agent, or occupant who creates, aids in creating, or 
contributes to a nuisance, or who supports, continues, or retains a nuisance, is guilty of a class 
B misdemeanor. 
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session 
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76-10-803. "Public nuisance" defined -- Agricultural operations. 
(1) A public nuisance is a crime against the order and economy of the state and consists in 
unlawfully doing any act or omitting to perform any duty, which act or omission: 
(a) annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety of three or more 
persons; 
(b) offends public decency; 
(c) unlawfully interferes with, obstructs, or tends to obstruct, or renders dangerous for 
passage, any lake, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway; 
(d) is a nuisance as defined in Section 78B-6-1107; or 
(e) in any way renders three or more persons insecure in life or the use of property. 
(2) An act which affects three or more persons in any of the ways specified in this section is 
still a nuisance regardless of the extent to which the annoyance or damage inflicted on 
individuals is unequal. 
(3) (a) Agricultural operations that are consistent with sound agricultural practices are 
presumed to be reasonable and do not constitute a public nuisance under Subsection (1) 
unless the agricultural operation has a substantial adverse effect on the public health and 
safety. 
(b) Agricultural operations undertaken in conformity with federal, state, and local laws and 
regulations, including zoning ordinances, are presumed to be operating within sound 
agricultural practices. 
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 76_10_080300.ZIP 2,436 Bytes 
Sections in this ChapterjChapters in this TitlejAII Titles|Legislative Home Page 
Last revised: Thursday, May 01, 2008 
Utah Code Annotated 
§77-18a-l (1953 As Amended) 
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE Home | Site Map j Calendar | Code/Constitution | House | Senate | Search 
77-18a-1. Appeals -- When proper. 
(1) A defendant may, as a matter of right, appeal from: 
(a) a final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea; 
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of the defendant; 
(c) an order adjudicating the defendant's competency to proceed further in a pending 
prosecution; or 
(d) an order denying bail, as provided in Subsection 77-20-1(7). 
(2) In addition to any appeal permitted by Subsection (1), a defendant may seek 
discretionary appellate review of any interlocutory order. 
(3) The prosecution may, as a matter of right, appeal from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony information following a 
refusal to bind the defendant over for trial; 
(b) a pretrial order dismissing a charge on the ground that the court's suppression of 
evidence has substantially impaired the prosecution's case; 
(c) an order granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest-
ed) an order arresting judgment or granting a motion for merger; 
(e) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double jeopardy or denial of 
a speedy trial; 
(f) an order holding a statute or any part of it invalid; 
(g) an order adjudicating the defendant's competency to proceed further in a pending 
prosecution; 
(h) an order finding, pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 19, Part 2, Competency for Execution, 
that an inmate sentenced to death is incompetent to be executed; 
(i) an order reducing the degree of offense pursuant to Section 76-3-402; or 
(j) an illegal sentence. 
(4) In addition to any appeal permitted by Subsection (3), the prosecution may seek 
discretionary appellate review of any interlocutory order entered before jeopardy attaches. 
Amended by Chapter 93, 2006 General Session 
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Note 1 
statewide, whether those rulings are constitu- apply statewide. U.C.A. 1953, 78-2a-2(2). 
tionally based or not; therefore, as Court of Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 1995, 904 
Appeals adjudicates cases only in three-judge p.2d 677. Courts <&* 91(2); Courts <S> 248 
panels, rulings of panel of Court of Appeals also 
§ 7 8 - 2 a - 3 . Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to c a m ' into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service 
Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions re-
viewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, 
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the 
state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except 
those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except 
petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging 
the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, includ-
ing, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, 
support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
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(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the district court has subject matter 
jurisdiction in class B misdemeanors, class C misdemeanors, infractions, and 
violations of ordinances only if: 
(a) there is no justice court with territorial jurisdiction; 
(b) the matter was properly filed in the circuit court prior to July 1, 1996; 
(c) the offense occurred within the boundaries of the municipality in which 
the district courthouse is located and that municipality has not formed a 
justice court; or 
(d) they are included in an indictment or information covering a single 
criminal episode alleging the commission of a felony or a class A misdemean-
or. 
(9) The district court has jurisdiction of actions under Title 78, Chapter 3h, 
Child Protective Orders, if the juvenile court transfers the case to the district 
court. 
Laws 1951, c. 58. § 1; Laws 1983, c. 75, § 2; Laws 1986, c. 47, § 50; Laws 1987, c. 
161, § 305; Laws 1988, c. 248, § 10; Laws 1991, c. 268, § 23; Laws 1992, c. 290, § 8; 
Laws 1993, c. 59. § 6; Laws 1996, c. 198, § 50, eff. July 1, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 216, 
§ 2, eff. July 1, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 313, § 1, eff. July 1, 1998; Laws 2000, c. 323, § 11, 
eff. March 16, 2000; Laws 2004, c. 201, § 2, eff. May 3, 2004. 
Codification C. 1943. Supp., § 104-3-4. 
Cross References 
Concurrent jurisdiction with juvenile court, see § 78-3a-105. 
District court jurisdiction, see Const. Art. 8, § 5. 
Extraordinary writs, judicial code, see § 78-35-1 et seq. 
Jurisdiction of district courts, see Const. Art. 8, § 5. 
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In general 1 Consent of parties as to jurisdiction 9 
Administrative adjudications 21 Constitutional provisions 10 
Attorney discipline 20 Counterclaims 16 
Concurrent and conflicting jurisdiction 6 Crimes and offenses, generally 11 
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Cross References 
Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration, see Jud. Admin., Rule 1-101 et seq. 
Library References 
Courts ®=>74, 78. CJ .S . Courts §§ 7, 121, 124 to 126. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 106k74; 
106k78. 
§ 7 8 - 3 - 1 2 . Repealed by Laws 1988, c. 152, § 26 and c. 248, § 50, eff. April 
25,1988 
§ 7 8 - 3 - 1 2 . 5 . Costs of system 
(1) The cost of salaries, travel, and training required for the discharge of the 
duties of district court judges, court commissioners, secretaries of judges or 
court executives, court executives, and court reporters shall be paid from 
appropriations made by the Legislature. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (1), the Judicial Council may directly 
provide for the actual and necessary expenses of operation of the district court, 
including personnel salary and benefits, travel, training, facilities, security, 
equipment, furniture, supplies, legal reference materials, and other operating 
expenses, or may contract with the county in a county seat or with the unit of 
local government in municipalities other than a county seat for the actual and 
necessary expenses of the district court. Any necessary contract with the 
county or unit of local government shall be pursuant to Subsection 
78-3-13.4(4). 
Laws 1988, c. 152, § 19; Laws 1991, c. 268, § 25; Laws 1996, c. 198, § 51, eff. July 1, 
1996; Laws 1997, c. 10, § 139, eff. May 5, 1997. 
Library References 
Counties <3=>136. CJ .S . Counties § 175. 
Judges o=>22(3). CJ .S . Judges §§ 75, 81. 
States <S» 129 to 134. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 360k 129 to 
360kl34; 227k22(3); 104kl36. 
CJ .S . States §§ 226, 230 to 241. 
§ 7 8 - 3 - 1 3 . Repealed by Laws 1988, c. 152, § 26; Laws 1988, c. 248, § 50, 
eff. April 25, 1988 
§ 7 8 - 3 - 1 3 . 4 . Transfer of court operating responsibilities—Facilities— 
StafF—Budget 
(1) A county's determination to transfer responsibility for operation of the 
district court to the state is irrevocable. 
(2)(a) Court space suitable for the conduct of judicial business as specified by 
the Judicial Council shall be provided by the state from appropriations made by 
the Legislature for these purposes. 
(b) The state may, in order to carry out its obligation to provide these 
facilities, lease space from a county, or reimburse a county for the number of 
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square feettused by the district. Any lease and reimbursement shall be 
determined in accordance with the standards of the State Building Board 
applicable to state agencies generally. A county or municipality terminating 
a lease with the court shall provide written notice to the Judicial Council at 
least one year prior to the effective date of the termination. 
(c) District courts shall be located in municipalities that are sites for the 
district court or circuit court as of January 1, 1994. Removal of the district 
court from the municipality shall require prior legislative approval by joint 
resolution. 
(3) The state shall provide legal reference materials for all district judges' 
chambers and courtrooms, as required by Judicial Council rule. Maintenance 
of county law libraries shall be in consultation with the court executive of the 
district court. 
(4)(a) At the request of the Judicial Council, the county or municipality shall 
provide staff for the district court in county seats or municipalities under 
contract with the administrative office of the courts. 
(b) Payment for necessary expenses shall be by a contract entered into 
annually between the state and the county or municipality, which shall 
specifically state the agreed costs of personnel, supplies, and services, as well 
as the method and terms of payment. 
(c) Workload measures prepared by the state court administrator and 
projected costs for the next fiscal year shall be considered in the negotiation 
of contracts. 
(d) Each May 1 preceding the general session of the Legislature, the county 
or municipality shall submit a budget request to the Judicial Council, the 
governor, and the legislative fiscal analyst for services to be rendered as part 
of the contract under Subsection (b) for the fiscal year immediately following 
the legislative session. The Judicial Council shall consider this information 
in developing its budget request. The legislative fiscal analyst shall provide 
the Legislature with the county's or municipality's original estimate of 
expenses. By June 15 preceding the state's fiscal year, the county and the 
state court administrator shall negotiate a contract to cover expenses in 
accordance with the appropriation approved by the Legislature. The con-
tracts may not include payments for expenses of service of process, indigent 
defense costs, or other costs or expenses provided by law as an obligation of 
the county or municipality. 
Laws 1988, c. 152, § 20; Laws 1991, c. 268, § 26, Laws 1996, c. 198, § 52, eff. July 1, 
1996. 
Cross References 
Budgetary Procedures Act, see § 63-38-1 et seq 
otate officials, reports of expenditures and appropriations, see § 67-10-1 et seq 
Library References 
Judges ^22(3) 
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States <3^129, 90. C.J.S. Courts § 121. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 104kl36; C J S Judges §§ 75 81 
227k22(3); 360kl29; 360k90; 106k74 / T V o ** id ' , c c ,*n n™ . . . 
C J S Counties § 175 e s ^ t 0 ' ' t 0 
§ 7 8 - 3 - 1 3 . 5 . Repealed by Laws 1967, c. 222, § 9 
§ 7 8 - 3 - 1 4 . Repealed by Laws 1988, c. 152, § 26; Laws 1988, c. 248, § 50, 
eff. April 25, 1988 
§ 78—3-14 .2 . District court case management 
(1) The district court of each district shall develop systems of case manage-
ment. 
(2) The case management systems developed by a district court shall: 
(a) ensure judicial accountability for the just and timely disposition of 
cases; 
(b) provide for each judge a full judicial work load that accommodates 
differences in the subject matter or complexity of cases assigned to different 
judges; and 
(c) provide that judges of the district court and judges of the court formerly 
denominated the circuit court who took office prior to July 1, 1991, are 
entitled to be assigned only cases from the subject matter jurisdiction of their 
respective courts as that jurisdiction existed on June 30, 1996. If the volume 
of such cases does not constitute a full work load, other cases shall be 
assigned. 
(3) A district court may establish divisions within the court for the efficient 
management of different types of cases. The existence of divisions within the 
court may not affect the jurisdiction of the court nor the validity of court 
orders. The existence of divisions within the court may not impede public 
access to the courts. 
Laws 1996, c. 198, § 53, eff. July 1, 1996. 
Library References 
Courts <s=78, 70, 50 C.J.S. Courts §§ 7, 106, 123 to 126. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 106k78; 
106k70; 106k50. 
United States Supreme Court 
Access to courts, death of foreign spouse of American 
Access to courts, identification of under- citizen by foreign army officers alleged-
lying cause of action and lost remedy, ly paid by the CIA, see Christopher v. 
government conspiracy to destroy or Harbury, U.S.D.C.2002, 122 S.Ct. 
cover up evidence of crime, torture and 2179, 536 U.S. 403. 
§ 7 8 - 3 - 1 4 . 5 . Allocation of district court fees and forfeitures 
(1) Except as provided in this section, district court fines and forfeitures 
collected for violation of state statutes shall be paid to the state treasurer. 
(2) Fines and forfeitures collected by the court for violation of a state statute 
or county or municipal ordinance constituting a misdemeanor or an infraction 
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shall be remitted 1/2 to the state treasurer and 1/2 to the treasurer of the state 
or local governmental entity which prosecutes or which would prosecute the 
violation. 
(3) Fines and forfeitures collected for violations of Title 23, Wildlife Re-
sources Code of Utah, Title 41, Chapter 22, Off-highway Vehicles, or Title 73, 
Chapter 18, State Boating Act, shall be paid to the state treasurer. 
(a) For violations of Title 23, the state treasurer shall allocate 85% to the 
Division of Wildlife Resources and 15% to the General Fund. 
(b) For violations of Title 41 , Chapter 22, or Title 73, Chapter 18, the state 
treasurer shall allocate 85% to the Division of Parks and Recreation and 15% 
to the General Fund. 
(4) Fines and forfeitures collected for violation of Section 72-7-404 or 
72-7-406, less fees established by the Judicial Council, shall be paid to the state 
treasurer for deposit in the B and C road account. Fees established by the 
Judicial Council shall be deposited in the state General Fund. Money deposited 
in the class B and C road account is supplemental to the money appropriated 
under Section 72-2-107 but shall be expended in the same manner as other 
class B and C road funds. 
(5) Until July 1, 2007, fines and forfeitures collected by the court for a 
violation of Subsection 41-1 a-1303(2) related to registration of vehicles after 
establishing residency shall be remitted: 
(a) 50% to the state or local governmental entity which issued the citation 
for a violation to be used for law enforcement purposes; and 
(b) 50% in accordance with Subsection (2). 
(6) Fines and forfeitures collected for any violations not specified in this 
chapter or otherwise provided for by law shall be paid to the state treasurer. 
(7) Fees collected in connection with civil actions filed in the district court 
shall be paid to the state treasurer. 
(8) The court shall remit money collected in accordance with Title 51, 
Chapter 7, State Money Management Act. 
Laws 1988, c. 152, § 21, Laws 1990, c 128, § 7; Laws 1996, c. 198, § 54, ett July 1, 
1996; Laws 1998, c 270, § 352, eff. March 21, 1998; Laws 2004, c 273, § 1, ett July 1, 
2004; Laws 2004, c. 349, § 6, eff July 1, 2004. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Composite section by the Office of Legislative 
Research and General Counsel of Laws 2004, c 
2
' 3 , § 1 and Laws 2004, c 349, § 6 
Cross References 
nipromise of traffic charges, plea in abeyance fee, surcharge, see § 77-2-4 2 
N«» and forfeitures, distribution and allocation, see § 63-63a-2 
*«*UC mitigation surcharge, distribution of monies, see § 63-63b-102 
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P'c'j40 Dissolution of Justice Courts 
^ Jf78-5-°-5 to 78-5-41 • R e P e a l e d 
»o^5_ J 0 1 . Creation of justice court—Not of record 
ter Article VIII, Section 1, Utah Constitution, there is created a court not 
rd imown as the justice court. The judges of this court are justice court 
1 ^ 1 9 8 9 c 157, § 10, Laws 1997, c 216, § 4, eff July 1, 1997, Laws 1999, c 21, 
fjS#eff.May3,1999 
l ^ p f * r Cross References 
IWtlflcation of justice courts, see Jud Admin , Justice Court Recert Standards App B 
ltdai of Civil Procedure, applicability, see Rules Civ Proc , Rule 81 
* *~ * Library References 
^Ljts $»41, 49 C J S Courts §§ 4 93 to 100 
v^lftttlaw Key Number Searches 106k41, 
^J8j06k49. 
Research References 
Am. Jur PI & Pr Forms Justice of the 
$MLCC § 3, Statutory References 
1 7 8 - 5 - 1 0 1 . 5 . Creation of justice courts—Classes of justice courts 
FftU 
(l)(a) For the purposes of this section, to "create a justice court" means to 
^ *' (i) establish a justice court, or 
%r* (ii) establish a justice court under Title 11, Chapter 13, Interlocal Coop-
£* erationAct. 
™*(b) A municipality or county that has created a justice court may change 
* the form of its court to another listed in Subsection (l)(a) without being 
^0)nsidered to have created a court 
l)LJustice courts shall be divided into the following classes 
|a) Class I: 501 or more citations or cases filed per month, 
p(b) Class II: 201-500 citations or cases filed per month, 
B(c)*Class III: 61-200 citations or cases filed per month, and 
W Class IV: 60 or fewer citations or cases filed per month 
t Municipalities or counties can elect to create a Class I or Class II justice 
• by filing a written declaration with the Judicial Council on or before July 
C least two years prior to the effective date of the election Upon demonstra-
J*™ Of compliance with operating standards as established by statute and the 
K ^ w l Council, the Judicial Council shall certify the creation of the court 
sJfcNAntto Section 78-5-139 
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Section 
78-5-140. Dissolution of Justice Courts. 
§§ 78-5-0 .5 to 7 8 - 5 - 4 1 . Repealed 
§ 78-5—101 . Creation of justice court—Not of record 
Under Article VIII, Section 1, Utah Constitution, there is created a court not 
of record known as the justice court. The judges of this court are justice court 
judges. 
Uws 1989, c. 157, § 10; Laws 1997, c. 216, § 4, eff. July 1, 1997; Laws 1999, c. 21. 
§ 103, eff. May 3, 1999. 
Cross References 
Certification of justice courts, see Jud Admin , Justice Court Recert Standards App B 
Rules of Civil Procedure, applicability, see Rules Civ Proc , Rule 81 
Library References 
Courts <s=>41, 49 C J S Courts §§ 4, 93 to 100 
Westlaw Key Number Searches 106k41, 
106k49 
Research References 
Forms 
15A Am Jur PI & Pr Forms Justice of the 
Peace § 3, Statutory References 
§ 7 8 - 5 - 1 0 1 . 5 . Creation of justice courts—Classes of justice courts 
(l)(a) For the purposes of this section, to "create a justice court" means to 
(i) establish a justice court; or 
(ii) establish a justice court under Title 11, Chapter 13, Interlocal Coop-
eration Act. 
(b) A municipality or county that has created a justice court may change 
the form of its court to another listed in Subsection (l)(a) without being 
considered to have created a court. 
(2) Justice courts shall be divided into the following classes: 
(a) Class I: 501 or more citations or cases filed per month; 
(b) Class II: 201-500 citations or cases filed per month, 
(c) Class III: 61—200 citations or cases filed per month; and 
W) Class IV: 60 or fewer citations or cases filed per month. 
_v) Municipalities or counties can elect to create a Class I or Class II justice 
Jr**! by filing a written declaration with the Judicial Council on or before July 
,!efst t w o v e a r s prior to the effective date of the election. Upon demonstra-
compliance with operating standards as established by statute and the 
Council, the Judicial Council shall certify the creation of the couit 
Mto Section 78-5-139. 
327 
§ 78-5-101.5 JUDICUl^dfflH 
(4)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (5), municipalities or countie^!*! 
elect to create a Class III or Class IV justice court by establishing the need fiSF 
the court and filing a written declaration with the Judicial Council on or befoi 
July 1 at least one year prior to the effective date of the election. '*-
(b) In evaluating the need for the creation of a Class III or Class IV justiciT 
court, the Judicial Council shall consider factors of population, case filings* 
public convenience, availability of law enforcement agencies and court sim. 
port services, proximity to other courts, and any special circumstance!1 
(c) The Judicial Council shall determine whether the municipality or coun* 
ty seeking to create a Class III or Class IV justice court has established the 
need for the court. 
(d) Upon demonstration of compliance with operating standards as estab-
lished by statute and the Judicial Council, the Judicial Council shall certify 
the creation of the court pursuant to Section 78-5-139. 
(5)(a) The following municipalities may create a justice court by filing a 
written declaiation with the Judicial Council: American Fork, Bountiful, Brig-
ham City, Cedar City, Clearfield, Elk Ridge, Kaysville, Layton, Logan, Moab, 
Murray, Ogden, Orem, Park City, Price, Provo, Richfield, Roosevelt, Roy, 
Salem, Salt Lake City, Sandy, Spanish Fork, St. George, Taylorsville, Tooele, 
Vernal, and West Valley City. 
(b) To form a Class I or Class II justice court, the municipalities listed in 
Subsection (5)(a) shall file a written declaration with the Judicial Council on 
or before July 1 at least two years prior to the effective date of the election. 
(c) To form a Class III or Class IV justice court, the municipalities listed in 
Subsection (5)(a) shall file a written declaration with the Judicial Council on 
or before July 1 at least one year prior to the effective date of the election. 
(d) Upon demonstration of compliance with operating standards as estab-
lished by statute and the Judicial Council, the Judicial Council shall certify 
the creation of the court pursuant to Section 78-5-139. 
(6) Upon request from a municipality or county seeking to create a justice 
court, the Judicial Council may shorten the time required between the city's or 
county's written declaration or election to create a justice court and the 
effective date of the election. 
(7) The Judicial Council may by rule provide resources and procedures 
adequate for the timely disposition of all matters brought before the courts. 
The administrative office of the courts and local governments shall cooperate in 
allocating resources to operate the courts in the most efficient and effective 
manner based on the allocation of responsibility between courts of record and 
not of record. 
Laws 1998, c. 313, § 2, eff. July 1, 1998; Laws 1999, c. 166, § 2, eff. May 3, 1999. 
Library References 
Courts <S=>41 
Westlaw Key Number Search 106k41 
C J S Courts §§ 93 to 100 
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, 57 Utah 365, 195 P. 194^ Justices Of The 
»58(1) 192a 
F ilure of the complaint filed in a justice's 
H to allege one of the grounds specified in 
*° n Laws 1917, § 7426, showing that the 
SSon was commenced in the city or precinct as 
uired by such section, did not deprive the 
^ t i ce of the peace, or the district court on 
ncal of jurisdiction, notwithstanding sections 
7147 and 7448, since section 7426 is not direct-
V.
 t 0 ^ question of jurisdiction, but is a legis-
utive direction as to the place of commencing 
lotions Silver City Mercantile Co. v. District 
£ L t of Utah County, 1920, 57 Utah 365, 195 
p j 9 4 . Justices Of The Peace <S=> 58(5) 
4 Presumptions as to jurisdiction 
* No presumption exists in favor of the jurisdic-
tion of the justice's courts. Silver City Mercan-
tile Co. v. District Court of Utah County, 1920, 
57 Utah 365, 195 P. 194. Justices Of The Peace 
*»59 
5. Waiver of objections 
Under Comp. Laws 1907, § 3668, providing 
where actions shall be commenced in justices' 
courts, and section 3669, providing for chang-
ing the place of trial where suit is brought in the 
wrong district, the privilege of bringing suit m a 
particular district is personal to defendant and 
may be waived. Beck v Lewis, 1917, 49 Utah 
368, 164 P. 480. Justices Of The Peace S=> 60 
Under Comp. Laws 1907, § 3668, prescribing 
where actions in justices' courts shall be com-
menced, and section 3669, providing for chang-
ing place of trial where suit is brought in wrong 
precinct, the defendant waives objection to the 
precinct by suffering a default judgment, espe-
cially where the complaint stated jurisdictional 
facts and no application for changing the place 
of trial was made. Beck v. Lewis, 1917, 49 
Utah 368, 164 P. 480. Justices Of The Peace ®=* 
60 
6. Determination of questions of jurisdiction, 
generally 
Comp. Laws 1888, § 3537, requires actions in 
a justice court to be begun and tried in the 
precinct or city of defendant's residence, unless 
there be no justice court therein; and section 
3595 provides for dismissal without prejudice 
when it is objected at the trial and appears by 
the evidence that the action is brought in the 
wrong county, precinct, or city. Held, that de-
fendant need not specially appear to move for 
such dismissal, but may object by answer, and 
prove the facts on the trial. Kansas City Hard-
ware Co. v. Nielson, 1894, 10 Utah 27, 36 P. 
131. Justices Of The Peace <&=> 61 
7. Place of holding court 
Under express provisions of Comp. Laws 
1907, § 687, where more than one precinct is 
embraced in a town, the justices of such pre-
cincts may hold court in any part of the touTi 
State v Maughan, 1909, 35 Utah 426, 100 P 
934. Justices Of The Peace <2> 71 
8. Change of venue 
Under Comp. St. 1907, § 3668, prescribing 
where actions in justices' courts shall be com-
menced and section 3669, providing for chang-
ing place of trial where suit is brought in wrong 
precinct, justice does not lose jurisdiction o\er 
suit brought before him in wrong precinct until 
affidavit setting forth facts as required by sec-
tion 3669 is filed. Beck v. Lewis, 1917, 49 Utah 
368, 164 P. 480. Justices Of The Peace &=> 
73(1) 
§ 7 8 - 5 - 1 0 4 . Jurisdiction 
(1) Justice courts have jurisdiction over class B and C misdemeanors, viola-
tion of ordinances, and infractions committed within their territorial jurisdic-
tion, except those offenses over which the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdic-
tion. 
(2) Justice courts have jurisdiction of small claims cases under Title 78, 
Chapter 6, Small Claims Courts, if the defendant resides in or the debt arose 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the justice court. 
Laws 1989, c. 157, § 13; Laws 1991, c. 268, § 39; Laws 1993, c. 159, § 11; Laws 1997, 
c215, § 16, eff. July 1, 1997. 
Cross Re fe r ences 
Transfer of small claims cases, see Jud. Admin., Rule 4-801. 
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§ 78-5—106.5 . Justice court judge administrative responsibilities H 
(1) Justice court judges shall comply with and ensure that court person 
comply with applicable county or municipal rules and regulations related l£ 
personnel, budgets, and other administrative functions. qj 
(2) Failure by the judge to comply with applicable administrative county^ 
municipal rules and regulations may be referred, by the county executive Of 
municipal legislative body, to the state Justice Court Administrator. i 3 
(3) Compliance with appropriate administrative requirements shall be coo» 
sidered as part of the Judicial Council's judicial performance evaluation pro* 
gram for justice court judges. 
(4) Repeated or willful noncompliance may be referred, by the county execu* 
tive or municipal legislative body, to the Judicial Conduct Commission. 
Laws 2003, c. 51, § 2, eff. May 5, 2003. 
Library References 
Justices of the Peace <$=>21, 20, 10. C J.S. Justices of the Peace §§ 9, 13 to 14. 
We^tlaw Key Number Searches: 231k21, 
231k20, 231kl0 
§ 7 8 - 5 - 1 0 7 . Place of holding court 
(l)(a) County justice court judges may hold court in any municipality within 
the precinct but may exercise only the jurisdiction provided by law for county 
justice courts. 
(b) County justice court judges may also, at the direction of the county 
legislative body, hold court anywhere in the county as needed but may only 
hear cases arising within the precinct. 
(2) A municipal justice court judge shall hold court in the municipality where 
the court is located and, as directed by the municipal governing body, at the 
county jail or municipal prison. 
Laws 1989, c. 157, § 16; Laws 1991, c. 92, § 1; Laws 1993, c. 5, § 1; Laws 1993,,c. 
227, § 390. 
Library References 
Criminal Law <3=>254.1. C.J.S. Justices of the Peace § 59. 
Justices of the Peace <S=>71 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 231k71; 
110k254.1. 
§ 7 8 - 5 - 1 0 8 . Trial facilities—Hours of business 
(1) A justice court judge shall conduct all official court business in a court-
room or office located in a public facility which is conducive and appropriate to 
the administration of justice. 
(2) Each county, city, or town shall provide adequate courtroom and auxilia-
ry space for the justice court. The facility need not be specifically constructed 
for or allocated solely for the justice court if existing facilities adequately serve 
the purposes of the justice court. 
336 
Utah Code Annotated 
§78-5-110 
JUSTICE COUKia 
(3) County and municipal justice courts shall be open and judicial business 
shall be transacted. 
(a) &v e days per week, tor 
(b) no less than four days per week for at least 11 hours per day. 
(4) The legislative body of the county, city, or town shall establish operating 
hours for the justice courts withm the requirements of Subsection (3) and the 
code of judicial administration 
(5) The hour s the courts are open shall be posted conspicuously at the courts 
and in local public buildings 
(6) The clerk of the court and judges of county and municipal courts shall 
attend the court at regularly scheduled times 
Laws 1989, c 157, § 17, Laws 2004, c 245, § 1, eff May 3, 2004 
Library References 
Clerks of Courts ®=>64 1 C J S Courts §§ 7, 121, 249 254 
Courts <S=>72, 73 c J S Justices of the Peace § 59 
Justices of the Peace <S=>71 
Westlaw Key Number Searches 106k72, 
106k73, 231k71 79k64 1 
§ 7 8 - 5 - 1 0 9 . Laws, ordinances, and reference materials provided by coun-
ties, cities, and towns 
Each county, city, or town shall provide and keep current for each justice 
court in its jurisdiction a copy of the motor vehicle laws of Utah, appropriate 
copies of the Utah code, the justice court manual published by the state court 
administrator, state laws affecting local government, the county, city, or town 
ordinances, and other legal reference materials as determined to be necessaiy 
by the judge 
Laws 1989, c 157, § 18 
Library References 
Counties <3=137 C J S Counties § 175 
Courts<S=>73 C J S Courts § 7 
^Municipal Corporations ^ 2 6 2
 CJS M u n a l Corporations §§ 955 to 956 
Westlaw Key Number Searches 106k73 v v 
> 104kl37, 268k262 
5 7 8 - 5 - 1 1 0 . Compensation and expenses—Clerical personnel 
(1) The county, city, or town creating or maintaining a justice court shall 
Provide and compensate clerical personnel to conduct the business of the court 
l * W The selection, supervision, and discipline of court clerical personnel shall 
^ *° accordance with local government personnel policies 
^ ( 3 ) Clerical personnel are governed by Title 52, Chapter 3, regarding employ-
ment of relatives 
\V The county, city, or town assumes the cost of travel and training expenses 
IpSfrical personnel at training sessions conducted by the Judicial Council 
HP* 1989, c 157, § 19, Laws 2003, c 51, § 3, eff May 5, 2003 
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(X) County and municipal justice courts shall be open and judicial business 
•hall be transacted: 
(a) five days per week; or 
fo) no less than four days per week for at least 11 hours per day. 
(A) The legislative body of the county, city, or town shall establish operating 
k rs for the justice courts within the requirements of Subsection (3) and the 
(pSde of judicial administration. 
/e\ fne hours the courts are open shall be posted conspicuously at the courts 
j |nd in local public buildings. 
16) The clerk of the court and judges of county and municipal courts shall 
attend the court at regularly scheduled times. 
]UWS 1989, c. 157, § 17; Laws 2004, c. 245, § 1, eff. May 3, 2004. 
Library References 
Clerks of Courts <s=>64 1 C J S Courts §§ 7, 121, 249, 254 
Courts «»72, 73. C J S Justices of the Peace § 59 
Justices of the Peace <s»71 
Wcstlaw Key Number Searches 106k72, 
!06k73; 231k71, 79k64 1 
§ 7 8 - 5 - 1 0 9 . Laws, ordinances, and reference materials provided by coun-
ties, cities, and towns 
Each county, city, or town shall provide and keep current for each justice 
court in its jurisdiction a copy of the motor vehicle laws of Utah, appropriate 
copies of the Utah code, the justice court manual published by the state court 
idministrator, state laws affecting local government, the county, city, or town 
ordinances, and other legal reference materials as determined to be necessary 
by the judge. 
Laws 1989, c. 157, § 18. 
Library References 
Counties <S=137 C J S Counties § 175 
Courts e-73 C J S Courts § 7 
^ ^
C i p a l
^
0 i P M a t l ° u n S ^ 2 6 2 u m , i ^ C J S Municipal Corporations §§ 955 to 956 
Wcstlaw Key Number Searches 106k73, v v 
104kl37; 268k262 
§78-5-110. Compensation and expenses—Clerical personnel 
(l)The county, city, or town creating or maintaining a justice court shall 
provide and compensate clerical personnel to conduct the business of the court. 
(2) The selection, supervision, and discipline of court clerical personnel shall 
w in accordance with local government personnel policies. 
, 0 ) Clerical personnel are governed by Title 52, Chapter 3, regarding emplov-
Btent of relatives. 
it I . e c o u nty> city, or town assumes the cost of travel and training expenses 
ppjgpcal personnel at training sessions conducted by the Judicial Council. 
|f*M989, c. 157, § 19, Laws 2003, c. 51, § 3, eff. May 5, 2003 
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Library References 
Counties 0=137 C J S Counties § 175 
Couits c=>55 C J S Courts §§ 107 to 109 
Municipal Corporations C=>262
 n T c » , , n 
WesUaw Key Number Searches 104kl37, C J S Municipal Corporations §§ 9 „ u , ^ 
26bk262 106k55 
§ 7 8 - 5 - 1 1 1 . Justice court staff to be provided 
(1) Each county, city, or town creating and maintaining a justice court shaS 
provide 
(a) sufficient staff public prosecutors to attend the court and perform tht 
duties of prosecution before the justice court, 
(b) adequate funding for the costs of defense for persons charged with ft 
public offense who are determined by the court to be indigent under Title77, 
Chapter 32, and 
(c) sufficient local peace officers to attend the justice court when required 
and provide security for the court 
(2) The county attorney or district attorney may appoint city prosecutors ai 
deputies to prosecute state offenses in municipal justice courts 
Laws 1989 c 157 § 20, Laws 1993, c 38, § 115, Laws 1998, c 282, § 81, eff May 4. 
1998 
Library References 
Counties C=> 137 C J S Counties § 175 
Courts c=>71 C J S District and Prosecuting Attorney! 
District and Prosecuting Attorneys 0=^3(1) §§ 49 ^0 52 57 
W ^ S T u X t e a c h e s 104,137, C J S ^ ^ C^™ § § < 
268K262 131k3(l) 106k71 
§ 7 8 - 5 - 1 1 2 . Repealed by Laws 1992, c. 219, § 19, eff. July 1, 1992 
§ 7 8 - 5 - 1 1 3 . Process to any part of the state—Service 
(1) Piocess from a justice court may be issued to any place m the state. ~j 
(2) Subpoenas in any action or proceeding of a justice court may be issued to 
any place in the state 
(3) All warrants issued by a justice court for violation of any state * a v l % 
local ordinance within a court's jurisdiction are directed to the sheriff, &n& 
constable of the county, or to the marshal or city police of the town or City* 
Laws 1989 c 157, § 22 
Library References 
Justices of the Peace 0 7 8 C J S Justices of the Peace § 66 
Witnesses <>9
 c j s Witnesses §§ 2, 20 to 22 25 
Westlaw Key Number Searches 231k78 
410k9 
§§ 78-5-114, 78-5-115. Repealed by Laws 1991, c. 268, § 49, eff- J*MI 
1992 
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H^flr-5-116. Disposition of fines 
mfi\i Except as otherwise specified by this section, fines and forfeitures collect-
i tp/
 fi justice court shall be remitted, 1/2 to the treasurer of the local 
Timent responsible for the court and 1/2 to the treasurer of the local 
'^rnment which prosecutes or which would prosecute the violation. 
B0Y6J ** 
t»(s) For violation of Title 23, the court shall allocate 85% to the Division of 
tttldlife Resources and 15% to the general fund of the city or county govern-
w n t responsible for the justice court 
hl$(b) F° r violation of Title 41, Chapter 22, Off-highway Vehicles, or Title 73, 
llfehapter 18, State Boating Act, the court shall allocate 85% to the Division of 
fflarks
 a n d Recreation and 15% to the general fund of the city or county 
government responsible for the justice court. 
i'll) The surcharge established by Section 63-63a-l shall be paid to the state 
fifeasurer. 
(4) Fines, fees, court costs, and forfeitures collected by a municipal or county 
lustlce court for a violation of Section 72-7-404 or 72-7-406 regarding maxi-
mum! weight limitations and overweight permits, minus court costs not to 
Jaeced the schedule adopted by the Judicial Council, shall be paid to the state 
ftfcasurer and distributed to the class B and C road account. 
jfe(5) Revenue deposited in the class B and C road account pursuant to 
Subsection (4) is supplemental to the money appropriated under Section 
72-2—107 but shall be expended in the same manner as other class B and C 
road funds. 
#(6) Until July 1, 2007, fines and forfeitures collected by the court for a 
Isolation of Subsection 41-1 a-1303(2) related to registration of vehicles after 
establishing residency shall be remitted. 
(a) 50% to the state or local governmental entity which issued the citation 
%
 for a violation to be used for law enforcement purposes, and 
(b) 50% in accordance with Subsection (1). 
Um 1989, c. 157, § 25, Laws 1991, c 138, § 2, Laws 1991, c 212, § 7, Laws 1991, c 
268, § 41; Laws 1998, c 270, § 353, eff March 21, 1998, Laws 2004, c 273, § 2, eff 
Jttly 1. 2004; Laws 2004, c 349, § 7, eff July 1, 2004 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
jgCttnposite section by the Office of Legislative 
IjJJfcarth and General Counsel of Laws 2004, c 
?73<§ 2 and Laws 2004, c 349, § 7 
Cross References 
™*jl and forfeitures, distribution and allocation, see § 63-63a-2 
pujc mitigation surcharge, distribution of monies, see § 63-63b-102 
Library References 
»«»20. 
tftttlaw Key Number Search 174k20 
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mQtL^\29> Compensation—Annual review and adjustment 
t \ The governing body of each municipality or county shall annually review 
Jd may a dJu s t the c o m P e n s a t i o n Pa id-
rcl The salary fixed for a justice court judge may not be diminished during 
k / rm for which the judge has been appointed or elected. |jp£ tern 
tX\ A copy of the resolution, ordinance, or other document fixing the salary 
t the iustice court judge and any adjustments to the document shall be 
JT \hed to the state court administrator by the governing body of the munici-
pality or county. 
^ 1 9 8 9 , 0 . 157, § 3 8 . 
Library References 
Ittiticcs of the Peace ®=»14 
*W«StlaW Key Number Search: 231kl4 
CJ.S. Justices of the Peace § 15 
ft 78-5-130. Monthly reports to court administrator and governing body 
(1) Every justice court judge shall file monthly with the state court adminis-
trator a report of the judicial business of the judge. The report shall be on 
forms supplied by the state court administrator. 
(2) The report shall state the number of criminal and small claims actions 
Wed, the dispositions entered, and other information as specified in the forms. 
(3) A copy of the report shall be furnished by the justice court judge to the 
governing body in the municipality or county, or to the person or office in the 
county, city, or town designated by the governing body. 
Laws 1989, c. 157, § 39. 
Library References 
Justices of the Peace @=>21 
Wcstlaw Key Number Search 23 lk21 
CJ.S. Justices of the Peace § 14 
§ 78-5-131. Repealed by Laws 1993, c. 1, § 164, eff. Jan. 28, 1993 
§ 78-5-132. Term of office for county court 
(lj(a) The term of a county justice court judge is four years beginning the 
first Monday in February 1991. 
(b) Judges holding office when this act takes effect or appointed to fill any 
vacancy hold office until reappointed or a successor is appointed and certi-
fied by the Judicial Council. 
(2)(a) The term of office of a municipal justice court judge is four years, 
beginning the first Monday in February 1992. 
(b) Judges holding office when this section takes effect or appointed to fill 
*ny vacancy hold office until reappointed or a successor is appointed and 
Certified by the Judicial Council. 
kws 1989, c. 157, § 41, Laws 1993, c. 1, § 162. 
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Library References 
Justices of the Peace <&=>8 
Westlaw Key Number Search 231k8 
C J S Justices of the Peace § 8 
§ 7 8 - 5 - 1 3 3 . Repealed by Laws 1993, c. 1, § 164, efif. Jan. 28, 1993 
§ 7 8 - 5 - 1 3 4 . Justice court judges to be appointed—Procedure—Report to 
Judicial Council—Retention election—Vacancy 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Appointing authority" means: 
(i) the chair of the county commission in counties having the county 
commission form of county government; 
(ii) the county executive in counties having the county executive-council 
form of government; 
(iii) the chair of the city commission, city council, or town council1]*! 
municipalities having the traditional management arrangement established 
by Title 10, Chapter 3, Part 1, Governing Body; 
(iv) the city manager, in the council-manager optional form of govern* 
ment defined in Section 10-3-1209; and 
(v) the mayor, in the council-mayor optional form of government defined 
in Section 10-3-1209. 
(b) "Local legislative body" means: 
(I) the county commission or county council; and 
(ii) the city commission, city council, or town council. 
(2) Justice court judges shall be appointed by the appointing authority and 
confirmed by a majority vote of the local legislative body. 
(3)(a) After a newly appointed justice court judge has been confirmed,^ 
local legislative body shall report the confirmed judge's name to the JudiCiw 
Council. 
(b) The Judicial Council shall certify the judge as qualified to hold offic|* 
upon successful completion of the orientation program and upon the written 
opinion of the county or municipal attorney that the judge meets the statutoij, 
qualifications for office. 
(c) A justice court judge may not perform judicial duties until certified o« 
the Judicial Council. 
(4) Upon the expiration of a county justice court judge's term of office u» , 
judge shall be subject to an unopposed retention election in accordance wi « 
the procedures set forth in Section 20A-12-201. j 
(5) Upon the expiration of a municipal justice court judge's term or °H;;SJN 
municipal justice court judge shall be reappointed absent a showing or g «. 
cause by the appointing authority. 
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Library References 
Justices of the Peace <3=>8 
Westlaw Key Number Search 23 lk8 
C J S Justices of the Peace § 8 
§ 7 8 - 5 - 1 3 3 . Repealed by Laws 1993, c. 1, § 164, eff. Jan. 28, 1993 
§ 7 8 - 5 - 1 3 4 . Justice court judges to be appointed—Procedure—Report to 
Judicial Council—Retention election—Vacancy 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Appointing authority" means: 
(I) the chair of the county commission in counties having the county 
commission form of county government; 
(n) the county executive in counties having the county executive-council 
form of government; 
(ui) the chair of the city commission, city council, or town council fa| 
municipalities having the traditional management arrangement established 
by Title 10, Chapter 3, Part 1, Governing Body; 
(IV) the city manager, in the council-manager optional form of govern-
ment defined in Section 10-3-1209; and 
(v) the mayor, in the council-mayor optional form of government defined 
in Section 10-3-1209. 
(b) "Local legislative body" means: 
(l) the county commission or county council; and 
(ii) the city commission, city council, or town council. 
(2) Justice court judges shall be appointed by the appointing authority and 
confirmed by a majority vote of the local legislative body. 
(3)(a) After a newly appointed justice court judge has been confirmed,,tlie 
local legislative body shall report the confirmed judge's name to the Judicial 
Council 
(b) The Judicial Council shall certify the judge as qualified to hold o^rf 
upon successful completion of the orientation program and upon the written 
opinion of the county or municipal attorney that the judge meets the statutory 
qualifications for office. 
(c) A justice court judge may not perform judicial duties until certified Pj 
the Judicial Council. 
(4) Upon the expiration of a county justice court judge's term of office u* 
judge shall be subject to an unopposed retention election in accordance Wl * 
the procedures set forth in Section 20A-12-201. 
(5) Upon the expiration of a municipal justice court judge's term of o ^ c . 
municipal justice court judge shall be reappointed absent a showing or g 
cause by the appointing authority. 
354 
COURTS § 78-5-135 
* \ jf
 an appointing authority asserts good cause to not reappoint a 
nicipal justice court judge, at the request of the judge, the good cause shall 
Presented at a formal hearing of the local legislative body. 
L\ Tke local legislative body shall determine by majority vote whether 
Jawed cause exists not to reappoint the municipal justice court judge. 
cc) The decision of the local legislative body is not subject to appeal. 
/ j \ j n determining whether good cause exists to not reappoint a municipal 
justice
 Court judge, the appointing authority and local legislative body shall 
consider: 
(i) whether or not the judge has been certified as meeting the evaluation 
criteria for judicial performance established by the Judicial Council; and 
(ii) any other factors considered relevant by the appointing authority. 
(6) Before reappointment or retention election, each justice court judge shall 
be evaluated in accordance with the performance evaluation program estab-
lished in Subsection 78-3-21(4). 
(7)(a) At the conclusion of a term of office or when a vacancy occurs in the 
position of justice court judge, the appointing authority may contract with a 
justice court judge in the county or an adjacent county to serve as justice court 
Judge. 
if* (b) The contract shall be for the duration of the justice court judge's term 
of office. 
(8) Vacancies in the office of justice court judge shall be filled as provided in 
Section 20A-1-506. 
Uws 1989, c. 157, § 43; Laws 1991, c. 244, § 4; Laws 1993, c. 1, § 163; Laws 1993, c. 
139, § 12; Laws 1996, c. 243, § 192, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 254, § 4, eff. 
Jan. 1,1997; Laws 1997, c. 10, § 143, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 313, § 3, eff. July 
1,1998; Laws 2001, c. 71, § 2, eff. April 30, 2001. 
Library References 
Justices of the Peace &*2>, 8 CJ.S. Justices of the Peace §§ 6, 8 
Wcstlaw Key Number Searches 231k3, 
231k8. 
9 78-5-135. Funds collected—Deposits and reports—Special account—Ac-
counting 
(l)(a) Municipal justice courts shall deposit public funds in accordance with 
Section 51-4-2 
(b) The treasurer shall report to the city recorder the sums collected and 
deposited. The recorder shall then apportion and remit the collected pro-
ceeds as provided in Section 78-5-116. 
(c) The municipality shall retain all small claims filing fees including the 
governmental filing fee for actions filed by the municipality as provided in 
Section 78-6-14. 
(2)(a) County justice courts shall deposit public funds in accordance with 
Section 51-4-2. 
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JUSTICE COURTS § 78-5-135 
(a) If an appointing authority asserts good cause to not reappoint a 
municipal justice court judge, at the request of the judge, the good cause shall 
be presented at a formal hearing of the local legislative body. 
(b) The local legislative body shall determine by majority vote whether 
good cause exists not to reappoint the municipal justice court judge. 
(c) The decision of the local legislative body is not subject to appeal. 
(d) In determining whether good cause exists to not reappoint a municipal 
justice court judge, the appointing authority and local legislative body shall 
consider: 
(i) whether or not the judge has been certified as meeting the evaluation 
criteria for judicial performance established by the Judicial Council; and 
(ii) any other factors considered relevant by the appointing authority. 
(£) Before reappointment or retention election, each justice court judge shall 
be evaluated in accordance with the performance evaluation program estab-
lished in Subsection 78-3-21(4). 
(7)(a) At the conclusion of a term of office or when a vacancy occurs in the 
position of justice court judge, the appointing authority may contract with a 
justice court judge in the county or an adjacent county to serve as justice court 
judge. 
(b) The contract shall be for the duration of the justice court judge's term 
of office. 
(8) Vacancies in the office of justice court judge shall be filled as provided in 
Section 20A-1-506. 
Laws 1989, c. 157, § 43; Laws 1991, c. 244, § 4; Laws 1993, c. 1, § 163; Laws 1993, c. 
159, § 12; Laws 1996, c. 243, § 192, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 254, § 4, eff. 
Jan. 1, 1997; Laws 1997, c. 10, § 143, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 313, § 3, eff. July 
1,1998; Laws 2001, c. 71, § 2, eff. April 30, 2001. 
Library References 
Justices of the Peace <3^3, 8 CJ .S . Justices of the Peace §§ 6, 8 
Wcstlaw Key Number Searches: 231k3; 
231k8 
8 7 8 - 5 - 1 3 5 . Funds collected—Deposits and reports—Special account—Ac-
counting 
(l)(a) Municipal justice courts shall deposit public funds in accordance with 
Section 51-4-2. 
(b) The treasurer shall report to the city recorder the sums collected and 
deposited. The recorder shall then apportion and remit the collected pro-
ceeds as provided in Section 78-5-116. 
|$\c) The municipality shall retain all small claims filing fees including the 
SOVerrimental filing fee for actions filed by the municipality as provided in 
Paction 78-6-14. 
WW County justice courts shall deposit public funds in accordance with 
^tion 51-4-2. 
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NUISANCE, WASTE, & OTHER DAMAGE § 7 8 - 3 8 - 1 0 
Research References 
Forms 
Land Use Prac. & Forms. Handling Land Use 
Case § 16 1, Definition 
§ 78-38—9. Nuisance—Right of action to abate nuisances—Drug houses 
and drug dealing—Gambling—Group criminal activity—Prostitution— 
Weapons 
(1) Every building or place is a nuisance where: 
(a) the unlawful sale, manufacture, service, storage, distribution, dispens-
ing, or acquisition occurs of any controlled substance, precursor, or analog 
specified in Title 58, Chapter 37, Controlled Substances; 
(b) gambling is permitted to be played, conducted, or dealt upon as 
prohibited in Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 11, Gambling, which creates the 
conditions of a nuisance as defined in Subsection 78-38-1(1); 
(c) criminal activity is committed in concert with two or more persons as 
j provided in Section 76-3-203.1; 
(d) parties occur frequently which create the conditions of a nuisance as 
defined in Subsection 78-38-1(1); 
" '(e) prostitution or promotion of prostitution is regularly carried on by one 
or more persons as provided in Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13, Prostitution, 
- and 
J
 (f) a violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5, Weapons, occurs on the 
i premises. 
(2) It is a defense to nuisance under Subsection (l)(a) if the defendant can 
prove that the defendant is lawfully entitled to possession of a controlled 
substance. 
(3) Sections 78-38-10 through 78-38-16 govern only an abatement bv evic-
tion of the nuisance as defined in Subsection (1). 
Laws 1992, c. 141, § 7, Laws 1996, c 69, § 2, eff April 29, 1996, Laws 1999, c 136, 
§ 1, eff. May 3, 1999. 
Cross References 
Forcible entry and detainer, judgment for restitution, damages, and rent, see § 78-36-10 
Forcible entry and detainer, time for appeal, see § 78-36-11 
injunctions, generally, see Rules Civ Proc , Rule 65A 
Nuisance^pffenses, criminal code, see § 76-10-801 et seq 
Jjjkances, brothels, see § 47-1-1 et seq 
wtojvfal detainer by tenant, see § 78-36-3 
Library References 
|Huiiance,<S=>3, 19, 25 C J S Nuisances §§ 10 to 14, 18, 20 to 23, 25, 
««stlaW Key Number Searches 279k3, 28 to 45, 48 to 57, 59 to 60, 62, 92 to 97, 
$79kl9; 279k25 99, 102 to 106 
Jp38-10. Nuisance—Abatement by eviction 
UHWhenever there is reason to believe that a nuisance under Sections 
3<M) through 78-38-16 is kept, maintained, or exists in any county, the 
617 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 26 
Rule 26. Written orders, judgments and decrees. 
(a) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter 
time as the court may direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity with the ruling. 
(b) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be served upon opposing 
counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be 
submitted to the court and counsel within five days after service. 
(c) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in such a manner as to show whether they are entered based on a 
ruling after a hearing or argument, the stipulation of counsel, the motion of counsel or upon the court's own initiative, and 
shall identify the attorneys of record in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or decree is made. If the 
order, judgment, or decree is the result of a hearing, the order shall include the date of the hearing, the nature of the 
hearing, and the names of the attorneys and parties present at the hearing. 
(d) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate documents and shall not include any matters by reference 
unless otherwise directed by the court. Orders not constituting judgments or decrees may be made a part of the documents 
containing the stipulation or motion upon which the order is based. 
(e) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation shall be signed or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, 
signed by the attorneys of record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or the stipulation was made on the 
record . 
Utah Rules of Judicial Conduct Canon 2 
Canon 2. A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. 
A. A judge shall respect and comply with the law and should exhibit conduct that promotes public confidence in the integrity 
and impartiality of the judiciary. 
B. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence the judge's judicial conduct or judgment. A judge 
shall not lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance the private interests of others; nor shall a judge convey or permit 
others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. A judge shall not testify voluntarily 
as a character witness but may provide honest references in the regular course of business or social life. 
C. A judge shall not belong to any organization, other than a religious organization, which practices invidious discrimination 
on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin. 
Hyde Park City Ordinance 10-332 
c 
P A R T 
PART 
1 0 - 3 2 0 . A8ATEMEOTOFWEED8ANDDELETER.0U8 
OBJECTS 
\ 10-321. REAL PROPERTY TO BE KEPT CLEAN. It 
shall be an infraction for any person owning or occupying real 
property to allow weed* to prow higher on such property than ia 
permitted by this part or not to remove from mich property any 
cuttings of such weeds or any refuse, unsightly or deleterious 
objects after having been given notice from the health director as 
hereinafter provided. 
10-322. WEEDS - DEFINED. Weeds shall include any 
vegetation commonly referred to as & weed, or which shall have 
been designated a noxious weed by the Utah commissioner of 
agriculture; 
10-323, STANDARDS OF WEED CONTROL 
A It is hereby declared that the above stated weeds constitute a 
nuisance when they: 
1. Create a fire Hazard, a source of contamination, or 
pollution of the water, sir or property, a danger to health, a 
breeding place or habitation for insects or rodents or other 
forms of life deleterious to humans or are unsightly or 
deleterious to their surroundings. 
B, The cut weeds Bhall be removed from the premises within 
. hours after cutting. 
10-330. NUISANCES ON PROFERTY. 
1G-3SL DEFINITION OF NUISANCE. For the purpose of 
this part the term "nuisance" is defined to mean any condition of 
use of premises or of building exteriors which are deleterious or 
injurious, noxious or unsightly which includes, but is not limited to 
keeping or depositing on
 f or scattering over the premises any of the 
following: 
A. Lumber, junk, trash, or debris, * 
s. B. Abandoned, discarded or unused objects or equipment such as 
furniture, stoves, refrigerators, freezers, cans or containers, 
/ O 0 - 3 3 2 . DUTY OFMAINTENANCE OF PRIVATE PROF-
t ERTY, No person owning, leasing, occupying ox having charge 
J of any premises shall maintain or keep any nuisance thereon, nor 
\ shall any such person keep or maintain such premises in a manner 
causing substantial diminution in the value of the other property 
in the neighborhood in which such premises are located. 
* Utah Leaf** oi Clti*# and T<miiA - 12/77 
Hyde Park City Ordinance 10-300 through 10-343 
PART 10-320. ABATEMENT OF WEE&S/ND DELETERIOUS 
OBJECTS. 
10-321. REAL PROPERTY TO BE KEPT CLEAN. It 
shall be an infraction for any person owning or occupying real 
property to allow weeds to grow higher on such property than is 
permitted by this part or not to remove from such property any 
cuttings of such weeds or any refuse, unsightly or deleterious 
objects after having been given notice from the health director as 
hereinafter provided. 
10-322. WEEDS - DEFINED. - Weeds shall include any 
vegetation commonly referred to as a weed, or which shall have 
been designated a noxious weed by the TJtah commissioner of 
agriculture. 
10-323. STANDARDS OF WEED CONTROL 
A. It is hereby declared that the above stated weeds constitute a 
nuisance when they: 
1. Create a fire hazard, a source of contamination, or 
pollution of the water, air or property, a danger to health, a 
breeding place or habitation for insects or rodents or other 
forms of life deleterious to humans or are unsightly or 
deleterious to their surroundings 
B The cut weeds shall be removed from the premises within 
48 hours after cutting. 
PART 10-330. NUISANCES ON PROPERTY. 
10-331. DEFINITION OF NUISANCE. For the purpose of 
this part the term "nuisance" is defined to mean any condition of 
use of premises or of building exteriors which are deleterious or 
injurious, noxious or unsightly which includes, but is not limited to 
keeping or depositing on, or scattering over the premises any of the 
following: 
A. Lumber, junk, trash, or debris.v 
B. Abandoned, discarded or unused objects or equipment such as 
furniture, stoves, refrigerators, freezers, cans or containers 
10-332. DUTY OF MAINTENANCE OF PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY. No person owning, leasing, occupying or having charge 
of any premises shall maintain or keep any nuisance thereon, nor 
shall any such person keep or maintain such premises in a manner 
causing substantial diminution in the value of the other property 
in the neighborhood in which such premises are located. 
£ Utah League of Cities and Towns — 12/77 
c 
10-333. STORAGE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. U 
sheltered storage of old, unused, stripped and junked machiner 
implements, equipment or personal property of any kind which 
no longer safely usable for the purposes for which it w< 
manufactured, for a period of 30 days or more (except in keens* 
junk yards) wi thm this municipality, is hereby declared to be 
nuisance and dangerous to the public safety 
1 0 - 3 3 4 . A B A T E M E N T O F N U I S A N C E B Y O W N E R S . 
The owner, owners, tenants , lessees or occupants of a n y lot with] 
this municipality on which such storage as defined in tl 
foregoing section 10-333 is made, and also the owner, owners < 
lessees of the above described personal property involved in sue 
storage shall jointly and severally abate such nuisance by I 
prompt removal into completely enclosed and secured buildings i 
be used for such purposes, or otherwise to remove such propert 
from the municipali ty 
P A R T 1 0 - 3 4 0 . D A N G E R O U S B U I L D I N G S . 
1 0 - 3 4 1 . A D O P T I O N O F A C O D E F O R T H E A B A T E M E N 
O F D A N G E R O U S B U I L D I N G S . The "Uniform Code for tr 
Abatement of Dangerous Buildings," 1976 edition, printed as 
code in book form by the International Conference of Buildir 
Officials (providing for a jubt, equitable and practicable methc 
whereby buildings or structures which from any cause endangi 
the life, limb, heal th , morals property, safety or welfare of tl 
general public or their occupants, may be required to be repaire 
vacated, or demolished), three copies of which have been filed f( 
use and examinat ion by the public in the office of the clerk of th 
municipality, is hereby approved and adopted as the Abatement < 
Dangerous Buildings Code ot this municipality 
1 0 - 3 4 2 . A P P L I C A T I O N The provisions of the Abatemer 
of Dangerous Buildings Code shall apply to all dangerou 
buildings as therein defined which now exist or which may exr 
or hereafter be constructed in this municipality 
1 0 - 3 4 3 . A L T E R A T I O N S , A D D I T I O N S A N D R E P A I R S . 
All buildings or structures w hich are required to be repaired und( 
the provisions of the Abatement of Dangerous Buildings Cod 
shall be subject to the provisions of subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), (e 
and (I) of Section 104 of the Uniform Building Code 
Utah League of Cities and Towns — 12/77 
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1 0 - 3 5 0 . C O L L E C T I O N BY LAW S U I T . In the event collec-
tion of expenses of destruction and removal are pursued through 
^the courts, (he municipality shall sue for and receive judgment for 
all of said expenses of destruction and removal, together with 
reasonable a t torneys ' fees, interest and court costs, and shall 
execute upon such judgment in the manner provided by law. 
1 0 - 3 5 7 . C O L L E C T I O N T H R O U G H T A X E S . In the event 
tha t the inspector elects to refer the expenses of destruction or 
removal to the county treasurer for inclusion in the tax notice of the 
property owner, he shall make in triplicate an itemized s ta tement 
of all expenses incurred in the destruction and removal of the 
same, and shall deliver the three copies of the s ta tement to the 
county treasurer within ten days after the completion of the work 
of destroying or removing such weeds, refuse, garbage, objects or 
structures. Thereupon, the costs of the work shall be pursued by the 
county treasurer in accordance with the provisions of section 10-
M-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, and the recalcitrant 
owner shall have such rights and shall be subject to such powers as 
are thereby granted. 
1 0 - 3 5 8 . C R I M I N A L P R O C E E D I N G . The commencement 
of cr iminal proceedings for the purpose of imposing penalties for 
violations of this chapter shall not be conditioned upon prior 
issuance of a notice or the grant ing to the defendant of an 
opportunity to aba te or remove the nuisance. The provisions of this 
chapter relating to notice and abatement shall be deemed merely 
a l ternat ive and addit ional methods of securing conformity to the 
provisions of this chapter . 
l O - 3 5 9 / y P E N A L T Y F O R F A I L U R E TO C O M P L Y . 
A. Any owner, occupant or person having an interest in the 
property subject to this chapter who shall fail to comply with 
the notice or order given pursuant to this chapter shall be 
guilty of a class C misdemeanor for each offense and further 
sum of $ 5 0 . 0 0 for each and every day such 
failure to comply continues beyond the date fixed for compli-
ance. 
B. Compliance by any owner, occupant or person to whom a 
notice has been given as provided in this chapter shall not be 
admissable in a n y criminal proceeding brought pursuant to 
this section. 
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fine sur cognizance de droit, comme ceo que il ad de son done 
wtS*rt A money payment from a tenant to the 
iflJaii t 's lord 
^
 P
 mmon fine. A sum of money due from a 
f° ant to a lord to defray the cost of a court 
r f t
 o r to allow the litigants to try the action 
l 9PT to home — Also termed head-silver 
L A pecuniary criminal punishment or civil 
^ j t y payable to the public treasury — fine, 
mxcessive fine. 1. Criminal law A fine that 
Unreasonably high and disproportionate to 
the offense committed • The Eighth Amend-
ment proscribes excessive fines An example 
<*f an excessive fine is a civil forfeiture in 
which the propeity was not an instrumentali-
st* of the crime and the worth of the property 
WW not proportional to the owner's culpabih 
(y, 2. A fine or penalty that seriously impairs 
jgtfi earning capacity, esp from a business 
hmh fine. Hist A fine levied withm the past 
ytar. 
ffe * 
U n i Wd Recovery Act. Hist A statute, enact 
^jM to 1833, that abolished the use of fines as a 
-flWibod of conveying title to land See FINE (l) 3 
| B l H l U f c h 74 
MjXnnullando levato de tenemento quod 
fdt de antiquo dommico (fl-nee a-na lan-
doh Wvay-to dee ten-a-men-toh kwod fyoo it 
Ipm-tl-kwoh da-min-a koh) [Latin "a fine to 
plJBnulled levied from a tenant which was of 
tit demesne"! Hist A writ for disannulling 
yance of land m ancient demesne to the 
f prejudice 
plendo pro terris (fl-nee kap-ee-en-doh 
'wMs). (Latin "a fine to be taken foi 
I Hist. A writ that an imprisoned felon 
i in some circumstances to obtain re 
9tn jail and to recover lands and goods 
|ttling imprisonment 
Uenation. Hist A fee paid by a tenant 
« upon the alienation of a feudal 
• substitution of a new tenant • It 
• by all tenants holding by knight's 
fcnants in capite by socage tenure — 
fined to fine 
iowment. Hist A fee paid by a 
Htenant to the tenant's lord • If not 
aow could not be endowed of her 
lid. 
| (ft-nom faysa-ree) [Latin] Hist 
•
a
 Composition or compromise, to 
relinquish a claim in exchange for consider-
ation 
"In the thirteenth centur} the king s justice^ \neld a 
wide and a common law power of ordering that an 
offender be kept in custod\ They have an equillv wide 
power of discharging him upon his making fine with the 
king We must observe the language of the time In 
strictness the> have no power to impobe a fine No 
tribunal of this period unless we are mistaken i=> evei 
said to impose a fine To oidei the offendei to pay so 
much money to the king — this the judge ma\ not do If 
he did it he would be breaking 01 evading the Great 
Charter for an amercement should be affeered not by 
royal justices but by neighbour^ of the wioni?doei 
What the judges can do 1*, this — they can pronounce a 
sentence of imprisonment ind then allow the ci lpnt to 
make fine that is to make an end (fineni factn of the 
matter by paying or finding secuntv foi a certain -um of 
money In theory the fine is a bilateral t ran-ut ion a 
bargain it is not imposed it is made 2 Frederick 
Pollock & Fredenc W Maitland The Histon < r r QII^II 
Law Before the Tune of Eduaid I 517 2d td 1899) 
2. To make a settlement of a penalty • Magna 
Carta (ch 55) specificallv limited "[a111 fines 
which were made with us unjustly and con-
trary to the law of the land " (\o\mnes 
fines qui injuste et contia legem ten at facti 
sunt nobiscum) 
fine non capiendo pro pulchre placitando 
(fl-nee non kap-ee-en doh proh pal-kiee plas a 
tan-doh) [Latin "a fine not to be taken foi 
pleading fairly"] Hist A writ piohibitin^ eouit 
officers from taking fines foi fair pleading d e , 
beaupleadei) 
fine p r in t . The part of an agieement oi docu 
ment — usu in small, light print that is not 
easily noticeable — refemng to disclaimeis, 
restrictions, or limitation^ 
fine pro redisseisma capiendo (fl nee pi oh re 
dis-see-zin-a kap ee en doh) |Law Latin "a 
fine to be taken for again disseising ') Hist A 
writ that entitled a person imprisoned foi twice 
dispossessing someone {ledisseisin) to ielease 
upon payment of a leasonable fine 
fines le roy (flnz la roy) [Law Fienchl Hibt 
The king's fines • A fine oi fee that \NJN paid 
to the monarch for an offense oi contempt 
fine sur cognizance de droit, comme ceo que 
il ad de son done (fin sai kon a zants da 
droyt , kom say oh kweel ad da sawn dawn) 
[Law French "a fine upon acknowledgment of 
the right, as that which he has of hi^ > gift" I 
Hist The most common fine of conveyance, by 
which the defendant (also called the defoitiant) 
acknowledged in court that he had alreadv con-
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premature since the ordinance does not allow for a sentence 
greater than allowed by state law. 
In ruling on this, let me read from my notes. The 
defendant's motion to dismiss and quash the conviction does 
not allege any wrongdoing on the part of the Hyde Park 
justice court. The defendant's motion only alleges that 
injustice happens in Utah justice courts. The defendant does 
not allege any wrongdoing on the part of Hyde Park's justice 
court and therefore defendant's argument is not relevant and 
moot. 
Further, the defendant has appealed the justice court 
decision to this court and therefore the justice court 
decision is moot at this point. Therefore, defendant's 
motion is denied. 
In regards to defendant's motion to dismiss, the court 
finds that the defendant has not overcome the long-standing 
presumptions regarding constitutionality. The court finds 
that plaintiff's ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague 
and therefore defendant's motion is denied. 
Counsel, will you prepare an order to that effect? 
MR. JENKINS: I will, Your Honor. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Very well. With that, counsel, it would 
appear that we need to set this matter for trial; is that 
correct? 
MR. LAURITZEN: Yes, please. 
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